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5Abstract
In this thesis I explore the effects of fiscal policy, on the main macroeconomic vari-
ables, particularly in the form of fiscal multipliers, mostly from an empirical but also
from a theoretical perspective. The second chapter explores several issues concerning
the workings of fiscal policy: the first is whether it is possible to identify proper spend-
ing shocks, overcoming potential problems caused by anticipation of policy from the
private sector; it turns out it is. The second issue is what are the effects of different
spending variables on the economy, and it turns out that civilian spending has beneficial
effects, while military investment leads to output contraction. The second issue, taken
up in chapter three, is to decipher the effects of both government spending and taxes
in the different phases of the business cycle. It turns out that useful public spending
has positive effects on economic activity, particularly in periods of low growth, and that
spending is more powerful to stabilize the economy than taxes. Proper policy action
appears to be necessary to make sense of the results. However, the current methods to
identify fiscal shocks have several shortcomings, and a method to achieve better identifi-
cation is proposed in chapter four. The econometric results verify that spending shocks
have positive effects on the economic activity, while tax shocks negative, and that the
spending multiplier appears to be bigger in absolute value than the tax multiplier, cast-
ing doubt on the relevance of several economic theories as well as policy prescriptions.
The size of both multipliers depends on policy. In addition, no deterioration over time
of the power of spending to stabilize the economy is visible. Finally, in chapter 5 a
simulation of a baseline DSGE model gives some guidelines on how policy may affect
economic outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
It is hard to overstate the practical importance of knowing what are actually the effects
of fiscal policy in the economy. As the recent crisis has shown, there are limitations to
the ability of central banks to stabilize the economy, and important fiscal action was
necessary in several countries in order to exit the recession; this is much more evident
in the case of EMU, where in some countries the crisis is far from over. However, the
way economists and policy makers think about the effects of fiscal policy is not uniform:
one may encounter totally different views, all claiming to be correct. In the last decade
there was a significant increase in the number of researchers trying to shed light on the
issue. It is only the last few years that a consensus seems to form, that fiscal policies
may have important effects on the economy and is a policy tool worth trying if needed.
A very important concept in macroeconomics, inherited from Keynesian theory, is
the one of the multipliers. It is the change in output generated by the change in the policy
variable, spending1 or taxes. Its size is of extreme importance: are spending multipliers
big enough to be worth using active fiscal policies in recessions? Which policy variable
has the highest multiplier is an extremely important question - should the government
increase spending or cut taxes in recessions? The size is also important to understand
how fiscal policy works: for example, a spending multiplier higher than one means that
private spending increases after a government spending increase, typically crowding in
consumption, while a multiplier lower than one signifies the opposite; a multiplier less
1Throughout this thesis spending is the expenditure on goods and services (government consumption
and/or investment, including wages), but not transfers, like pensions or unemployment benefits.
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than one might mean that the fiscal action under consideration should not be taken,
since such an action would probably reduce the welfare of society. These are probably
the most important issues in understanding the effects of fiscal policy. Estimating these
output multipliers is the most important issue in this thesis, and it is done in ways that
differ in several aspects from what has been typically done in the literature so far.
There are many important questions, especially for policy-making, concerning the
effects of fiscal policy on the economy, beyond those stated previously. One that has not
been answered so far, at least not thoroughly, is the following: what are the effects of
different spending variables on the economic activity? This is one of the basic questions
this thesis tries to address, and taken up in chapter 2, where several econometric models
are used including not only total spending in goods and services, as is customary in the
literature, but also its main components. As will become evident there, which spending
variable is increased matters a lot: civilian spending of all kinds has strong expansionary
effects on the economy; on the contrary defense spending, in particular expenditure for
weapons (defense investment in the U.S. data), has recessionary effects on output.
Another issue with fiscal policy is that since fiscal institutions are slow to react,
there is plenty of time left to agents to adjust their behavior before the actual change in
the spending or tax variables occur. It is argued that one of the reasons typical SVAR
techniques find positive effects on spending shocks, especially on consumption, is the
existence of fiscal foresight: agents can anticipate spending changes, and adjust their
behavior beforehand - they reduce their consumption before the actual spending increase
occurs; then what the VAR actually estimates is the positive reaction of consumption,
as the economy returns to the long-run equilibrium. The problem of fiscal foresight, if
it is present, does not allow reliable estimates of fiscal policy effects, at least in the way
it is customarily done in the literature, which uses Structural Vector Autoregressions.
This is another issue taken up in chapter 2, where it is shown that this is not a major
problem in U.S. data, and therefore SVAR techniques can give reliable results in this
case.
Another very important question, especially for policy-making, is whether there are
different effects of fiscal policies during different economic conditions. One particular
way to put forward this question, of the most important ones admittedly, is to ask
what are the effects of fiscal policy during the different phases of the business cycle -
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are e.g. spending increases more effective during recessions, as Keynesian theory and
common sense (at least among many policy makers) suggest? More specifically, the
previous questions about the sizes of fiscal multipliers, both of aggregate variables and
their constituents, can be asked over the business cycle. This issue is taken up in chapter
3, where it is shown that important non-linearities exist in the data and that spending
multipliers are probably higher than those of taxes, and both are higher (in absolute
value) in recessions.
Many of the disputes over the effects of fiscal policy stem from the inability to find
proper exogenous shocks, or good enough instruments, to estimate the contemporaneous
effects of fiscal policy. This is particularly evident in the case of taxes; it is notoriously
difficult to estimate the tax multiplier, because in the data taxes are very highly corre-
lated with GDP, so are mostly driven by the cyclical movements of output. Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) were the first who actually developed a convincing methodology to
estimate the cyclical movement of taxes based on institutional information outside the
model, but after the work of Romer and Romer (2010), the literature has moved to-
ward seeking plausible exogenous instruments to estimate tax effects and multipliers.
However, not any of these methods is flawless, as will be shown later.
This issue, along with the underlying one about the size of fiscal multipliers, is the
focus of chapter 4. There a different identification method is used, based on the separa-
tion of structural shocks hitting the economy in permanent and transitory. This method
allows to generate instruments that can be used for the estimation of contemporaneous
relations. The results of this econometric analysis suggest that spending multipliers
are higher, and they depend on policy. Also, tax multipliers are lower than those of
spending, and that the results of several recent papers estimating tax multipliers are
not robust.
Another important issue, particularly relevant now days that many countries are
trying to reduce debt, is whether it is possible to consolidate without too much pain. In
an famous paper, Alesina and Perotti (1995) advocated that a fiscal consolidation based
on spending cuts is preferable to tax increases, since the former has a negative effect
on interest rates, that lead to increases in private sector’s investment and consumption.
Naturally, such a view considers government spending as predominantly useless, and
reducing it does not deteriorate the equilibrium of the economy. The results in chapters
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3 and 4 suggest that this theory is not likely to hold in reality, at least for the part
of government spending regarding goods and services; it might hold for transfers and
pensions, but this is an issue not taken up in this work.
Further, the stability of the effects of spending and tax policies and of the relevant
multipliers, is of particular importance from both a theoretical and a practical point of
view. Perotti (2004a) argued that spending multipliers have reduced after 1980, probably
because of more aggressive monetary policy towards inflation, but other explanations
based on the fall on the number of credit constrained consumers because of financial
liberalization or increased openness are possible.
This thesis is also motivated from the opposing views in economic theory about
the effects of fiscal policy shocks. There are two fundamental views among academics
about the operation of the economy. The first one is the equilibrium - Real Business
Cycle approach, for which fiscal policy is ineffective, due to the presence of Ricardian
Equivalence, and possibly even leading to bad economic outcomes, especially when the
yardstick to measure the policy is individual welfare; the stronger effects of fiscal policy,
mostly if taxes are distortionary, may come from the supply side of the economy, by
altering people incentives to work and save. On the other hand, Keynesian theory
asserts that fiscal policy, and particularly government spending, is a very powerful tool
to stabilize the economy, particularly during deep recessions - government should act
as the spender of the last resort. These two views are in accord in the issue of output
response to government spending increases, which is positive in both cases, but differ in
their predictions about the consumption response: RBC theory suggests it is negative
because of the negative wealth effect, Keynesian that it is positive.
These models have different assumptions about the transmission mechanism of fiscal
policy. The typical neoclassical model, and most of current DSGEs, predict that spend-
ing has a multiplier lower than one, since the increase in useless government consumption
(that will eventually lead to higher taxes) forces consumption to fall. This is unlike the
results of the majority of SVAR studies, which predict that consumption rises after in-
creases in spending. It takes a different mechanism to generate a positive consumption
response; most common mechanisms to generate this effect are a) the addition of rule-
of-thumb consumers in an NK model in a sufficient proportion to give such an effect, or
b) the assumption that government spending generates some positive externality to the
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productivity of the private sector, or c) a utility function that assumes non-separability
of consumption with either government spending or labor. The tax multiplier naturally
depends heavily on the nature of taxes in the model: a lump-sum tax has very different
effects compared to a distortionary income tax. This thesis contributes in this discus-
sion by setting up models to replicate the basic estimated effects in the empirical parts
of chapters, using non-standard modeling elements to achieve the desired responses. A
transmission mechanism used in this thesis to get the desired responses depends on pol-
icy: even with a model that deviates only slightly from the basic RBC or NK model
in what concerns fiscal policy, the operation of this policy alone, in the form of proper
fiscal rules, can go a long way into generating the observed responses. This is a feature
that adds realism, and makes some explanations offered so far redundant.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Different ways to calculate responses to innovations in fiscal pol-
icy
1.2.1.1 The exogenous shocks method
The first way to see the effects on the economy required the existence of a variable
that constitutes a plausible unexpected / exogenous shock to fiscal policy. Naturally,
this kind of variable solves the identification problem that is present in all econometric
models. But such shocks are hard to come by. The only big exogenous events are wars,
that were scarce in post-WW2 data for developed countries that have trustworthy and
long time series, and even these do not capture all aspects of fiscal policy actions.
Assuming such exogenous shocks exist and are observable to the econometrician,
one can use fairly standard techniques to assess their effect on the economy. A natural
macroeconometric model for this task would be a VARX model, a VAR model augmented
with the exogenous shocks variables2. Schematically, these models can be described in
the following way; estimate a reduced form VARX:
Yt = A(L)Yt−1 + B(L)Xt + Ut, Ut ∼ iid(0,Σ)
2The interested reader could see the details on good time series books like Lu¨tkepohl (2005), especially
chapter 10.
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where Yt is the vector of n endogenous variables, Xt is the vector of the m exogenous
shock variables, and Ut the residuals, A(L) and B(L) are polynomials in the lag op-
erator with orders p and q respectively; other exogenous or deterministic variables are
ignored for expositional purposes. To see the effects of the shocks on the endogenous
variables of the system, one can form the augmented companion matrix A and the
impact matrix B of the system:
A =

A1 ... Ap−1 Ap B1 ... Bq−1 Bq
In · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · In 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 · · · 0 0
0 Im · · · 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · Im 0

, B =

B0
0
0
0
Im
0
0
0

With these matrices, IRFs can be constructed in the same way as those of the shocks
to the endogenous variables.
1.2.1.2 The SVAR identification method
When one estimates a VAR, the errors are in general contemporaneously correlated.
However, the VAR can be thought of as the reduced form of a more general, structural
model which allows for contemporaneous correlation of the endogenous variables, but
with shocks uncorrelated both intertemporally and among them during the same period;
usually one is interested in the effects of these shocks, the so called structural shocks, to
the endogenous variables3. Formally, suppose that the true model is:
C0Yt = C(L)Yt−1 + Et =
∑p
i=1 CiYt−i + Et
but since the matrix C0 will not be known in general, the researcher has to estimate
the reduced form VAR and use some restrictions in order to identify the parameters of
the true structural model. So one estimates:
Yt = A(L)Yt−1 + Ut =
∑p
i=1 AiYt−i + Ut =
∑p
i=1 C
−1
0 CiYt−i + C
−1
0 Et
3For the interested reader an excellent exposition of the structural VAR topic is chapter 9 of Lu¨tkepohl
(2005).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 20
and imposes some appropriate restrictions in order to estimate the true coefficient ma-
trices and find the effects of the structural shocks. Typically Et ∼ iid(0, I) and Ut ∼
iid(0,Σ).
The SVAR method mainly rests on imposing enough restrictions to ensure a de-
composition of the variance - covariance matrix of the residuals from the VAR - with
k variables one needs to impose k(k−1)2 restrictions on C0 or C
−1
0 to identify the “true”
shocks, in addition to the covariance restrictions, so that C0Ut = Et ⇔Ut = C−10 Et is
satisfied; this problem is generally solved by maximizing numerically the log-likelihood
of the model where the restrictions are imposed.
The most commonly used restrictions to identify structural errors is the (lower)
Cholesky factorization of the variance – covariance matrix of the estimated residuals; so
chol(Σ)=C−10 , and each column of the generated matrix has the effect of a (hopefully)
structural shock to the endogenous variables.
This method imposes a recursive pattern of causality in the same period; the first
variable is not affected by any other in a given period of time (but can be affected in the
following periods), the second can be affected only by the first in that period, and so on.
Off course, this pattern depends on the way the variables are ordered in the VAR, so one
can not estimate unique impulse response functions for the fiscal policy shock under any
ordering. It is considered quite reliable for spending shocks when the spending variable
is ordered first, since government spending is pretty much predetermined within the
same period, at least when transfers are excluded so that it only contains spending on
goods and services. It is the most commonly used method in the literature. Needless to
say, other patterns are possible, but this one is the most common and seems to be quite
reasonable for spending shocks.
A more general SVAR model is the (in the terminology of chapter 9 of Lu¨tkepohl
(2005)) so called AB model. This model implies this relation between the VAR residuals
Ut and the structural errors Et: AUt = ΒEt ⇒ Ut = A−1ΒEt = ΒEt. Using covari-
ance restrictions, one can only identify k(k+1)2 parameters on matrices A and B, the same
number as in the model of the previous paragraphs, so typically one assumes that either
A or B is equal to I(k) and works with a B or an A model or, in the terminology of the
previous paragraphs, with C−10 or with C0.
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1.2.1.3 The Blanchard and Perotti approach to identification
Another commonly used approach in the estimation of SVAR models in the literature
related to the effects of fiscal policy shocks employs an alternative, although very similar,
identification method, pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). This method uses
external information in order to identify some of the parameters of A = C0 and produce
the correct responses to a fiscal policy shock. The exposition below follows Perotti
(2004a), who estimated more general versions of the model used in the original Blanchard
and Perotti paper.
The procedure is roughly the following. First estimate the reduced form model de-
scribed above; in most papers time trends and quarterly dummies are added in the speci-
fication, as in the original application of the methodology. Suppose Yt = [gt, tt, yt, pit, it]΄
(government purchases, taxes less transfers, GDP, inflation and an interest rate – the
first three variables in logs), and Ut = [u
g
t , u
t
t, u
y
t , u
pi
t , u
i
t]΄. Ut, the residuals of each equa-
tion can be thought of as linear combinations of the residuals from the other equations
and the structural residuals for this equation, and in the case of each fiscal variable the
structural residual of the other fiscal variable may also affect it. So the residuals can be
represented in equation form as (εit is the structural residual of the ith equation):
ugt = αgtu
t
t + αgyu
y
t + αgpiu
pi
t + αgiu
i
t + ε
g
t
utt = αtgu
g
t + αtyu
y
t + αtpiu
pi
t + αtiu
i
t + ε
t
t
uyt = αygu
g
t + αytu
t
t + αypiu
pi
t + αyiu
i
t + ε
y
t
upit = αpigu
g
t + αpitu
t
t + αpiyu
y
t + αpiiu
i
t + ε
pi
t
uit = αigu
g
t + αitu
t
t + αiyu
y
t + αipiu
pi
t + ε
i
t
Naturally, the structural policy shocks should enter directly in the VAR equations
for the policy residuals – the fiscal authority knows the shocks. Additionally, assuming a
recursive ordering in the three equations for the non–policy variables (so that output is
not affected contemporaneously by inflation and interest rates but only by policy shocks
and its own structural shock, inflation is affected at a given period by all variables
except the interest rate, which is affected by all shocks contemporaneously – however
this ordering is immaterial for the calculation of the effects of fiscal policy shocks) these
equations can be written as:
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ugt = αgyu
y
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The key to computing the values of the elasticities in the equations of policy vari-
ables is to realize that due to decision and implementation lags, there is no systematic
discretionary response within the same quarter, so whatever value these elasticities (of
government spending with respect to output, inflation and interest rates, αgj , and those
of taxes with respect to these variables, αtj , j = y, pi, i) have is due to the automatic
stabilizers – the automatic response of budget components to economic activity, and can
be calculated with using external information, e.g. on the tax system; for example, Per-
otti (2004a) gives the following values for the US: αgy = αgi = 0, αgpi = −0.5, αty = 1.85,
αti = 0, αtpi = 1.25. As it is evident, the validity of this approach relies critically on
the availability of quarterly (or higher frequency) data; with lower frequency data, it is
more difficult to defend the assumption of no systematic discretionary response within
the same time period. One can then perform the following operation and calculate the
cyclically adjusted residuals:
ug,cat = u
g
t − αgyuyt − αgpiupit − αgiuit = βgtεtt + εgt
ut,cat = u
t
t − αtyuyt − αtpiupit − αtiuit = βtgεgt + εtt
Then what is left is to find the values of βgt and βtg in order to achieve exact identifi-
cation; the solution to this problem is to assume that one of them is zero; in that case the
structural error is equal to the cyclically adjusted residual. This structural error can be
used as instrument to estimate the relevant β in the other equation; luckily, the values
of βgt and βtg turn out to be small, so ordering of fiscal variables makes little difference
for the results. Proceeding further, one can use the structural errors as instruments in
IV regressions to calculate the elasticities with respect to fiscal shocks in the output
equation, then in the inflation equation and finally in the interest rate equation; this
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way the elasticities from these estimations are used to form the impact vector for the
structural shocks4. This identification is written in the general AB framework as:
A=

1 0 0 −αgpi 0
0 1 −αty −αtpi 0
−αyg −αyt 1 0 0
−αpig −αpit −αpiy 1 0
−αig −αit −αiy −αipi 1

, B=

1 0 0 0 0
βtg 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

.
Afterwards, it is a standard procedure to calculate the impulse response functions
and assess the effects of fiscal policy shocks to the macroeconomic variables of the system.
Comparing this method with the Cholesky ordering, it is evident that the latter imposes
many elasticities of fiscal variables to the rest to be zero. It is also evident that it
corresponds to Cholesky identification of the cyclically adjusted residuals.
1.2.1.4 The sign-restrictions approach
The last approach used to identify fiscal policy shocks is due to Uhlig. It is a general
approach and rests on imposing restrictions on the sign of the impulse response functions,
e.g. that the response of GDP to a tax shock (increase) must be negative. This approach
can be summarized in the following way (see Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Caldara
and Kamps (2008)).
First estimate the VAR specification; the assumption is that reduced form and
structural residuals are linked by the equation Ut = BEt, where E(UtUt΄) = Σ and
E(EtEt΄) = I; it is worth noting that Et usually has less elements than Ut, meaning
that the number of structural shocks is less than that of the reduced form residuals/the
number of the variables. Then one has to decompose B as if B = PQ, where P is the
lower Cholesky factor of Σ and Q is any orthonormal matrix such as QQ΄ = I. Q is the
crucial matrix; its columns carry the weights needed to identify the structural errors.
The identifying assumptions in Mountford and Uhlig (2009) are that for four quarters
after any shock variables have to move in a specific manner: a business cycle shock must
comove positively with revenues and output and its components; a monetary policy shock
must move in the same direction with the interest rate, but must comove negatively
4Alternatively, one can directly estimate their effects on the other variables using (under the assump-
tion of uncorrelated structural shocks) OLS regressions of the residuals on the structural shocks, to get
the first 2 columns of the relevant Β = Α−1Β matrix.
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with reserves and prices; a revenue shock must comove positively with revenue and a
spending shock must comove positively with spending. Afterward, one has to bootstrap
the model to generate impulse responses, from which he/she will retain the ones that
satisfy the sign restrictions by means of minimizing a loss function for the deviations
of responses from the restrictions, and by imposing that the identified structural shocks
are orthogonal with each other.
However, sign restrictions also have some drawbacks. Fry and Pagan (2005) argue
against using such restrictions uncritically, indicating that they constitute weak restric-
tions and consequently give weak information which may not allow one to actually
recover true impulses. In addition, Fry and Pagan (2011) argue that it is not good prac-
tice to identify single shocks with sign restrictions, since it is likely that one may mix
responses to structural shocks that share some common characteristics - alternatively
one might need to use restrictions on many variables and for more periods, a modelling
decision that would also raise some concerns; sign restrictions are more likely to work
better if one tries to identify several structural shocks, and contemporaneous restric-
tions are likely to work better in policy issues, where an institutional setting is likely
to provide credible contemporaneous restrictions for a single structural shock. Paustian
(2007) found that sign restrictions typically work better if a) many shocks are identified
at the same time and b) these shocks exert a significant influence on the main variables
of the VAR; this latter requirement is less likely to be satisfied in the case of fiscal policy,
since fiscal (especially spending) shocks are not expected to exert a significant influence
on the main macro variables.
1.2.2 A brief introduction in the literature
1.2.2.1 General
Many studies, most of them quite recent and focusing on U.S., try to estimate the effects
of fiscal policy shocks in the economy. Most of these studies estimate some form of a
(linear) VAR model; each of these studies follows one of the available methodologies
described in the previous section. Each methodology uses a different way to identify
fiscal policy shocks; in practice, differences boil down to different ways to extract a
shock, since the residuals from the VAR mix “true” shocks with the automatic response
of budget variables to the state of the economic activity at a particular period; this is
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mostly important for taxes, since most of spending is predetermined, and only transfers
(mainly unemployment benefits) vary with the economic activity. A good reference for
describing the methodologies is Caldara and Kamps (2008), and a comprehensive survey
of the results of all methodologies is Ramey (2011b).
The first identification method rests on exogenous shocks to military spending to
identify spending shocks; it was pioneered by Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and followed
by Edelberg et al (1999) and Burnside et al (2004); the authors estimate models using
dummies for the dates these build-ups started, in particular dummies for the third quar-
ter of 1950 (1950:3 - Korea War), the first quarter of 1965 (1965:1 - Vietnam War),
the first quarter of 1980 (1980:1 - Reagan build-up) and the third quarter of 2001
(2001:3 - 9/11) - shocks are just giving the value of one to the dummy. The papers
adopting the narrative approach find that in response to a war dummy, output rises
significantly and persistently, consumption of non-durables and services is not affected
very much, contrary to consumption of durables and residential investment, which fall
sharply. Spending shocks cause prices and interest rates to rise.
In addition, Romer and Romer (2010) have compiled a series of tax shocks; their
sources are the proceedings of the U.S. legislature - shocks are classified as exogenous,
that are legislated for ideological reasons, or endogenous that come as reactions to the
economic situation. Higher taxes have a big negative effect on output, especially in
consumption of durables, while non-durables and services consumption is not affected
that much; taxes imposed to decrease the deficit have smaller contractionary effects.
Ramey (2011a) assembles a new dataset for defense spending shocks, constructed in a
narrative way similar to the one used in the previous paper, and confirms the results
coming from the war dates dummies. As it is evident, the findings of this method for
spending increases mostly resemble those of an RBC model. These two series are used
in the present work.
The SVAR method mainly rests on imposing enough restrictions to ensure a decom-
position of the variance - covariance matrix of the residuals from the VAR, as described
in the previous subsection. The seminal papers are Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and
Fata´s and Mihov (2001), who find that a spending shock increases both output and
consumption. Fata´s and Mihov find that prices fall after a spending shock, and the real
interest rate increases. These results in general have been confirmed by Gal´ı et al (2007),
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Caldara and Kamps (2008) and Perotti (2004a and 2007) among others. In addition,
Perotti (2004a) has shown that the effect of spending shocks on output diminishes after
1980, possibly due to increased responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation, while the
interest rate is not affected much; in addition to the behavior of central bank, Bilbiie
et al (2008) attribute some of the effect on the fall of the number of credit constrained
consumers because of financial liberalization, while Canzoneri et al (2012) argue that it
may be partially explained by the increase in openness. Lately, in an innovative paper,
Fisher and Peters (2010), confirmed the results of SVAR methodology using excess stock
returns of major U.S. military contractors as instruments.
Some papers have used sign restrictions to identify fiscal shocks; this methodology
in essence restricts the shape of the IRFs. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) found that a
spending shock has a very small, positive yet significant effect on GDP in the first year
that turns insignificantly negative later, but causes no reaction in consumption; it also
has a negative effect on inflation and the interest rate. In general their results resemble
those of the SVAR approach and give more support to some aspects of the Keynesian
model. Forni and Gambetti (2010a) also use this identification method in the context
of a dynamic factor model; their results are closer to the typical Keynesian effects (as
are their identification restrictions).
Other papers with interesting results are Perotti (2004b), Tenhofen and Wolff (2010)
and Caldara and Kamps (2008). In the first the author tries to find whether public
investment has stronger positive effects on output compared to public consumption -
the answer he gives is negative; especially defense investment5 seems to have adverse
effects. Public consumption is more stimulative for output, perhaps because western
countries have too much public infrastructure. In the second paper the authors try to
see whether anticipation matters for the effects of government spending on the economy;
they find that although defense expenditures have the expected (for non-Keynesians)
negative effect on consumption, civilian spending has a positive one, and these effects
do not depend, at least qualitatively, on whether anticipation is taken into account. In
the third, the authors try to compare the different identifications on similar models for
a variety of macroeconomic variables; they find mostly Keynesian effects for government
spending that are hard to reconcile with DSGE models, and diverging results for taxes
5Here defense investment is used as in U.S. data - it includes weapon purchases.
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depending highly on identifying assumptions. In addition, Mertens and Ravn (2010)
confirm the conclusion of Tenhofen and Wolf (2010) and Blanchard and Perotti that
anticipation does not bias the results of SVARs for fiscal policy.
As mentioned before, the main channel through which government spending shocks
operate in the economy in DSGE models is the negative wealth effect on agents: govern-
ment demands to consume more resources, which it takes from agents; these agents are
now poorer and have to work more (if taxes are lump-sum, so they do not affect labor
supply decisions) and consume less. If taxes are distortionary (so that the Ricardian
equivalence is not active), possible choices to work less (if tax rates increase to finance
spending) only work to reenforce the negative wealth effect of spending on the budget
constraints of the private sector. Important papers that develop models on these lines
are Aiyagari et al (1992) and Linemmann and Schabert (2003). These papers imply that
the output multiplier of government spending is less than 1, since private consumption
(and probably investment) fall, and could become negative if labor supply falls because
higher tax rates induce people to work less.
This need not be the case in general. There are various ways to generate positive
consumption responses, if the researcher believes that such an outcome is appropriate.
First, government spending may work like a productivity shock, and increase the pro-
duction of the private sector; notable contributions utilizing this idea are Baxter and
King (1993) and Linnemann and Schabert (2006); a similar idea is present in the work
of Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996), where the role of productivity is played by the
entry of new firms in the economy - as the government spends more, it facilitates more
firm entry, increasing the capital stock of the economy and eventually productivity.
These are not the only ways to achieve such an outcome. Gal´ı et al (2007) resort to
the presence of non-optimizing agents in the economy that consume all their available
income; if their number is big enough, and wages increase for some reason after the
spending shock (e. g. non competitive labor markets), then a positive response of
consumption is possible. Another way to do it is to force people consume more by
specifying their preferences appropriately: if labor or government spending enters the
utility function in a non-separable way with consumption, it is possible to generate this
effect; Linnemann (2006 and 2009) uses this mechanism. Finally, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe´
and Ur´ıbe (2006) manage to get this effect by their deep habit mechanism; this particular
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preferences specification generates countercyclical mark-ups that are strong enough to
overcome the wealth effect. Theory has provided a lot of different ways to setup a model
that generates many kinds of potentially desired effects of government spending shocks.
Lately, some papers have conducted counterfactual experiments comparing the re-
sponse of more than one DSGEs used by international organizations or central banks -
typically these models assume (and calibrate or estimate) that a fraction of population is
not optimizing and simply consumes all its income (rule-of-thumb consumers). Coenen
et al (2012) give spending multipliers for a temporary spending increase between 1 and
2, depending on the existence of monetary accommodation. Cogan et al (2010) report
multipliers to permanent spending increases of less than one, similar to those of the pre-
vious paper in the permanent case. Freedman et al (2010), using IMF’s GIMF model,
report multipliers from 0 to 2 depending on the fiscal instrument used and the presence
of monetary accommodation. As it is evident, there is enough theory to accommodate
many empirical results.
1.2.2.2 Effects over the business cycle
Lately, because of the recent crisis, the focus turned towards the estimation of nonlinear
models that try to estimate the effects of fiscal policy shocks during different regimes.
Most of these papers use small threshold VARs (TVARs) with few variables, usually not
more than 4, typically including a spending and a tax variable, a variable to describe the
economic activity (usually output) and possibly another variable. The length limitations
of available quarterly time series data allow the estimation of only 2 regimes6, even in the
US that has the longest time series available. In addition, identification is typically done
employing familiar SVAR techniques, like Cholesky decompositions or the Blanchard and
Perotti method.
The first paper that sought to find whether fiscal policy has different effects during
low and high interest rates was the one by Choi and Devereux (2005). They used TVARs
for US data and found that significant nonlinearities exist, especially for interest rates
and inflation; they do not allow for endogenous regime switching and no output multi-
pliers are reported. With low real interest rates expansionary fiscal policy (spending)
raises output, consumption and taxes, while in a high real interest rate environment
6An exception is Choi and Devereux (2005) who use 3 regimes.
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expansionary fiscal policy does not stimulate much, and may even have negative effects.
Interest rates rise after a spending shock only in the low interest rate regime, while they
fall in the high rate environment; inflation rises after a spending shock only in the low
interest rate regime.
The closest papers in spirit to the present work (specifically with the work in chapter
3) is the one by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) and Baum and Koerster (2011).
In the first paper, the authors try to answer essentially the same question for the US
employing a different technique - they use Bayesian methods to estimate their Smooth
Transition Vector Autoregressive model, a recursive identification and a mixture of linear
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to look at the effects during recessions and expan-
sions. They find important nonlinearities on the effect of fiscal policy (spending) shocks
over the cycle – spending shocks are considerably more effective during recessions (big-
ger multipliers), and the multiplier can reach even 1.5 in their baseline model. They use
forecasts of fiscal policy variables, the inclusion of which in the specification increases the
size of multipliers. In the second paper they also use similar techniques, but for German
data, and find that spending increases are more effective during recessions (multiplier
> 1 and rising with the magnitude of the spending shock), while it is rather ineffective
during expansions; tax policy is not that effective, but it is slightly more effective during
expansions.
Candelon and Lieb (2010) and Fazzari, Morley and Panovska (2010) also try to esti-
mate the effects of fiscal policy shocks during expansions and recessions for the US. The
authors of the first paper use a threshold VECM and find that spending is more effective
than taxes during recessions in stimulating output; spending drives output, consumption
and wages up but prices and interest rates down – investment falls shortly; additionally,
tax shocks decrease output, consumption and investment in recessions but do not react
in booms; prices go up. The authors of the second paper find typical SVAR effects in
both regimes: after a spending shock output and consumption increase, but investment
does not fall – it increases in both regimes; government spending affects output more
during recessions – consumption rises more during these periods – investment increases
also during recessions; additionally, a tax cut raises output, consumption and investment
in low regime, and these variables rise by less in the high regime; however, their model
is a fiscal SVAR for each regime, with no endogenous switching between states.
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Some more papers use the same methods in several countries. Similarly to the
previous papers (and the present work), Batini et al (2012) and Baum et al (2012)
try to look for the effects of spending and taxes, in expansions and recessions and find
higher multipliers in recessions. Both find that tax multipliers are lower than the ones
of spending, suggesting that fiscal consolidations in recessions concentrated on spending
are likely to be a bad idea since they are likely to suppress output even more; if necessary,
it is best to implement them gradually and not frontloading the spending cuts. Both
papers find high heterogeneity across countries in their estimated multipliers, suggesting
that other things like openness or the extent of automatic stabilizers may affect results;
in most cases they find higher spending multipliers than those of taxes, reaching values
close to 2 in several cases in recessions, and higher multipliers of both policy variables
in recessions.
Finally, two more papers try to estimate the effects of fiscal policy shocks in different
regimes, where the regimes are defined in a different way. Afonso, Baxa and Slavic (2011)
look at the effects of fiscal policy during periods of financial stress. They find positive
effects of government spending shocks; the effects are similar in both regimes, multipliers
are generally low but higher during the 2008-09 crisis – the multipliers increased in
general after 1990 (more important financial crises). Dea`k and Lenarcˇicˇ (2010) try to
find how the economy reacts when the government debt is high or low; in the low-debt
regime spending drives output up while taxes drive it down; on the contrary, in the
high-debt regime spending drives output down and taxes drive it up; however, their
chosen threshold variable (debt-to-GDP ratio) is so slow moving and does not change
regimes often, so it should make their model behave more like a structural break model,
with the threshold variable replacing time.
Some recent theoretical papers trying to explain the higher multipliers in recessions.
Christiano et al (2011) develop a model in which spending multipliers are larger when
the interest rate has hit the zero lower bound. Canzoneri et al (2011) develop a model
based on the asymmetry generated by financial frictions over the business cycle - these
countercyclical frictions make the consumption of borrowers rise more after a spending
shock during recessions, and create big multipliers. Another paper that tries to explain
the apparent non-linearities of the business cycle is Eggertsson and Krugman (2012),
where the forced deleveraging during recessions help to explain the empirical findings.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Government
Spending Components
2.1 Introduction
There are many important questions, especially for policy-making, concerning the ef-
fects of fiscal policy on the economy. One that has not been answered so far, at least
not thoroughly, is the following: what are the effects of different spending variables on
the economic activity. This is the basic question this chapter tries to address. This
is done by using several SVAR models, in which the relevant spending variable is not
only total spending in goods and services, as is customary in the literature1, but also its
main components. As will become evident later on, which spending variable is increased
matters a lot: civilian spending of all kinds has strong expansionary effects on the econ-
omy; on the contrary defense spending, in particular expenditure for weapons (defense
investment in the U.S. data), has recessionary effects on output. Typically, economists
do not expect such reactions, even when public spending is useless. To show a possible
way to generate such an effect, I develop a DSGE to account for the most important
results.
A potential problem of econometric models of fiscal policy is the so called fiscal
foresight: since fiscal institutions are slow to react, there is plenty of time left to agents
to adjust their behavior before the actual change in the spending or tax variables occur;
1A short summary of the available evidence on the effects of fiscal policy is available in section 1.2.2.1
in introduction.
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therefore, agents can anticipate spending changes, and adjust their behavior beforehand -
e.g. they reduce their consumption before the actual spending increase occurs, so what
the VAR actually estimates is the positive reaction of consumption, as the economy
returns to the long-run equilibrium. This is one of the major arguments against using
SVAR techniques for fiscal policy. To this end, I use a recently proposed method by Forni
and Gambetti (2010b) that essentially tries to find whether these shocks are forecastable
when agents can use all the available information. It turns out that this is not a major
problem in U.S. data.
The remaining of the chapter is structured in the following way. Section 2.2 describes
the data, and presents the tests for the sufficiency of the information contained in the
structural shocks generated by each identification method. Section 2.3 presents the
effects of the different spending variables in the U.S. economy. In section 2.4 a DSGE
model is developed and calibrated to account for the basic results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Assessing the appropriateness of fiscal shocks
2.2.1 The data
The data used are for the U.S.; the data frequency is quarterly; the sample covers
1960q1 to 2006q4. The choice of the sample is made in the light of the discussion in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) who argue that the 50’s are not expected to be from the
same stochastic process as the rest of the series because of the Korean war and the
large increase in taxes to finance that war, and especially Perotti (2007) who discusses
about the effects of including the Korean War on the results under different identification
assumptions. Consistently with this paper, Caldara and Kamps (2008) find that different
identification methods produce similar results, once differences in sample and included
variables are eliminated. For these reasons, I have opted to use similar specifications that
always include some basic macroeconomic variables, and the aforementioned common
sample.
Most data series come from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
tables, published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis2; additional sources are St Louis
FED’s FRED® database3 for the interest rate, unemployment and the wage rate.
2Available at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/index.asp.
3Available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING COMPONENTS 38
In particular the following series from the NIPA tables are used. At first the main
macro variables, namely real total output, real total private consumption and real total
private investment. The main government spending variable4 is total government spend-
ing on goods and services, in particular total government consumption and investment
(includes federal defense and and non-defense spending and state and local spending,
but excludes transfers); additionally, I use two more spending variables, total civilian
(non-defense, without transfers) and total defense spending (both include government
consumption and investment) on good and services. Furthermore, I split government
spending to total consumption and its civilian and defense counterparts, as well as total,
civilian and defense government investment. The tax variable is total net taxes, calcu-
lated as the sum of personal taxes, taxes on production and imports, corporate taxes
and social security contributions minus transfers, for total government (federal and state
and local). Inflation is the annualized quarterly GDP inflation rate (first difference of
log GDP deflator), and the nominal interest rate is the federal funds rate. The labor
market variables are the unemployment rate and the real compensation per hour in the
non-farm business sector. All the above variables (except unemployment, wage, infla-
tion and the interest rate) are in logs of the real per capita relevant variables, where the
deflator used is the relevant deflator for each variable, except the fiscal variables, which
are deflated by the GDP deflator. Population has been calculated by dividing nominal
GDP by nominal per capita GDP. All series are seasonally adjusted at annual rates by
the source.
In the following sub-sections, I use the first 10 principal components from U.S. data.
The data used for calculating these principal components come from Stock and Watson
(2008)5, and have been transformed to quarterly frequency; in addition, several quarterly
variables have been added to the dataset, including output components, deflators, major
spending and tax variables from the NIPA tables.
2.2.2 Ways to assess the usefulness of fiscal shocks
In a series of recent papers Forni and Gambetti (2010a,b) proposed a procedure to test
whether a VAR can be used to recover the structural shocks of interest or not. The
4The government spending and tax variables are similar to those used by Perotti (2004).
5Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/˜mwatson/publi.html.
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method is based on the fact that a VAR model is limited in its capacity to include
information - with 4 lags, the typical length in quarterly data, one can hardly use
more than 6 - 8 variables in the model; after this point, the estimates are likely to
be problematic with the current post-war macroeconomic datasets. However, there are
many variables omitted, and these variables may contain useful information.
In this view, the first thing a researcher should do is to assess the information suf-
ficiency of the model; in practice, this means to check whether important variables are
omitted. Since this is difficult to do with each specific variable, the authors suggest
to use the principal components estimated from the large datasets available: if (some
of) these factors Granger-cause the endogenous variables, then the equations for these
variables do not contain all the relevant information. This condition has nothing to do
with identification - to identify “true” shocks, one has to be sure that at least the model
contains all the relevant information. If it is rejected, then the researcher can estimate
a dynamic factor model or a FAVAR (a VAR augmented with factors). A natural ob-
jection to this procedure would be that it is very likely that the model still contains a
lot of variables and coefficients, and that with the factors one is not absolutely certain
what he/she estimates - factors give good summaries of the data for forecasting, but not
explanations.
However, even in situations in which informational sufficiency is rejected, it may still
be possible that a subset (one or more) of the structural shocks can be recovered. This
happens when the structural shock(s) is orthogonal to the lagged factors, which means
that the structural shock is unforecastable. This implies a simple testing procedure for
a particular shock: perform the desired SVAR analysis to get the A and B matrices of
structural coefficients of the (more general structural model now) similarly to the previ-
ous chapter; then obtain the structural shock of interest - ΑUt = ΒEt ⇒ Et = Β−1ΑUt.
Then if one regresses the jth structural shock (the jth row of Et) on the lagged factors,
the significance of the F statistic from this regression allows one to see the whether the
structural shock is forecastable - an insignificant F statistic does not reject the null of
orthogonality, and the researcher can use the estimated structural shock for inference.
In a similar context, this is the way Ramey (2011) used to assess the suitability of
the VAR residuals from the spending equation to be used as structural shocks - instead
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of factors, she used the news shocks she constructed6 from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters. Perotti (2011) argues forcefully against the suitability of these news shocks
for the intended purpose, by noting that these forecasts are essentially useless, so the
news shocks are simply the growth rate of spending and should be expected to be cor-
related with the VAR residuals from the spending equation. Nevertheless, Mertens and
Ravn (2010), Tenhofen and Wolf (2010) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) all conclude
that anticipation is not likely to be a major problem for spending shocks.
2.2.3 Identification Assumptions
In this Chapter I use most of the identification methods described in section 1.2.1, and
in particular I use a Cholesky decomposition of the variance - covariance matrix of
residuals, with government spending ordered first, the Blanchard - Perotti method, and
I also use Ramey’s (2011) exogenous defense shock series; in the next section it will
be shown that forecast errors for spending from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF) do not constitute proper fiscal shocks, so I will not use them in section 2.3 to
draw conclusions.
When I utilise the exogenous defense spending shocks, the augmented companion
and impact matrices of section 1.2.1.1 are used. The Cholesky identification implies a
Β model (in the terminology of Chapter 9 of Lu¨tkepohl (2005), Ut = ΒEt, since Α =
Ι(k)) with the following pattern for a model with 6 variables and spending ordered first:
Β=

b11 0 0 0 0 0
b21 b22 0 0 0 0
b31 b32 b33 0 0 0
b41 b42 b43 b44 0 0
b51 b52 b53 b54 b55 0
b61 b62 b63 b64 b65 b66

.
The first column of the Β matrix has the initial responses to the spending shock (since
the latter has a unit variance). The Blanchard - Perotti identification implies an ΑΒ
model ΑUt = ΒEt that (for a model with 6 variables with spending ordered first, taxes
6These government spending news shocks are the difference between the forecasts and the actual
spending in the next period.
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second, output third, inflation fourth and 2 other variables) leads to a matrices with the
same pattern as in section 1.2.1.3, and specifically the following ones:
A =

1 0 0 −αgpi 0 0
0 1 −αty −αtpi 0 0
−αyg −αyt 1 0 0 0
−αpig −αpit −αpiy 1 0 0
−α5g −α5t −α5y −α5pi 1 0
−α6g −α6t −α6y −α6pi −α65 1

, B =

1 0 0 0 0 0
βtg 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

.
I did not use sign restrictions to identify spending shocks, for the reasons mentioned
in section 1.2.1.4. In short, sign restrictions are expected to work better when one
tries to identify many shocks, especially ones that explain a significant portion of the
variance of residuals. However, in this case I want to identify a single shock (a spending
shock) for which there is a clear institutional setting that leads to enactment lags and
implementation lags, making the assumption that government spending in goods and
services is predetermined relative to other variables a reasonable one. In addition, this
variable in not expected to explain a big portion of output fluctuations. Therefore, it
seems reasonable not to use sign restrictions in this case7.
2.2.4 Do the shocks coming from the different identification methods
constitute proper fiscal shocks?
To see whether the shocks coming from the various identification methods constitute
proper fiscal shocks, one first has to define the models from which these shocks come.
I have run a variety of VARs from which I extract the spending shocks. As mentioned
in section 2.2.2, the idea is that a shock is considered structural if it is unforecastable
with the information agents have before it is realized. I also test the exogenous shocks
mentioned in the literature in the same way. I do not try to estimate models that are
informationally sufficient as defined in the sense of Forni and Gambetti - no reasonable
model is likely to be anyway. I only want to focus on the effects of fiscal shocks, so I
consider only these shocks.
The test is very simple. For all the shocks, I run a regression of the chosen shock on
2 lags of it; to these regressors I add those from the first two lags of the first 10 principal
7However, in Appendix A, the interested reader can find some results using sign restrictions; these
results indicate why one should be cautious using such restrictions in a setup like the current one.
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components of the U.S. data that give the best model according to the Hannan-Quinn
criterion - all combinations are automatically run to choose the best one. Then I check
whether the F-statistic from the regression is significant. This procedure is implemented
in order not to have many unnecessary regressors in the model, and consequently accept
the null of no significance of the regression more often.
The VAR models have the following specifications: the first class of VARs (model
1) includes a spending variable, output, net taxes, inflation, the federal funds rate and
consumption; the second class of models (model 2) takes out inflation and adds total
investment (without inventories) at the end; the last class (model 3) has a spending
variable, output, net taxes, the federal funds rate, unemployment and the real wage
as defined above. A time trend is always added, and all specifications have 4 lags
of the endogenous variables. All models have many variables - although many more
variables could be included in them, the variables included should ensure a quite accurate
description of the basic aspects of the U.S. economy.
Various spending variables are used; these are total spending, total government con-
sumption and investment, and their military and civilian counterparts. Government
wages are not used separately, since they are the biggest part of government consump-
tion (and give essentially the same results with it). As it is evident, many models are
produced by these combinations; for each model, spending shocks are constructed, and
the procedure described above is implemented to give the best regression model. In
the Cholesky case, the spending variable is always put first, output second and taxes
third, while in the Blanchard and Perotti8 case the spending variable is always put first,
taxes second and output third. Additionally, when inflation is not present in the model,
the Blanchard - Perotti spending shock is identical to its Cholesky counterpart, since
the procedures to obtain each of these two shocks are virtually the same - however, for
completeness both are reported.
In table 2.1 the results for the forecastability of spending shocks are shown. As it is
evident from the table, there is very little evidence that spending shocks identified by
the typical Blanchard - Perotti or Cholesky identifications are forecastable; they seem
to be truly structural shocks, in the sense of Forni and Gambetti, and inference coming
8In this case all the elasticities of spending are 0 except the elasticity of spending with respect to
inflation, which is set at -0.5, as in Perotti (2004a).
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Table 2.2: Regressions including exogenous shocks
Number of addi-
F statistic probability F R2 tional regressors
Defense News Shock 3.19 0.014 0.049 2
SPF Forecast shock 5.38 0 0.155 4
from these two approaches concerning the effects of government spending shocks seems
to be valid. As it will become evident later, they are also very similar shocks - their
only difference comes from the adjustment for inflation in the Blanchard - Perotti case,
which produces a positive correlation between these shocks and the residuals from the
inflation equation.
In table 2.2 the results for the forecastability of the exogenous spending shocks used
in Ramey (2011) are shown. As it is evident from this table, the only shock that might
qualify as a truly structural one is the Ramey’s defense spending news shock; though
it seems to be somewhat forecastable, in practice it is very difficult to forecast the big
and infrequent changes to forecasts of defense spending. What is more important is that
the forecast error of the SPF forecasts for spending variables, a variable used in some
papers and also one that is supposed to forecast residuals from spending equations is
quite forecastable and cannot be considered a true structural shock. This conclusion is
evident if one takes a look on the graphs of actual vs fitted values from the best model,
presented in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Actual vs fitted values from best models of exogenous shocks
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Figure 2.2: The effects of defense news shocks on the various spending variables (90%
C.I.);
(a) Defense spending variables
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Rdefsp gdp: Ramey’s shock; gcidef: total defense spending; gidef: defense investment;
gcdef: defense consumption; gcindef: total civilian spending; gindef: civilian investment;
gcndef: civilian consumption.
2.2.5 What part of the budget do the exogenous fiscal shocks really
affect?
To be sure that the defense news shocks are truly such shocks, and to gain further
understanding on what these shocks actually move, it is important to see the effects of
these shocks on the major budget categories. To this end, I will perform the following
exercise: 2 VARs are run for the defense news spending shock and the major spending
categories, one for defense and another non-defense spending variables. Then the system
is shocked in the shock variable, by using a recursive ordering with the shock variable
placed first.
The IRFs for shocks in the defense news shocks (with 90% confidence intervals) are
shown in figure 2.2. As it is evident, the defense news shocks increase defense spending
variables, and insignificantly decrease civilian ones; importantly, they increase defense
consumption significantly, meaning that their biggest effect is on military personnel
wages (that also includes their effect on the number of military personnel).
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2.3 The effects of fiscal shocks in US economy
2.3.1 The baseline models
As mentioned above, the baseline models consist of a spending variable, taxes, output
(or output and then taxes in the Cholesky case), inflation, the federal funds rate and
consumption. The spending variable is either total spending, government consumption
or government investment, total or broken into the relevant civilian and military series.
So we have 9 different spending variables, and three different identifications. When the
exogenous shocks are used, they are placed as exogenous variables in the model. All
models have 4 lags of the endogenous variables, and the ones that use the exogenous
shocks have lags 0-4 of these shocks; a constant and a time trend is always added; in all
graphs 90% confidence intervals are plotted.
Figure 2.3 presents the results for the responses of the baseline models (the ones
that include output, inflation, the federal funds rate and consumption) to shocks on
the basic government spending aggregates - total spending on goods and services, total
government consumption and total government investment - or to defense news shocks.
As it is evident from the graphs included in this figure, shocks to total government
spending and government consumption lead to increases in output and consumption
and to decreases in the federal funds rate, in both the Cholesky and the Blanchard-
Perotti (BP) cases; taxes also follow a similar pattern in both cases: first they fall, but
in the medium term they rise above baseline. The differences in these two identifications
lie in the responses of inflation: in the Cholesky case they are negative, while in the BP
case inflation rises; as mentioned before, the positive reaction of inflation in the BP case
is mechanically generated by the cyclical adjustment of spending residuals with those
from the inflation equation9, as described in section 2.2.4.
Overall, these responses are more compatible with a Keynesian view of the economy;
the Cholesky case is very compatible with the story told by some recent DSGE models
that allow government spending to have a positive externality to the private sector
production function (e.g. Baxter and King (1993) or Linnemann and Schabert (2006)),
effectively to be a kind of a productivity shock; the reduction of inflation is particularly
9The residuals from inflation equation are added to those of the spending equation creating a pos-
itive correlation of the structural spending residuals with inflation, a correlation that is absent in the
unadjusted residuals, which can also be considered structural.
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Figure 2.3: Baseline models, spending shocks from all identifications, models that include
total government spending (90% C.I.)
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(c) Cholesky identification, gov-
ernment investment
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(d) B-P identification, total
spending
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(e) B-P identification, govern-
ment consumption
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(f) B-P identification, govern-
ment investment
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(g) Exogenous shock identifica-
tion, total spending
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(h) Exogenous shock identifica-
tion, government consumption
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(i) Exogenous shock identifica-
tion, government investment
compatible with such a story. The BP case is more similar to Keynesian view of the
economy - again the (positive in this case) inflation response is crucial for this.
The responses of these variables to government investment shocks are not significant,
but some puzzling features reappear, as in Perotti (2004b): in particular, government
investment leads to a fall in consumption - but how can the not so useful on a priori
grounds government consumption give rise to significant positive output and consump-
tion responses, while the generally considered more useful government investment not
affect output and lead to negative consumption responses? Can the same institutions
do a good job in one part of fiscal policy (government consumption choices) and fail in
the other part (government investment choices)? An answer will be suggested later.
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Figure 2.4: Baseline models, spending shocks from Cholesky and BP identifications,
models that include government civilian spending (90% C.I.)
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(a) Cholesky identification, total
civilian spending
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(b) Cholesky identification, civil-
ian government consumption
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(c) Cholesky identification, civil-
ian government investment
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(e) B-P identification, civilian
government consumption
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(f) B-P identification, civilian
government investment
The last row of figure 2.3 has the responses of the previous models to the exogenous
defense spending news shocks. In responses to such shocks, all parts of the major budget
categories rise permanently; government consumption is the spending variable that rises
more strongly and significantly. It is probably worth to point out that shapes of the
government spending responses are quite different in this case: unlike the SVAR case,
where government spending takes its peak value on impact and then falls (as the stable
roots of the model force the system to go back to equilibrium), in the exogenous shocks
case spending variables are permanently set in a higher level - government investment
immediately, government consumption shortly after the shock. Output and taxes do not
move significantly - output does not move at all, while taxes fall somewhat. Inflation
goes in a negative path for the first few periods and federal funds rate is not affected.
Lastly, consumption falls. Another thing to point out is the similarity of responses in all
variables, except spending ones, across models. These reactions are somewhat consistent
with a baseline NK model with price rigidities (like the one of Linnemann and Schabert
(2003)) - output does not move much, inflation falls slightly, the FED does not move the
target rate much, consumption falls; these results are also reminiscent of Ramey’s (2011)
results and explanations; in her work, a defense spending news shocks give similar results
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Figure 2.5: Baseline models, all identifications, models that include government defense
spending (90% C.I.)
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(i) Exogenous shock identifica-
tion, government defense invest-
ment
in VARs with mostly real variables - a difference is that she obtains a strong positive
output response and a clear negative consumption response.
In figure 2.4 the results from the models that have only civilian spending are pre-
sented. The identifications used are only the two SVAR variants - the defense news
spending shocks are not used, since they primarily affect defense variables, as shown is
section 2.2.5. Leaving aside the responses of inflation, which continue to be different
according to the identification method as described before, in all cases taxes fall initially
and recover in the second half of the forecast period, the federal funds rate falls and
both consumption and output increase strongly. The first important result is that shocks
to civilian government investment have positive effects on output and consumption, as
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one would expect. The second one is that civilian government consumption has strong
positive effects on output and consumption; since the major component of government
consumption is public sector wages, this means that by hiring more people the U.S.
government was able to affect positively the economy.
Figure 2.5 presents the responses to spending shocks in the models with defense
spending variables. I will not discuss the responses in the exogenous shocks cases, since
they are very similar to those in figure 2.3; the only thing worth looking at is the strength
of the responses of spending variables to the exogenous news shocks. In what concerns
the two SVAR cases, leaving aside the issue of inflation, there are some common find-
ings: taxes tend to fall and the federal funds rate does not move. Total defense spending
has minor effects on all variables. Additionally, government defense consumption has
positive effects on output and consumption, although these are not particularly strong
and are not very precisely estimated; these results suggest that government consumption
expenditures of all kinds have similar effects, something not that surprising if one recalls
that they also have the same nature - they mostly reflect wages. The most important
result however comes from the graphs depicting the responses to military investment
shocks: military investment, which includes purchases of armament in U.S. data, has
strongly recessionary effects on output, and consequently reduces taxes and consump-
tion. The effects on output and consumption are particularly strong and significant. All
these happen despite the fact that U.S. military procurements are mainly manufactured
in the country and not imported from abroad.
Lastly, an important thing is to quantitatively assess the effects of these variables
on output. In table 2.3 the output multipliers of all cases of spending shocks described
previously in this section are presented. The multipliers in the models with civilian
variables and identification using the defense news shocks are not presented, since these
spending variables are not particularly affected by these exogenous shocks. There are
several results worth mentioning, and these are consistent with the visual inspection of
the figures.
I start with the SVAR cases. The first thing to notice is that for all cases civilian
spending has a higher multiplier than total spending and defense spending; between the
last two, total spending has higher multiplier. Civilian spending of all kinds has a big
multiplier - 2 or more on average in the Cholesky case, more than 1.3 in the BP case;
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particularly big is the multiplier of civilian investment, which is 4.5 on average in the
Cholesky case and 3.25 in the BP case, a lot bigger that any value reported in Perotti
(2004b). Defense investment has a very negative effect on output - the multiplier is less
than -3.5 in both SVAR cases. It is evident that different spending categories affect the
economy in very different ways.
The results in the exogenous spending shocks suggest that the values of spending
multipliers are totally different from those in the SVAR cases; especially the positive
value of the defense investment multiplier on impact strikes out. Given the very similar
patterns in all IRFs in this case, maybe it is pointless to talk for other multipliers than
those to total defense spending; the nature of these spending shocks seems to make
it impossible to isolate the effects of different defense spending variables - they give a
combined effect. In addition, the shapes of the IRFs are totally different from those of
the SVAR cases, making it hard to compare these effects.
2.3.2 Extensions
In order to see more clearly the effects of the various spending shocks in the economy, a
further set of models has been estimated. The first set, under the general name model
2, seeks to explore the effects on investment. From the baseline set of models inflation is
dropped and total private investment is added in the last place. The variables are: the
government spending variable, output, taxes, the federal funds rate, consumption and
investment.
Furthermore, I seek to find the effects on labor markets. To gain further insight
on this issue, I estimate a third set of models, under the general name model 3; from
the specification of model 2 I drop consumption and investment and add at the end
unemployment and wage, in this order.
In these models the BP identification method is not used - no inflation is present
in the model, so for the spending shocks the two SVAR methods will give the same
results since there is not any adjustment for inflation. The results from the other two
identification methods are presented though - in figure 2.6 the responses of investment
are presented, while in figure 2.7 those of unemployment and wages.
As it is clear, in all cases the exogenous shocks generate a positive effect in invest-
ment - this is insignificant in most cases; such a response is consistent with a simple
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Figure 2.6: Responses of investment to Cholesky and Exogenous spending shocks (90%
C.I.)
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(a) Total spending, Cholesky identification
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(b) Total spending, exogenous shock
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(c) Total government consumption, Cholesky iden-
tification
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(d) Total government consumption, exogenous
shock
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(e) Total government investment, Cholesky identi-
fication
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(f) Total government investment, exogenous shock
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(g) Total civilian spending, Cholesky identification
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(h) Total civilian spending, exogenous shock
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(i) Total civilian government consumption,
Cholesky identification
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Figure 2.7: Responses of unemployment and wages to Cholesky and Exogenous spending
shocks (90% C.I.)
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(a) Total spending, Cholesky identification
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(c) Total government consumption, Cholesky iden-
tification
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shock
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0 5 10 15 20 25
wage
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0 5 10 15 20 25
unemployment
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0 5 10 15 20 25
fedfunds
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0 5 10 15 20 25
taxes
-0.003
-0.002
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0 5 10 15 20 25
output
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
3
0.04
0 5 10 15 20 25
total.gov.investment
(e) Total government investment, Cholesky identi-
fication
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(g) Total civilian spending, Cholesky identification
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DSGE-RBC model if the real interest rate does not respond to spending shocks, so that
the negative wealth effect drives people to increase saving. In the SVAR case, the re-
sponses of investment generally follow those of consumption; government consumption
and especially civilian consumption increases investment - only defense consumption
leaves private investment unaffected; defense investment depresses private investment,
in line with the other recessionary effects of this variable.
The effects of exogenous spending shocks on the labor market are again uniform -
unemployment falls insignificantly, while wage rises, insignificantly in most cases, sig-
nificantly in the models using total and civilian government consumption; again these
results are not very consistent with a baseline DSGE-RBC model - people work more,
which is what they would do in such a model, but that should result in falling wages.
The effects of the SVAR models in the labor market have a strong Keynesian flavor:
unemployment falls and wage rises, suggesting strong effects on labor demand, more
strongly when civilian spending and especially civilian government consumption is used.
But there is one important exception - in response to shocks in (total and) military
investment, unemployment rises and wages fall, although insignificantly, a manifestation
of the negative output effects of government investment.
2.4 A model to account for the results
2.4.1 The basic results the model should explain
The positive effects of civilian spending and the negative effects of military investment
are similar to those obtained by Perotti (2004b) and Tenhofen and Wolff (2010). What
this paper has done in the econometric work was to analyze more thoroughly the U.S.
data and check whether these results still apply. However, in both papers the authors
give some tentative explanations. What I will do in this section is to develop a DSGE
model that will account for the most important results.
In this point I will repeat the important results of the empirical analysis. The first
is that civilian consumption and investment have strong positive effects on economic
activity - the response of the FED does not seem to be the main reason for that in the
Cholesky case, meaning that the actions of a central bank that lowers interest rates to
accommodate fiscal policy decisions do not seem to produce these effects; one can say
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the opposite in the BP case; in any case, the effects on the real variables are similar in
both cases (though the lower inflation in the Cholesky case seems to increase the output
multipliers), implying that the biggest part of the explanation is likely to be a real factor
(as opposed to a passive FED reaction to spending shocks), and this route I will follow.
All these results of government consumption can potentially be explained in the
framework of a DSGE model if government hires labor to produce a public good, which
raises the productivity of the private sector, working in a way similar to Linnemann and
Schabert (2006); this is the mechanism adopted here. It also explains the increase in
output, consumption, investment and wages and the fall in unemployment after govern-
ment consumption shocks. I will deal with the explanation of the effects of government
consumption here, since the effects of government investment have been explained by
Baxter and King (1993).
The second crucial result is that defense investment spending leads to contractionary
output effects; this result is in stark contrast with both major economic schools of
thought - in both, even useless government spending increases output, regardless of its
effect on consumption. The explanation I suggest is that military equipment is produced
by an inferior production function. This may sound and extreme assumption, especially
given that in military equipment the cutting edge of technology is used, but it has some
truth: companies that operate in the defense business are less exposed in competition
- e.g. in U.S. presently only two companies manufacture military airplanes; certainly,
defense contractors are rarely exposed to foreign competition. Often they are required
to keep their production lines open and ready for operation without actually producing,
because military contracts are infrequent and big - this definitely costs. In addition,
these companies are famous for exceeding budgets and timetables; the fairness in the
methods they use to compete is often questionable; these characteristics are indicative
of an industry that does not operate in a competitive manner. Then the basic effects
of government investment are also explained - when government decides to buy more
weapons, in practice it shifts resources towards the less efficient sector, leading to a fall
in total output; this contraction in output forces consumption, investment and wages to
fall.
The previous two paragraphs give the basic results the model should explain. Basi-
cally, the model explains the effects of the main spending variables. I do not attempt to
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estimate the model here so that its IRFs match those of the VAR as much as possible -
I only try to indicate a mechanism to explain the basic results. Importantly, the model
is real - no attempt to explain the inflation and interest rate responses is undertaken,
since they are not as clear as the ones of real variables, and do not seem that important
for the explanations of the reactions of the real variables.
2.4.2 The model
2.4.2.1 Households
The economy is inhabited by numerous households that belong to the interval [0,1]. The
representative household maximizes the intertemporal utility (1) subject to the budget
constraint (2).
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln(Ct)− κL
1+θ
t
1 + θ
)
(2.1)
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt + Tt = (1− τw)WtLt + (1− τk)(RtKt +D2t) (2.2)
Ct is consumption, Lt is the labor supplied in a period, Kt is capital owned by the
household, Tt is the (real) lump-sum taxes/transfers, Wt the real wage, τ
w and τk are
the tax rates on wage and capital income, the later including income both from lending
capital RtKt to firms and from dividends D2t. The household can choose Ct, Kt+1 and
Lt and takes the rest of the variables as given.
The solution of this problem gives rise to the usual Euler equations for consumption
(EL1) and labor supply (EL2).
1
Ct
= Et
1
Ct+1
(1 + (1− τk)Rt+1 − δ), (EL1); Wt = κL
θ
tCt
1− τw , (EL2)
2.4.2.2 Firms
There are two sectors in the economy, one that produces consumption goods and one
that produces goods that are consumed by government. In the first sector there are
many firms belonging in the interval [0,1], each producing the same consumption good
under perfect competition, while in the second sector there is only one firm.
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For firms in the consumption sector the problem is to minimize cost, WtL1t+RtK1t,
subject to the production function (3), which is a standard Cobb-Douglas one, with a
modification: G1t, a good produced by the government, affects the labor productivity, so
it has an externality, and its exponent, γ, controls the size of this externality; A1 is the
level of technology, Rt the real return to capital. As it is typical in competitive sectors,
each firm employs labor L1t and capital K1t up to the point where the factor price equals
the marginal product as shown in equations (4) and (5), price equals marginal costs and
profits are zero.
Y1t = A1K
α
1t(G
γ
1tL1t)
1−α (2.3)
Rt = αA1K
α−1
1t (G
γ
1tL1t)
1−α = α
Y1t
K1t
= MPKt (2.4)
Wt = (1− α)A1Kα1tGγ(1−α)1t L1t−α = (1− α)
Y1t
L1t
= MPLt (2.5)
An important thing to notice is that this is the big sector in the economy. This has
the consequence that factor prices, the rental rate of capital Rt and the real wage Wt are
determined in this sector. The other sectors are price takers. Additionally, all capital is
produced in this sector (but rented to both sectors after its production).
The monopolist that produces government consumption goods (military equipment)
has the objective to maximize profits, and it can actually obtain economic profits. Since
this is a small sector in the total economy, it takes factor prices as given. One thing
to notice is the different production function (6) of this firm: it is the same as the one
of the firms in competitive sector, but with one difference: A2, the level of technology,
is lower in this sector. Solving a cost minimization problem like the previous gives the
factor demands (7) and (8) for this firm, as well as the total and marginal cost functions
(9) and (10).
Y2t = A2K
α
2t(G
γ
1tL2t)
1−α (2.6)
K2t =
1
A2
(
α
1− α
Wt
Rt
)1−α
G
γ(α−1)
1t Y2t (2.7)
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L2t =
1
A2
(
α
1− α
Wt
Rt
)−α
G
γ(α−1)
1t Y2t (2.8)
TC2t =
1
A2
Wt
(
α
1− α
Wt
Rt
)−α
G
γ(α−1)
1t Y2t (2.9)
MC2t =
1
A2
Wt
(
α
1− α
Wt
Rt
)−α
G
γ(α−1)
1t (2.10)
However, being a monopolist, this firm can set its price - assuming that the govern-
ment has a demand function for this product that belongs to the constant elasticity of
demand category, e.g. Y2t = CP
−ε
2t (where P2t is the relative price for this good), the
solution of the profit maximization problem leads to pricing as a constant mark-up over
marginal cost (11) and real profits given by (12).
P2t =
ε
ε− 1MC2t (2.11)
D2t = P2tY2t −WtL2t −RtK2t (2.12)
2.4.2.3 Government
The government collects taxes and buys a) labor services Lg to produce the government
service to the private sector G1 using production function (13) and b) products from the
government producing sector G2. As mentioned before, the largest part of government
consumption is wages, so in the model what the fiscal authority buys is simply labor
services, at the market wage rate, in a setup similar to Linnemann (2009). To simplify
the problem there is no debt - the government budget (14) is always balanced - and
tax rates are constant, so varying the lump-sum taxes/transfers T ensures the equality
between taxes and spending.
G1t = L
ξ
gt (2.13)
WtLgt + P2tG2t = τ
wWLt + τ
k(RtKt +D2t) + Tt (2.14)
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Lastly, the two variables the government chooses to buy from the private sector
follow simple AR(1) processes (15 and 16). Variables with a bar on top denote steady
state values, elgt and eg2t are iid shocks.
Lgt = (1− ρlg)Lg + ρlgLg,t−1 + elgt (2.15); G2t = (1− ρg2)G2 + ρg2G2,t−1 + eg2t (2.16)
2.4.2.4 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
To clear the markets, demand must equal supply in all of them; this leads to the following
identities. These denote the equilibrium in capital market (17), in labor market (18),
in government consumption sector (19), in consumer goods sector (20) and the GDP
identity (21).
Kt = K1t +K2t (2.17); Lt = L1t + L2t + Lgt (2.18); Y2t = G2t (2.19)
Y1t = Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (2.20); Yt = Y1t + Y2t (2.21)
The equilibrium is defined by solving the system that is defined by equations (EL1)
and (EL2), (2) - (5), (7), (8), (10) - (12), (13) - (16), (17) - (19) and (21).
2.4.2.5 Steady state
From (EL1) one can calculate the steady state (ss henceforth) value of the real interest
rate: R = 1/β−1+δ
1−τk . From MPK (equation (4)) one has the output to capital ratio
Y1
K1
= Rα in consumption sector; then, after calculating the ss value of G1 = L
ξ
g using
(13), dividing the production function of Y1 (3) by K1 allows one to calculate the steady
state value of the capital to labor ratio in this sector: K1L1 =
(
R
αA1
)1/(α−1)
G
γ
1 . Using
this ratio in (5) makes it possible to calculate the value of wage: W = (1 − α) Y1L1 =
(1− α) Y1K1 K1L1 = 1−αα K1L1 R.
From the ss shares of consumption and government consumption sectors and the
respective production functions (3) and (6) one can do the following operations: Y2Y1 =
G2
Y1
=
Y2
Y /Y1Y =
A2K
α
2t(G
γ
1tL2t)
1−α
A1K
α
1t(G
γ
1tL1t)
1−α . Since factor prices are the same in both sectors, one
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Table 2.4: Parameters used in calibration and their values; bars over a variable denote
steady state values.
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Time discount factor
δ 0.02 Depreciation of capital
θ 2 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
τk 0.3 Tax rate on capital income (capital and dividends)
τw 0.2 Tax rate on labor income
κ W (1−τ
w)
L
θ
C
Normalization factor for disutility of labor
α 0.3 Share of capital
γ 0.4 Value of externality of government services
ξ 0.5 Productivity of government workers
A1 1 Level of technology in consumption sector
χ 0.7 Relative level of technology in government consumption sector
A2 χA1 Level of technology in government consumption sector
ε 4 Elasticity of substitution of government demand
ρlg 0.9 Autoregressive coefficient of Lg
ρg2 0.9 Autoregressive coefficient of G2
σlg 0.01 Variance of elg
σg2 0.01 Variance of eg2
L 0.3 Steady state level of employment
Lg 0.15L Steady state level of government employment
Y1
Y 0.95 Steady state share of consumption sector output in GDP
Y2
Y 0.05 Steady state share of government consumption sector output in GDP
can write: W
R
= 1−αα
K2
L2
, so the capital to labor ratio must be the same in both sectors.
This allows to write the previous equation as: L2L1 =
A1
A2
(
Y2
Y /Y1Y
)
= 1χ
(
Y2
Y /Y1Y
)
; since
L1 +L2 = L−Lg = (1− 0.15)L, one has two equations for two unknowns, the ss values
L1 and L2; solving one gets the following values: L2 =
(1−0.15)L
1+χ
Y1
Y2
and L1 =
Y1
Y2
χL2. The
rest ss values of the variables can be trivially calculated using the relevant equations.
2.4.3 The IRFs
To generate the impulse responses to the two fiscal shocks, the system is linearized
around the deterministic steady state using typical linear methods; the values used in
the calibration are presented in table 2.4; the time period is assumed to be one quarter.
There are not many things to discuss about the values of the parameters: most are
typical in the literature, and for those that are not (like γ or ξ or χ) there is scarce
or no guidance at all - the choice of values was based on the desire not to have a big
externality (in case of γ) or productivity of government employed labor (ξ is less than
1− α), and not to have huge differences in the relative technology levels (in case of χ);
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Figure 2.8: IRFs of theoretical model
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part B
the government is assumed to employ 15% of people (or actually 15% of working hours
in the model - Lg) in steady state.
As it is evident from figure 2.8, the model is quite successful in replicating the
effects of civilian wages and military equipment purchases on the main macroeconomic
variables. The positive reactions of output, wages, consumption and investment after
civilian government employment shocks are present, as well as the negative responses
of output, consumption and investment to military equipment shocks. The proposed
setup, that is to allow to different parts of spending to affect the economy in a different
ways seems to be able to generate the desired responses of the basic macroeconomic
variables.
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2.5 Conclusions
There are several ways to think about fiscal policy, especially about spending increases
that are the focus of this analysis, and there is still no clear consensus on their effects.
What this work has done is to carefully examine some aspects of them. First, I have
documented that the popular SVAR identification methods are successful into producing
proper spending shocks - for these shocks, the typical inference conducted is valid, at
least with the U.S. data.
Another contribution in this chapter is that I have carefully examined the differences
between identification methods. It has been shown that typical SVAR techniques are
not equivalent to those using exogenous shocks. One of the major differences between
them, apart of the shape of the IRFs, is that in SVARs one has a chance to isolate
effects of components of spending aggregates, while in the exogenous shocks cases this is
impossible; in the later case one is only able to estimate the effects of the typical policy
mix, e.g. the combination of military personnel hires and defense equipment purchases
or the combination of tax increases that have been used on average. The other is
that exogenous shocks can be used in a way that can minimize any effects stemming
from anticipation of fiscal actions, but this does not seem to be a major problem in
the spending shocks generated by SVAR analysis of the dataset at hand, confirming
previous work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and especially Mertens and Ravn (2010)
and Tenhofen and Wolf (2010).
The third contribution of the chapter is to show in a thorough way the differences
in the effects of the various government spending aggregates, combining and extending
the work of Perotti (2004b) and Tenhofen and Wolff (2010), under a variety of identi-
fying restrictions, as in Caldara and Kamps (2008). I have shown in detail that civilian
spending has a beneficial effect on economic activity; this spending category resembles
to a kind of productivity shock, giving some supportive evidence to papers advocating
this explanation for the positive effects of government spending on economic activity;
civilian consumption seems to affect private consumption and investment particularly
strongly, while civilian investment has the highest output multiplier; a big effect of fiscal
policy comes from labor market, through an effect that seems to affect labor demand
and supply. These results comply with those obtained in the SVAR literature, in e.g
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fata´s and Mihov (2001) or Perotti (2004a). However,
military spending does not seem to affect the economy so positively; especially govern-
ment investment seems to have a particularly negative effect on economic activity, like
a negative productivity shock. This later effect is not predicted by any standard theory.
Finally a DSGE is proposed to account for the basic effects. Its key property is
the disaggregation of the budget variables and allowing these to have quite distinct
effects, as in reality. In particular, government consumption - hires are assumed to
work in a manner similar to a productivity shock. Military equipment purchases work
in the opposite way, because they are produced by an inferior production function -
shifting resources towards this unproductive sector lowers the overall production of the
economy. The mechanism is successful in replicating qualitatively the responses of the
basic macroeconomic variables that are obtained from the SVAR models.
This work can be extended in several ways. A natural one seems to repeat this
analysis using the various tax variables and shocks, which are available at least for the
U.S. economy. The other is to repeat a similar analysis in other countries, preferably
those that have long quarterly time series data. These routes are left for future research.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Fiscal Policy
during the Business Cycle
3.1 Introduction
A very important question, especially for policy-making, is whether there are different
effects of fiscal policies during different economic conditions; this question has been taken
up recently by a number of authors, who have tried to answer this question from different
perspectives. One particular way to put forward this question, of the most important
ones admittedly, is to ask what are the effects of fiscal policy during the different phases
of the business cycle - are e.g. spending increases more effective during recessions, as
Keynesian theory and common sense (at least among many policy makers) suggest? In
addition, a related and extremely important question is which is the policy tool of choice
during recessions - governments should increase spending or reduce taxes?
I try to address these questions using regime switching models, namely Threshold
Vector Autoregressions (TVAR), and a variety of identification restrictions. A significant
difference from other papers utilizing a similar technique is that I use models with more
variables, in an effort to describe the economy more accurately, more identification
methods and that I try to look at the effects of different categories of spending, as well
as those of taxes, while the literature concentrates on spending; importantly, to my
current knowledge, this is the first paper that utilizes the recently compiled exogenous
tax shock series and explores their effects in a regime switching framework. In this
paper, robustness of results is sought, something not always guaranteed in potentially
67
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fragile models like those employing regime switching. I also try to sketch a model that
reproduces the basic results.
The basic results from the various specifications confirm the basic findings from
the SVAR methodology, and the papers undertaking similar analysis1: in response to
a spending shock, economic activity (measured by output) is higher, and the effect is
likely to be higher during recessions. Importantly, the spending shock has a positive
effect on consumption, suggesting that the simple neoclassical model is not consistent
with the data. A tax shock seems to have a negative effect on economic activity, though
this result is not as clear-cut as the one for spending shocks; consumption, and in
most cases output too, fall. In addition, inflation and the federal funds rate are more
likely to fall in response to fiscal shocks. Investment is more likely to follow the output
pattern. Unemployment responds in the expected manner to fiscal shocks: falls with
more spending, rises with more taxes. Furthermore, the composition of spending matters
a lot: civilian spending is expansionary, while military spending the opposite.
An important finding is that spending multipliers are probably higher than the ones
of taxes in recessions, at least when non-military spending (the bulk of government ex-
penditures) is used. The main policy implication of the findings is that a fiscal stimulus
package concentrated in spending is more likely to work, as a Keynesian would assert.
Another useful finding is that in most models output responses to taxes are negative
in recessions and very small, yet positive in expansions; negative output responses to
taxes is a pattern not so easy to replicate with linear VARs and conventional identifi-
cation methods, and suggests that important nonlinearities exist in the data, and not
all theoretical and policy analysis should be based on linear models. In addition, not
all spending categories are good to stimulate the economy in recessions - civilian spend-
ing is to be preferred as a policy instrument. Also, there is no sign of falling spending
multipliers after 1980, contrary to the findings of Perotti (2004).
Finally, a theoretical model is developed to account for most of the results. The
key insight of this model is that some simple and expected nonlinearities are capable of
reproducing most of the basic results from the econometric analysis, without resorting
to consumer heterogeneity or some form of unconventional utility function.
The remaining of the chapter is structured in the following way. Section 3.2 presents
1The interested reader should read section 1.2.2.2 in introduction for a brief review of related work.
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the methodology and the identification assumptions. Section 3.3 discusses the results
from the different specifications. Section 3.4 discusses the DSGE that explains some
aspects of the results. Section 3.5 concludes. In Appendix B I describe the data and
present the tests for threshold effects for both the individual time series and the VAR
systems, as well as graphs omitted from the main text.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Threshold VARs
The model used in this chapter is the Threshold Vector Autoregression (TVAR).
In this model there are a number of regimes, and the switch between regimes depends
on the (usually lagged) value of the threshold variable, which can be a function of
either an endogenous or an exogenous variable and must be stationary. This model
has several attractive features, from the practitioner’s point of view. First, it is a
regime switching model, so it can provide evidence about what happens in different
circumstances - regimes. Secondly, it is easy to estimate, since it is just OLS. Thirdly,
the regime change does not depend on some latent variable, about which one has no clue,
but on an observable variable with a clear economic meaning. On the downside, it is not
that easy to test for the existence of threshold effects; additionally, producing forecasts
and Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) is a rather complicated and time consuming
issue, since it involves a bootstrap or monte-carlo procedure.
Alternative multivariate regime switching models commonly used in the literature
are Markov switching VAR models or Smooth Transition VARs. Compared to the first,
a threshold VAR has two basic advantages: it is much easier and faster to estimate, as
it does not require any numerically expensive optimization of an objective function and
regime change depends on an observed variable, not a latent one which might not have
a clear economic explanation2. Compared to the second, a Threshold model retains the
(smaller in this case) advantage of estimation simplicity; additionally, one has to observe
that a Smooth Transition models should present strong regime switching effects mainly
when it is close to a Threshold model (so that it resembles an abrupt transition model,
2However, once estimated, it is much easier to simulate the Markov switching model in order to
produce forecasts and IRFs.
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despite being called smooth3).
Assuming that Yt and Xt represent vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables
respectively and wt the threshold variable and d its lag, a general TVAR model in which
both the coefficients as well as the variance - covariance matrices are allowed to change
across regimes can be represented as:
Yt = Ci +
pi∑
j=1
Ai,jYt−j +
qi∑
h=0
Di,hXt−h + Ut,i, if ri−1 < wt−d ≤ ri
The model is estimated by OLS by splitting the sample according to the value of
the threshold variable for all combinations of threshold values and its delay. The chosen
model (a vector θˆ containing the estimates) is the one that minimizes the determinant
of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated residuals Σˆ = 1T
∑T
t=1 UtU
′
t - formally
θˆ = argmindet
θΘ
(Σˆ(θ)); this choice corresponds to ML estimation under the assumption
of normality of residuals, but other choices, like minimizing the trace of the variance -
covariance matrix of the estimated residuals are possible. In practice, for a 2 regime
threshold model, one forms a grid for the different values of the threshold variable (and
possibly of d), leaving out enough observations at both ends of the vector of the threshold
variable so that there are enough observations to estimate the system, and then loops
over this grid to pick the threshold value and split the sample accordingly; in univariate
2-regime threshold models, it is typically suggested to leave 10% - 15% of observations
at each end out of the estimation - for the VAR, I leave out 20% of observations to
get more precise estimates. After splitting the sample, one performs OLS in each sub-
sample and stores the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix or the trace; when
the loop is finished, the threshold value that gives the minimum value for the minimand
is chosen. In this work, the break occurs only in the coefficients of the equations and
not the variance-covariance matrix, for reasons that will be discussed in section 3.3.1.
Testing for linearity is a difficult issue; the main reason for this is, similarly to the
case of testing for structural break models, the presence of nuisance parameters caused
by the fact that there are parameters not identified under the null hypothesis of linearity.
3In fact, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) who use a Smooth Transition VAR mention (in p. 6
footnote 8) that when they estimate all parameters simultaneously, their estimate of the parameter that
controls the curvature of the exponential function used to weigh the regimes is quite high, making their
model similar to a Threshold VAR.
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This means that the distribution of the test statistic is not standard and is dependent
on the specific data set.
To test for linearity, I employ several methods. The first was developed by Hansen
(1996) for the regression case, and extended by Hansen and Seo (2002) for VECMs
with one cointegrating vector (so it is readily applicable in the VAR case). The test
consists on computing the supremum of Wald4 (or LM or LR) statistics (supWald) for
each threshold value in the threshold region, and generate p-values for this statistic
using a fixed regressors bootstrap, which gives the correct asymptotic distribution; one
can also calculate average or exponential Wald5 statistics (aveWald or expWald) for all
possible threshold values - the latter two statistics may be more robust. The bootstrap
to calculate the p-values is done in the following way (see Hansen and Seo (2002) p.
303-304): take the residuals from a baseline linear VAR and multiply them with N(0,1)
variables; then regress the variable generated by the regressors coming from the TVAR
model, for all possible threshold combinations; calculate and store the supWald (and/or
aveWald and expWald statistics); repeat this process many times; compare the results
from the baseline calculation with those obtained from the bootstrap to get the p-values
as the percentage that the baseline statistics do not exceed the outcomes from the
bootstrap.
The second way to test for linearity comes from Tsay (1998) and is based on the
concept of arranged regression. The mechanics of threshold models are similar to those
of structural break models, where the latter have a time trend as the threshold variable.
So one starts by arranging the data according to the values of the threshold variable,
where d (the lag of the threshold variable) and p (the autoregressive lag) are assumed
known. Then one estimates the model with recursive least squares (expanding the
ordered sample for one observation at a time) and calculates the predictive residuals
(the residuals from the next period observation using the estimates from the current
period). Under the null hypothesis of linearity, those residuals are uncorrelated with the
regressors. The test is based on the regression of the (standardized) predictive residuals
on the regressors, and is actually testing whether a significant relationship between the
4the formula for the Wald is: W = (Rvec(B))′(R((X′X)−1 ⊗ Σ)R′)−1(Rvec(B)), where R is a 0−±1
matrix of restrictions, B is the coefficient matrix, X is the regressors matrix and Σ the variance covariance
matrix from the TVAR.
5The formula for the expWald statistic is: expW = ln(1/I
∑I
i=1 exp(W (i)/2)), where I is the number
of different threshold values used.
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residuals and the regressors exists. This test has a χ2 distribution under the null of no
relationship (linear model).
Two more ways to test for threshold effects are used. The first one is based on the
efficient bounds proposed by Altissimo and Corradi (2002 - for the regression case) and is
formulated as in Galva˜o (2006). This approach utilizes a variant of the supWald (supLM)
statistic, but from a model selection approach. Calculate for all possible threshold and
threshold lag combinations the following Wald (LM) statistics for the null model (θ0)
and the alternative (θ)
W (θ) = Τ
(
SSR(θ0)− SSR(θ)
SSR(θ)
)
; LM(θ) = Τ
(
SSR(θ0)− SSR(θ)
SSR(θ0)
)
where SSR is the sum of the sum of squared residuals from all equations. Take the
supWald (or supLM) statistic and reject the null if the following condition holds:
BWald =
[
1
2ln(ln(T )) [supW (θ)]
1/2
]
> 1
Finally, one can employ a pure model selection approach: chose the model that
minimizes the model selection criteria - AIC, BIC, HQ - although these criteria may not
have all the properties of the linear case; Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2002) advocate the use
of BIC or variants of it in the regression case, while Kapetanios (2001) proposes the use
of HQ in the same case; however, in both papers the best performing model when the
data are generated by a threshold model is AIC, rendering the choice of criterion quite
uncertain - here I present all of them, and take all into account.
3.2.2 Generalized IRFs
In what concerns the output - forecasts or impulse responses - from nonlinear models
like the TVARs, the main issue with such models is that their IRFs are not unique and
may depend on the regime, the past history, the size and even the sign of the shocks.
For this reason, generating IRFs or forecasts is a complicated process, that takes a lot
of time and is highly computationally intensive, since it involves integrating the effects
of all other factors that might affect the IRFs except the one under consideration, and
are called generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs); formally, the GIRF of a
vector process Yt to a shock vt at horizon n ≤ N conditional on the history It can
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be represented as: GIRFY (n, vt, It) = E(Yt+n | vt, It) − E(Yt+n | It). The shock can
incorporate identification restrictions, and in this implementation it does, so it is a
structural one, as will be explained in the next section. The algorithm to produce the
GIRFs in the present work is the following (for details see Koop et al (1996) or Galva˜o
(2003)):
1. Pick a shock vit (if there are many shock possibilities) and pick one particular
history Iit .
2. Draw a sample of size N + 1 by bootstrapping from the residuals of the model,
U i,N+1t .
3. Solve the the model forward using U i,N+1t and I
i
t . These are the responses absent
the shock.
4. Solve the the model forward using U i,N+1t and I
i
t , adding the shock in the first
period. These are the responses when the shock is present. Take the difference
between the two responses. This is the response to the shock in the current repli-
cation.
5. Repeat steps 2 - 4 many times, to compute the dynamic effect of the shock for
history Iit .
6. Repeat steps 2 - 5 for all possible (or desired) histories.
7. Calculate the mean response for all variables of Yt. These are the GIRFs to shock
vit.
8. [If applicable] Pick another shock vjt and repeat steps 2 - 7, until all shock possi-
bilities are exhausted. Calculate the mean responses to all shocks. These are the
GIRFs conditional on all shocks and all possible histories.
At step 5, 200 replications per different history are used in this paper. The forecast
horizon is 20 dates (after the impulse date). In the present work, step 8 is not imple-
mented. I do not present results from negative shocks, as it is customary in the relevant
literature - usually they are almost symmetrical around x-axis with the ones shown,
indicating that nonlinearities caused by the sign of the shock are not important.
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3.2.3 Identification methods
In the structural VAR literature several identification methods have been proposed.
In what concerns the fiscal VARs, several have been applied, and will be shown in the
context of a VAR including government spending, taxes, output, inflation and an interest
rate with this ordering, except when a Cholesky identification scheme is used. In this
work I use the following methods, in order to get results that are as robust as possible.
The first method, and the most widely applied is the Cholesky decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix of the VAR, with government spending ordered first, since
this variable is unlikely to react within the same period, once transfers like unemploy-
ment benefits have been taken out from the spending variable. In my implementation,
government spending is ordered first, followed by GDP, taxes, inflation, the interest rate
and the rest of the variables in the specification.
A very popular method is the one proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which
is equivalent to a Cholesky decomposition of the residual variance-covariance matrix,
once these residuals have been “purified” by extracting the automatic response of fiscal
variables to changing economic conditions, the latter having been calculated using in-
formation on the institutional settings for the conduct of fiscal policy or the tax system.
These two methods result in a B matrix in the first case and an A matrix in the second
(in the SVAR terminology - look at section 1.2.1 for details) with the forms presented
in table 3.1 for the 5 variables mentioned in the previous paragraph (in that order).
Table 3.1: Cholesky and Blanchard - Perotti identifying restrictions
a) Cholesky decomposition b) Blanchard and Perotti
b1,1 0 0 0 0
b2,1 b2,2 0 0 0
b3,1 b3,2 b3,3 0 0
b4,1 b4,2 b4,3 b4,4 0
b5,1 b5,2 b5,3 b5,4 b5,5
1 0 0 −bg,p 0
−a2,1 1 0 0 0
−a3,1 −bt,y 1 −bt,p 0
−a4,1 −a4,2 −a4,3 1 0
−a5,1 −a5,2 −a5,3 −a5,4 1
In the Blanchard and Perotti identification method, bg,p, bt,y and bt,p are the elas-
ticities of spending with respect to price and taxes with respect to output and prices,
and are calibrated using outside information. In this paper I use the values reported by
Perotti (2004) for the U.S. for these scalars, namely bg,p = -0.5, bt,y = 1.85 and bt,p =
1.25 respectively; for further details check the construction of the elasticities there. The
bi,j and ai,j entries (i,j numbers) are estimated.
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Another method used to understand the reaction of the main macro variables to
fiscal policy shocks is to find some good exogenous shock and calculate the reactions of
the variables of the model to this shock. It is the lack of good such shocks that leads
to the use of the SVAR methodology. For fiscal policy, the exogenous shocks proposed
so far, only for the U.S., are the following: first, the war dates by Ramey and Shapiro
(1988). Secondly, in Ramey (2011) two more shock series are proposed: the increases
in defense spending forecasts as they were published in the news and the change in
the forecasts of the forecasters included in the SPF survey. In what concerns taxes,
the exogenous shock proposed by Romer and Romer (2010) is based on the motivation
for the legislated change in the U.S. tax code - this means that the change in the tax
code is not enacted as a response to output movements. I use these exogenous tax
shocks (without retroactive effects) as exogenous variables in some specifications and
simulate the responses to such shocks; the SPF shock series has fewer observations and
its usefulness is debated (see Perotti 2007 and 2011 and chapter 2), while the other
tax shock variables are not guaranteed to be exogenous - Romer and Romer base their
findings on this exogenous series. These exogenous shocks, measured in percent of GDP,
are placed as exogenous variables in the TVAR, and their effects are estimated - only the
contemporaneous value of the shocks is used, and these effects are restricted to be the
same in both regimes, because there are very few observations in the recession regime.
Then, these vectors serve as the impulse to 1% (or 3%) increase in taxes. In addition, in
a specification where defense spending is used as the spending variable, I use Ramey’s
exogenous military spending shocks in a similar manner; this variable is not used in
the other models, as in chapter 2 it is shown that it does not move civilian spending
variables significantly.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Baseline model – all identifications
The baseline model includes total spending in goods and services (defense and non-
defense, consumption and investment), taxes, output, inflation, the federal funds rate
and consumption; one lag of the endogenous variables is used in each regime. Alternative
models, discussed later in this section, replace either the spending variable with civilian
or military spending, or consumption with investment or unemployment. The threshold
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Figure 3.1: Threshold variable and business cycle
-0.01
-0.005
 0
 0.005
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005
4-period lagged moving average of output growth
threshold
Shaded areas are NBER recessions. Threshold value of baseline model.
variable in all cases is a 4-period (backwards) moving average of output growth rate,
lagged once, and the threshold splits the sample (1960:1 - 2006:4) in high and low growth
regimes; as it is evident in figure 3.1, the chosen threshold variable is a natural business
cycle indicator. Details on the data are available in Appendix B.1. In Appendix B.2
linearity tests for the individual time series are presented. The linearity tests supporting
the choice of the model(s) are available in Appendix B.3. Figures with the GIRFs of
the other models are included in Appendix B.4.
Shocks, in all cases except when the exogenous shocks are used, are normalized to give
an initial 1% increase in spending or taxes, and big shocks give a 3% increase in spending
or taxes. In the figures, IRFs from big shocks are scaled down by a factor of 3. In all
cases, the starting values of the shocks are the same, implying no change in the variance
covarinace matrix of the residuals; there are very few observations (41) to estimate
both the coefficients (9 in each equation6) and the variance-covariance matrix of the
low growth regime (with 21 parameters); additionally, it would be too risky to estimate
different responses to exogenous structural shocks in the low growth case, since few
exogenous shocks observations occur in recessions (6 the case of exogenous tax shocks,
11 in the case of Rameys defense spending shocks); therefore, consistency across the
different identification assumptions necessitated the assumption of no break in residuals.
6Apart from one lag of the 6 endogenous variables, a constant, a time trend and a squared time trend
are added in the equations.
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In addition, assuming a common variance-covariance matrix in both regimes, meaning
having the same starting values in both of them, shifts the focus on the endogenous
reaction of the system, as opposed to differences caused by the breaks in the process
that generated the residuals7.
In figure 3.2 the responses to spending and tax shocks for the baseline model under
the different identifying assumptions are presented. A first thing to notice is that the
Blanchard - Perotti (BP) and the Cholesky (Ch) methods identify quite similar spending
shocks, which are also very similar across regimes and histories. The same thing happens
in the reaction of taxes to tax shocks (in all three cases). In all cases the responses of
spending and taxes have a smaller persistence in the case of recession history (when
starting values for the forecasting are from recessions only).
In the BP case, a spending increase leads to a fall in taxes, suggesting the existence
of a deficit bias of the fiscal authority; output and consumption go up, more during
recessions despite the lower spending increase, inflation goes up but the interest rate
down - here the spending shock looks like a Keynesian demand shock and FED seems
to accommodate fiscal policy. In the Cholesky case, the reactions to the spending shock
differ in the case of inflation which is negative, something that suggests the transmission
of spending increase through lower markups as in some DSGEs that deal with fiscal
policy issues; additionally, here taxes rise, leading one to think that the fiscal authority
does not change the tax rates and the output expansion increases tax receipts. Generally
history appears less important to the reactions to spending shocks in this case compared
to the BP case.
A tax increase under BP identification drives spending down by little - more intensely
so during recessions, suggesting that the fiscal authority raises taxes and cuts spending
when the latter has gone too far. There is a small negative response of inflation and a
tiny positive response of the federal funds rate during expansion (does not move from the
starting values) - but the latter clearly falls during recessions. Output and consumption
clearly fall during recessions once history from that regime is used, as most models
and common sense would suggest, but, curiously, there is a positive response of output
and consumption during expansions (or in recession when the full history is used). The
7In section B.5 of the Appendix some results from models where the variance-covariance matrix is
allowed to change are presented - there it will be shown that proper handling of structural breaks does
not alter the main results even in case of breaks in variance-covariance matrix.
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY DURING THE BUSINESS CYCLE 78
Figure 3.2: Baseline model, various identifications.
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(e) Exogenous tax shock
Red: starting in recession regime; blue: starting in expansion regime. Lines: 1% shock, regime
specific history; stars: 1% shock, full history; x: 3% shock, regime specific history; circles: 3%
shock, full history.
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positive output and consumption response to tax increases does not does not make much
sense, unless people were afraid of the fiscal position of the U.S. and the higher taxes
indicate a expansionary fiscal contraction story, something highly unlikely; probably it is
an indication of the high difficulty to extract tax shocks from the residuals of a (T)VAR,
even when the techniques used to do it are quite advanced, since the major force behind
tax movements is output fluctuations.
In the Cholesky case, tax shocks have a positive effect on inflation initially, a more
conventional outcome, since this can be achieved if indirect taxes rise, and a fall in
consumption, particularly during recessions; this inflation response is reversed fast. The
interest rate falls fast during recessions but does not really move from the staring values
in expansions. Like the BP case, they drive spending down and output up during
expansions. Even though the Cholesky approach is more atheoretic, the results from it
seem to tell a story that is easier to believe, if one has in mind some recent theoretical
models analyzing fiscal policy - the tax shocks especially seem more consistent with a
simple neoclassical model.
Exogenous tax shocks have similar effects in both regimes, but their magnitudes
differ; in both regimes, taxes rise and all the other variables fall, pointing to recessionary
effects of taxes, consistent with a Keynesian view of the economy. Particularly the fall
in inflation is hard to reconcile with a NK model, as markups and inflation there have
opposite signs with output. During recessions however, the fall in output is particularly
strong, suggesting that for some reason (e.g. more rule-of-thumb consumers during
recessions), it does not seem prudent to consolidate in a recession.
Evidently, there are clear nonlinearities in the responses, especially in those of output
and consumption - they both move more in recessions, since having common starting
values there does not limit subsequent paths a lot. It is clear that, in recessions, spending
causes real variables to increase more and taxes reduce them more. However, the size
of the shocks does not seem to matter - or at least shocks of the chosen sizes are not
what it takes to have regime switching often, yet I doubt that bigger shocks would ever
be politically feasible, unless under extreme circumstances.
This optical impression is verified by the output multipliers from each case; the
cumulative spending and tax multipliers8 are shown in table 3.2. More specifically,
8The cumulative multiplier at period p is calculated as the cumulative sum of the response of output
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Table 3.2: Cumulative mean multipliers across regimes of the baseline TVAR model
Spending multipliers Tax multipliers
Recession Expansion Recession Expansion
BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS
Mean 0.97 1.22 0.39 0.87 0.11 0.06 -2.58 0.40 0.17 -0.18
T=0 0.76 0.89 0.76 0.89 0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.12 0.00 -0.12
T=4 0.75 0.88 0.50 0.74 0.05 -0.03 -0.80 0.25 0.11 -0.16
T=8 0.91 1.11 0.31 0.76 0.03 0.01 -2.01 0.38 0.19 -0.19
T=16 1.17 1.52 0.28 0.99 0.17 0.15 -4.43 0.54 0.23 -0.19
(a) Mean multipliers using both regime-specific and full history
Spending multipliers Tax multipliers
Recession Expansion Recession Expansion
BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS
Mean 1.26 1.32 0.33 0.85 -0.11 0.03 -4.34 0.42 0.18 -0.09
T=0 0.76 0.89 0.76 0.89 0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.12 0.00 -0.12
T=4 0.86 0.89 0.47 0.73 -0.11 -0.14 -1.30 0.27 0.12 -0.10
T=8 1.21 1.19 0.25 0.74 -0.25 -0.09 -3.44 0.41 0.20 -0.10
T=16 1.59 1.70 0.20 0.96 -0.08 0.18 -7.51 0.57 0.23 -0.08
(b) Mean multipliers using regime-specific history only - 1% shock
BP : Blanchard & Perotti, Ch : Cholesky, ExS : Exogenous Shock.
spending multipliers are much higher during recessions, especially in the BP case, with
more pronounced differences if one uses history from the relevant regime - recession
multipliers rise and expansion multipliers fall a bit. These multipliers are close to 1 even
in the first year of a recession, and could be over 1.5 in prolonged low growth episodes.
Overall, these multipliers are in line with previous estimates for the US.
Tax shock multipliers also look different; in the two SVAR cases, they are generally
low, yet lower in recession. They are negative in simulations where the recession regime
has a recession history, although their magnitude is small. In the case of Romer and
Romer tax shocks, the multipliers differ substantially between regimes; they are slightly
negative during expansions, but very negative during recessions, although they are low
on impact. Such big (in absolute value) multipliers in recessions for R&R shocks are
reminiscent of the analogous results of Romer and Romer (2010) in linear models. How-
ever, the estimated values here (higher than 4 in recessions at four years) are too big
to be accepted without doubt, especially considering the difference in magnitude from
those reported from SVARs.
to the cumulative response of the spending or taxes, the latter multiplied by the average share of
government spending or taxes in output, as in Perotti (2004).
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There is the possibility that the SVAR shocks are not structural, unlike the narrative
shocks. However, if one reads the paper that documents the construction of the exoge-
nous tax shocks series (Romer and Romer (2008)), it becomes clear once again that the
SVAR shocks could be quite different from the exogenous tax shocks: SVAR shocks refer
to shocks to all tax variables together, so they largely consist of a shock to sales and
property taxes (with smaller effects on labor supply decisions), while the exogenous tax
shocks are in the most part shocks to income and (to a lesser extend to) corporate taxes,
and as such can have substantial supply side effects. However, such a view would be
open to a different kind of criticism - what is the economic mechanism that would make
the responses to tax shocks so different in high and low growth regimes, if they mostly
work through their effects in labor supply - why would the later be so much affected
during low growth episodes - can the labor supply function be so non-linear?
In general, leaving aside the question of which is the best way to identify fiscal shocks,
what the data suggest is that for immediate demand management purposes during a
recession, spending may be more effective, even though tax cuts may have stronger long-
run effects in recessions; output multipliers are higher for spending increases in the first
periods. Additionally, tax increases - consolidations - should be done during expansions;
histories of the shocks affect the results strongly - in this respect nonlinearities are
important. Additionally, the CB reaction does not seem to be important - either it
does not react to fiscal shocks (fiscal dominance) or these shocks do not move inflation
strongly enough to force the FED to react. I have to remind though that spending and
tax shocks did not have any big effects on inflation; these were mostly negative, and
even when they were positive, they were very short lived.
The results presented here suggest that the best policy to drive the economy out
of a recession should be a combination of immediate spending increases, lasting a few
quarters, to stimulate demand a bit, accompanied by cuts to income and corporate taxes,
that give the big boost to the economy after a year. This looks like an optimal policy
in ordinary recessions, where the zero lower bound is not operative.
Lastly, a very debated issue, the response of consumption to spending shocks, has
a quite clear answer in the previous models: consumption mimics the output response;
for whatever reason this may happen (e.g. Keynesian economy, government spending
resembling a productivity shock, rule-of-thumb consumers or non-separable utility in
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consumption and government spending), if someone expects a positive output reaction
then one should also expect a similar consumption response. Overall, despite the differ-
ences in magnitudes, the results for each identification method resemble those coming
from linear SVARs.
As robustness checks, I have also estimated the responses for all the cases using
more lags in the expansion regime, and I have also added as exogenous variables the
defense spending and tax shocks of Romer and Romer and Ramey respectively in the
BP and Cholesky case. The results do not differ substantially from the baseline case,
suggesting that the responses derived using the baseline model are indicative of the
identification scheme; only some more nonlinearities and substantially different shapes
between regimes are evident in the cases with 2 lags in high growth regimes, but the
overall picture does not change. One important difference occurred in the BP tax shock
when I used 4 lags in the expansion regime: in this case, the consumption response
was negative, probably because the output response was lower, reconciling the results
with those of the Cholesky method and conventional wisdom. Adding more lags to the
models with Cholesky identification, irrespectively of the addition of exogenous shocks,
leads to another major change in the reactions to tax shocks: output now falls and this,
apart from the negative consumption response, explains better the fall of inflation after
the first period.
3.3.2 The effects of different histories
There is high likelihood that the many shocks that have occurred during the last 50
years have altered the US economy, and these changes may have affected, among other
things, the potency of fiscal policy to affect the economy or its transmission mechanism.
This may be explored in the following way: produce GIRFs for a specific part of the
sample to see whether these change as time passes.
Figure B.1 (in Appendix B.4) presents the GIRFs of the baseline model under dif-
ferent identifying restrictions, where histories from each decade from 1960 up to 2000
have been used. It turns out again that the history used matters: while the responses
are similar to those in figure 3.2, a clear pattern emerges in most cases. Specifically, the
response of output, taxes and consumption to spending shocks has been stronger during
recessions in the 60s and, although not as much, in 90s, confirming the results of Afonso
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et al (2011)9. There are not many differences in the responses during expansions. In
any case, the differences found do not seem to have been caused by any differences in
the patterns of spending and federal funds rate.
As for tax shocks, no clear differences between decades and common in all identifica-
tion setups emerge; the only noticeable reaction was that the economy responded better
during expansion in the 60s and 90s, only in the BP and Cholesky cases and that the
exogenous tax shock implies lower vales for the real variables, as one might expect.
The results from the calculation of multipliers in table 3.3 suggest that spending
multipliers also vary by decade and are higher during recessions in 60s and 90s, con-
firming the visual impression from figure B.1, despite that fact that both regimes have
common starting values that necessarily mitigate differences. Tax multipliers do not
differ substantially between decades, yet still multipliers from exogenous tax shocks are
uniformly lower in recessions, particularly in 60s. An important thing to keep in mind is
that we do not observe the high tax multipliers in recessions of the baseline model when
exogenous tax shocks are used; this casts doubts on the magnitude of these multipliers,
especially since it is the same model that produces them, with just different starting
values.
Overall however, these results suggest that there is no clear trend towards lower
spending multipliers, casting doubt on the results of Perotti (2004), who documented
the fall of spending multipliers after 1980 for the US, among other countries; at least, no
significant difference in the reaction of FED is discernible, weakening the case for lower
spending multipliers because of more aggressive anti-inflationary policy after Volcker. In
addition, the high multipliers of exogenous shocks in recessions do not seem so robust.
3.3.3 The effects of civilian and military spending
Another issue that has not been thoroughly investigated is what happens when the
fiscal authority chooses to change different spending variables. Here I look at one major
decomposition of spending: defense vs non-defense spending. This distinction may be
very important, since defense spending is the definition of useless spending, while one
9To avoid criticism based on misunderstandings like that there was only one sallow recession during
the 90s, I have to say that the computation uses as starting values all dates in a decade, and the initial
regime is a recession or an expansion, meaning that the companion matrix from the relevant regime is
used for the first computation; the computation is equivalent to what you would get if each quarter of
the relevant decade was the beginning of a recession or an expansion.
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can argue that many components of non-defense spending may have various positive
effects on growth, both in the short and the long run. In chapter 2 it was demonstrated
that civilian spending can have completely different effects on the economy compared to
military, and mixing these effects by using total spending in goods and services might
be totally misleading.
Only Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) address this question, and find that spend-
ing multipliers differ with respect to the spending variable used, and that defense spend-
ing has the highest multiplier in recessions (reaching 4). Using the same models, identi-
fication restrictions and variables, I simply replace total spending with total defense and
non-defense spending. The results are presented in figures B.2 and B.3 for non-defense
and defense spending respectively (in Appendix B.4).
These GIRFs to non-defense spending shocks are broadly similar to those of figure
3.2, with stronger output and consumption responses in expansions; spending shocks
have similar persistence in both regimes. Only in the Cholesky case the responses of
taxes become negative and of inflation positive, resembling qualitatively (but not in
shape) those of the BP case; one can assert that differences in the identification schemes
for spending do not matter as much as differences in the information sets.
One interesting difference with the baseline model is the reaction to tax shocks in
models with non-defense spending in the BP and Cholesky cases. Here, the tax shocks
generate a permanent increase in spending, that drives output and consumption to higher
levels. In this information set, taxes serve to generate an increase in the non-defense
spending of the public sector, something that has a stimulative effect in the economy; in
other words, the identified shocks resemble shocks that are associated with a permanent
expansion of (potentially useful) government. GIRFs to exogenous tax shocks are just
like the BP tax shock of this model, with the only difference being lower starting values
of most of the variables.
The most important difference from the baseline model is in the responses to ex-
ogenous tax shocks. Here output and consumption responses are very similar across
regimes and both turn positive after a few quarters, unlike the baseline case with total
spending. Obviously, the multiplier (presented later) will be higher in recessions, but
this is due to the tax response, not that of output.
The GIRFs to defense spending - including Ramey’s shocks - are quite different. In
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all three cases, defense spending increases are less persistent in recessions. Importantly,
in all cases output responses are very similar and counter-intuitive: output turns neg-
ative after a few periods, faster in recessions. Consumption responses are negative in
recessions in all cases and negative in BP and exogenous shocks in expansions too. Taxes
do not move a lot in either regime, inflation and interest rate responses are negative.
Overall, a low growth, even recessionary, picture, totally different from the one depicted
in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko for defense spending, but reminiscent of the results in
chapter 2 for defense investment. In addition, it shows the importance of using specifi-
cations that enhance the information set and potentially give more robust results - as
the models become richer and more similar in the information they contain, the iden-
tification method becomes less important. Caldara and Kamps (2008), in linear VARs,
also document that similar models produce similar results, regardless of identification
differences.
The responses to tax shocks in models with defense spending are close to those with
civilian spending, but now because defense spending falls, allowing positive responses of
output and consumption in SVAR models and eventually in models with R&R shocks.
Yet, in this case non-linearities are more evident.
Table 3.4 has the multipliers of these 2 models under the various identifying restric-
tions; these verify the lower output responses to defense spending. Spending multipliers
in the model with civilian spending are similar with those in the baseline while tax
multipliers in SVAR cases uniformly positive; importantly, tax multipliers using the ex-
ogenous tax shocks are lower here, tending to be lower than those of spending, as SVAR
models predict, casting doubt on the size of tax multipliers using these shocks and their
robustness to different information sets.
Spending multipliers in models with defense expenditures are lower than those of the
previous case regardless of the identification and, oddly, are higher in expansions; these
results are opposite to those reported by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko. Tax multipliers
are very big again, reminding the values of the baseline model - however, these values
are suspect, since they seem to depend on the inclusion of defense expenditures in the
model.
As mentioned before, it seems clear that different spending variables have totally dif-
ferent effects on the economy. This is not peculiar: there are many categories of civilian
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Table 3.4: Cumulative mean multipliers across regimes of the TVAR model with non-
defense and defense spending; 1% shocks, regime specific history.
Spending multipliers Tax multipliers
Recession Expansion Recession Expansion
BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS
Mean 1.12 1.56 0.34 1.19 0.71 0.51 -0.32 0.54 0.33 0.28
T=0 0.41 0.59 0.41 0.59 0.09 0.00 -0.43 0.09 0.00 -0.43
T=4 0.98 1.03 0.35 0.72 0.18 0.08 -1.41 0.29 0.18 -0.07
T=8 1.26 1.63 0.27 1.08 0.65 0.40 -0.78 0.50 0.31 0.22
T=16 1.26 2.02 0.35 1.62 1.15 0.89 0.45 0.77 0.49 0.62
(a) Non-defense spending
Spending multipliers Tax multipliers
Recession Expansion Recession Expansion
BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS
Mean -0.06 0.21 -1.02 0.20 0.61 0.53 0.57 0.57 -2.14 0.42 0.14 0.02
T=0 0.99 1.09 3.56 0.99 1.09 3.56 0.09 0.00 -0.20 0.09 0.00 -0.20
T=4 0.36 0.57 0.46 0.60 0.84 1.70 0.14 0.01 -1.93 0.24 0.09 -0.11
T=8 -0.13 0.15 -1.37 0.27 0.69 0.64 0.45 0.40 -5.51 0.39 0.15 -0.03
T=16 -0.44 -0.12 -2.50 -0.22 0.35 -0.74 0.94 1.05 -0.43 0.59 0.19 0.16
(b) Defense spending
BP : Blanchard & Perotti, Ch : Cholesky, ExS : Exogenous Shock.
spending that are considered to be growth enhancing, like expenditure in education or
public investment, while defense spending is the definition of useless public spending;
however, even useless public spending is not usually considered to cause output to fall -
this makes sense only if the resources used for it utilize an inferior production function,
or distortionary taxes are raised more aggressively to pay for it; chapter 2 describes a
model consistent with the first explanation. Additionally, taxes used to finance different
types of spending can have totally different effects: taxes used to expand the useful
public sector may not be especially harmful, while budget consolidations using higher
taxes and lower useless spending may even be beneficial - these results echo the tale of
expansionary fiscal contractions, but for specific types of spending.
3.3.4 Investment and unemployment
Another much neglected issue is what happens to other important macroeconomic
variables during recessions and expansions. In this section I look at the responses of
two of the most cyclical variables, private investment and unemployment, which replace
consumption.
The responses are on figure B.4 for investment and B.5 for unemployment (again in
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Table 3.5: Cumulative mean multipliers across regimes of the TVAR models with in-
vestment and unemployment rate; 1% shocks, regime specific history.
Spending multipliers Tax multipliers
Recession Expansion Recession Expansion
BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS
Mean 1.99 2.08 1.03 1.10 -0.24 -0.66 -0.57 0.16 0.04 0.29
T=0 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.13 0.00 0.47 0.13 0.00 0.47
T=4 1.68 1.79 0.90 0.96 -0.17 -0.42 -0.02 0.18 0.11 0.48
T=8 2.16 2.29 1.00 1.08 -0.31 -0.74 -0.52 0.19 0.12 0.41
T=16 2.30 2.37 1.14 1.22 -0.31 -0.89 -1.10 0.13 -0.02 0.11
(a) Investment
Spending multipliers Tax multipliers
Recession Expansion Recession Expansion
BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS BP Ch ExS
Mean 2.06 2.03 1.17 1.13 -0.61 -0.76 -0.20 0.29 0.13 0.62
T=0 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.09 0.00 -0.08 0.09 0.00 -0.08
T=4 1.73 1.68 0.98 0.98 -0.43 -0.52 -0.16 0.21 0.15 0.38
T=8 2.23 2.18 1.13 1.10 -0.78 -0.88 -0.23 0.30 0.20 0.68
T=16 2.38 2.36 1.34 1.26 -0.77 -0.98 -0.23 0.36 0.10 0.85
(b) Unemployment Rate
BP : Blanchard & Perotti, Ch : Cholesky, ExS : Exogenous Shock.
Appendix B.4). Spending responses are very similar in both BP and Cholesky cases, and
are characteristically non-linear - real variables and inflation rise more in expansions,
interest rate falls more in recessions. Investment rises strongly in recessions while it
does not move in expansions. The results from unemployment model are also similar,
with unemployment rate falling strongly in recessions. Lastly, higher economic activity
is associated with rising inflation, opposite to what one would observe in an NK model.
These results have a definite Keynesian flavor.
Tax shocks lead to a decrease in government spending, stronger in recessions with BP
identification, the opposite using exogenous tax shocks. Output declines, but much more
strongly in recessions. Inflation and the interest rate fall, the latter more strongly in re-
cessions. Investment declines, much faster in recessions. Unemployment falls marginally
in the 2 SVAR cases, suggesting diminished effects of taxes on this variable, but quite
strongly in the exogenous shock case, a movement that must be associated with the
minimal output response (even positive in expansions) in this case. Once again the
R&R shocks raise some questions.
Multipliers for these cases are presented in table 3.5. Spending multipliers here
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are the highest of all models, both in expansions and in recessions, exceeding 2 in the
latter case. These highly cyclical variables give negative tax multipliers in all cases in
recessions, with values not exceeding -1 in general; in addition, apart from being lower
than the ones of spending, we do not observe big differences in the value of tax multiplier
among the various identification cases. Anyway, once again the extreme values obtained
using the R&R shocks are not maintained.
3.4 A theory model to explain some of the baseline results
At this point I will try to develop a theory model to account for the basic results. This
model must have some asymmetry built in it, so as to respond differently in recession or
expansions. At this point it is useful to repeat the basic reactions of the variables: after
a spending shock, output, consumption, investment rise and unemployment falls - these
reactions become more forceful in recessions; at the same time the nominal variables,
inflation and the federal funds rate, do not seem to respond differently in the two regimes.
Taxes also seem to have bigger and worse effects during recessions.
The closest work in spirit with this one is the paper by Canzoneri et al (2011), where
the authors develop a model based on Curdia and Woodford (2009); their aim is to
explain the asymmetric effects of spending shocks during business cycle that were found
by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010). Their model is based on the asymmetry gener-
ated by financial frictions over the business cycle - these countercyclical frictions make
the consumption of borrowers rise more after a spending shock during recessions, and
create big multipliers. Another paper that tries to explain the apparent non-linearities
of the business cycle is Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), where the forced deleveraging
during recessions help to explain the empirical findings.
In this paper I explore a different mechanism, following the lead of Reis (2007), that
is related to policy - the response of policy to changing circumstances; Reis observed
that the baseline RBC - DSGE can be consistent with a wide range of responses to
government spending shocks, if the policy rules are parameterized appropriately - it is
quite wrong to draw general conclusions from the results of models where only balanced
budget fiscal expansions are undertaken.
The key elements of the model are the following two. First, government is assumed
to produce a public good that enters the private sector production function; this idea
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has a long tradition in economics, and papers with DSGEs using this idea include Baxter
and King (1993) or Linnemann and Schabert (2006); most economist, including some
who adhere to the narrative approach to identify spending shocks (e.g. Ramey 2011),
are quite comfortable with the notion that government produces goods (e.g. public
infrastructure like roads or water facilities) or services (e.g. police or education) that
enter directly or indirectly in the private sector’s production function. Technically, an
assumption of this kind is required to overcome the negative wealth effect; it is not the
only possible10, but it is the easiest and produces a very familiar model, similar to the
one in the previous chapter.
In addition, the government conducts a kind of countercyclical policy: in recessions,
taxes are not allowed to increase so fast, because government coordinates fiscal policy
instruments, reducing the tax rate to accommodate the effects of spending. The pre-
sentation shows the levels model and the steady state for all variables, and the model is
solved using typical linearization techniques in Dynare.
3.4.1 The model
3.4.1.1 Households
The economy is inhabited by numerous households that belong to the interval [0,1]. The
representative household maximizes the intertemporal utility (1) subject to the budget
constraint (2).
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln(Ct)− κL
1+θ
t
1 + θ
)
(3.1)
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Bt = (1− τwt )WtLt +RtKt +Rbt−1Bt−1 (3.2)
Ct is consumption, Lt is the labor supplied in a period, Kt is capital owned by the
household, Wt the real wage, τ
w
t is the tax rate on wage income, Bt are new (one period)
bond purchases, RtKt is income from lending capital to firms, R
b
t−1Bt−1 is income from
bond holdings. Household can choose Ct, Bt, Kt+1 and Lt and takes the rest of the
10One could resort to Rule of Thumb consumers (Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido and Valle´s (2007)), requiring a
monetary model, but several trials have shown that it is very difficult to produce a variant of such a
model giving multipliers of the required magnitude. Other possible solutions, like firm entry (Devereux,
Head and Lapham (1996)), do not differ in essence from the chosen approach.
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variables as given.
The solution of this problem gives rise to the usual Euler equations for consumption
(3), bonds (4) and labor supply (5).
1
Ct
= Et
1
Ct+1
(1 +Rt+1 − δ) (3.3)
1
Ct
= Et
1
Ct+1
(1 +RBt ) (3.4)
Wt =
κLθtCt
1− τwt
(3.5)
3.4.1.2 Firms
The private sector in the economy produces a good that can be used either for consump-
tion or investment. There are many firms belonging in the interval [0,1], each producing
the same consumption good under perfect competition.
For firms in the consumption sector the problem is to minimize cost, WtL
p
t +RtKt,
subject to the production function (6), which is a standard Cobb-Douglas one, with a
modification: Gt, a good produced by the government, affects the labor productivity, so
it has an externality, and its exponent, γ, controls the size of this externality; A is the
level of technology, Rt the real return to capital. As it is typical in competitive sectors,
each firm employs labor Lpt and capital Kt up to the point where the factor price equals
the marginal product as shown in equations (7) and (8), price equals marginal costs and
profits are zero.
Yt = AK
α
t (G
γ
t L
p
t )
1−α (3.6)
Rt = αAK
α−1
t (G
γ
t L
p
t )
1−α = α
Yt
Kt
= MPKt (3.7)
Wt = (1− α)AKαt Gγ(1−α)t Lpt−α = (1− α)
Yt
Lt
= MPLt (3.8)
An important thing to notice is that this is the big sector in the economy. This has
the consequence that factor prices, the rental rate of capital Rt and the real wage Wt
are determined in this sector. Government is a price taker.
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3.4.1.3 Government
The government collects taxes and buys labor services Lg to produce the government
service to the private sector Gt using production function (9). As mentioned before,
the largest part of government consumption is wages, so in the model what the fiscal
authority buys is simply labor services, at the market wage rate, in a setup similar to
Linnemann (2009). The government budget is given by (10), and (11) gives the tax
policy reaction function: taxes are set to ensure solvency via ξ, which measures the
strength of tax response to debt, without excessively changing tax rates, and coordinate
policy objectives when needed with the parameter ετg.
Gt = L
χ
gt (3.9)
WtL
g
t +R
b
t−1Bt−1 = τ
w
t WtLt +Bt (3.10)
ln (τwt WtLt/τwWL) = ρτln (τ
w
t−1Wt−1Lt−1/τwWL) + ξln (Bt−1/B)
+ετgln (WtL
g
t/WLg) + eτt (3.11)
Lastly, public employment follows a simple AR(1) process (12). Variables with no
subscripts denote steady state values, elgt and eτt are iid spending and tax (rate) shocks.
Lgt = (1− ρlg)Lg + ρlgLgt−1 + elgt (3.12)
3.4.1.4 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
To clear the markets, demand must equal supply in all of them; this leads to the following
identities for labor market (13), and the GDP identity (14).
Lt = L
p
t + L
g
t (3.13)
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (3.14)
The equilibrium is defined by solving the system that is defined by equations (2) -
(13).
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3.4.1.5 Steady state
From (3) and (4) one can calculate the steady state (ss henceforth) values of the real
interest rates: R = 1/β − 1 + δ for capital, R = 1/β − 1 for bonds. The knowledge
of the ss value of labor, L = 0.3, allows to calculate the ss values of Lg = 0.15L,
Lp = (1 − 0.15)L and G = (Lg)χ. From MPK (equation (4)) one has the output to
capital ratio YK =
R
α ; then, dividing the production function of Y (6) by K allows
one to calculate the steady state value of the capital to labor ratio in private sector:
K
Lp =
(
R
αA
)1/(α−1)
Gγ . Using this ratio in (8) makes it possible to calculate the value
of wage: W = (1 − α)YL = (1 − α) YK KLp = 1−αα KLpR. Then K = KLpLp, Y = YKK and
C = Y − δK follow directly. The target level of debt to GDP ratio gives B and (10)
allows us to find the ss value of τw =WL
g+(Rb−1)B
WL .
3.4.2 The responses to fiscal policy shocks in recessions and expansions
3.4.2.1 Solution procedure
As I mentioned before, the driving idea of this exercise is that potentially very simple
(and quite old-fashioned) mechanisms can go a long explain towards explaining the
observed behavior of the main macro variables after fiscal policy shocks. In particular,
I will deal with just one.
The basic mechanism used to give asymmetric responses to spending primarily is a
very simple one that seems quite plausible on a priori grounds: I assume that ετg, the
coefficient that measures the strength of the reaction of taxes to government spending,
falls during recessions - any government is likely to be quite reluctant to balance the
budget during recessions, unless it faces severe market pressure to do so, something that
has not happened to the U.S. after the second World War, at least according to my
knowledge.
This assumptions mean that the world is perceived to have two states, expansion
and recession; during each state the same model describes the economy, with just the 1
different parameter. Then the policy functions are derived for each state using familiar
linear techniques, and the model is simulated in each state to produce IRFs in the
familiar way. The procedure is implemented in Dynare; cumulative output multipliers
are calculated by the formula multt =
∑T
t=1(Y
F,A
t )∑T
t=1(F
A
t )
, Y F,A is the path of output after the
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY DURING THE BUSINESS CYCLE 94
Table 3.6: Parameters used in calibration and their values; known steady state values
of variables
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Time discount factor
δ 0.025 Depreciation of capital
θ 2 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
κ W (1−τ
w)
LθC
Normalization factor for disutility of labor
α 0.3 Share of capital
γ 0.4 Value of externality of government services
χ 0.5 Productivity of government workers
A 1 Level of technology in consumption sector
ρτ 0.9 strength of tax smoothing
B/Y 3 ss debt to GDP ration (75% on annual basis)
ξ 0.2 elasticity of tax rate to debt
ετg 0 / -0.2 elasticity of tax rate to government spending in expansions / recessions
ρlg 0.9 Autoregressive coefficient of Lg
σlg 0.01 Variance of elg
στ 0.01 Variance of eτt
L 0.3 Steady state level of employment
Lg 0.15L Steady state level of government employment
fiscal shock in the relevant regime (after the business cycle shock, that determines the
state of nature) and F is the budget variable shocked, spending (WLg, by increasing
government employment) or taxes (T, by increasing the tax rate).
3.4.2.2 Calibration, IRFs and discussion
Table 3.6 presents the values of the parameters and the known steady state variables;
time period is a quarter. Many of the values of the parameters are quite standard
in the literature. For those that are not, the following remarks are appropriate. The
parameters of fiscal policy equations all affect the results. Productivity of government
workers is assumed lower than that in the private sector, similarly to chapter 2, and
the value of the externality γ is not high. They where chosen so that we get positive
consumption responses even in expansions, as some of the econometric results show,
and multipliers with the desired characteristics, that is stronger spending multipliers in
recessions and stronger spending multipliers than tax ones in both regimes, as in section
3.3.
Figure 3.3 presents the responses of the variables11 to spending shocks in both
11In both figures 3.3 and 3.4, variables are defined as: c=consumption, y=output, k=capital,
r=real return on capital, w=real wage, l=labor, lp=private sector labor, lg=government sector labor,
wlg=government spending, t=tax collections, tw=income tax rate, b=real debt.
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Figure 3.3: Model responses to spending shocks; red: recession, blue: expansion
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regimes. The responses are consistent with several qualitative features of the data,
if we consider Cholesky and BP identifications appropriate for spending shocks. In par-
ticular output, labor, investment and consumption rise in both regimes, more strongly
in recessions; the model is able to generate asymmetric responses to spending shocks.
This result is driven by the fall in tax rates in recessions, as government is slower to
balance the budget; this means that their distortionary effects diminish. People find it
optimal to work more in this period, as productivity is higher and taxes lower. Panel A
of figure 3.5, which graphs output multipliers in both regimes, confirms these effects.
Figure 3.4 presents the IRFs to tax shock in both regimes, and the second panel
of figure 3.5 the cumulative output multipliers to tax increases. As it is evident, the
mechanism is not successful at all to generate asymmetry. The reason is that only one
parameter really affects the reaction to tax shocks, and that is ξ, the elasticity of tax
rate to changes in debt, which increases tax multipliers and reduces spending ones as it
increases - however, it is highly unlikely that such a policy is relevant for the US in the
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Figure 3.4: Model responses to tax shocks; red: recession, blue: expansion
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Figure 3.5: Output multipliers; red: recession, blue: expansion
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Figure 3.6: Output multipliers with 2 taxes; red: recession, blue: expansion
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sample period - only countries under severe debt limits would be obliged to react more
in debt during a recession, and obviously this would hardly be the recommended policy
prescription in recessions.
However, it is possible to generate asymmetry in reaction to tax shocks in a different
way, using a slight modification to the model at hand. Suppose that there are 2 taxes
available, a lump-sum and a distortionary one, each covering 50% of government ex-
penses in steady state. What would be the differences if government could increase both
to balance the budget, or only the wage income tax? Logic says that in the first case
we have less distortions, so macroeconomic variables would fall by less. This is precisely
what happens in reality. Think of the following scenario: government does have these
two taxes at hand. In normal times, it is free to choose any tax to close the budget - let’s
assume it uses both, each to yield the same amount of revenue12. However, in bad times
it can only use the wage income tax to close the budget, for reasons beyond economic
analysis, like not wanting to increase consumption taxes that hurt poor more, or because
“serious” governments deserving loans have to make their citizens suffer more etc. Then,
in recessions one would necessarily obtain a higher tax multiplier. This is confirmed in
figure 3.6, where the output multipliers from this exercise are plotted; while spending
multipliers are quite similar, tax multipliers are now different, with those in recessions
higher, and quantitatively not very different from the best estimates for tax multipliers.
12Using only the non-distortionary tax would imply a zero effect on real variables.
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3.5 Conclusion
In the present paper I have tried to shed some light on the effects of fiscal shocks,
both spending and tax ones, during good and bad times. To this aim, several different
models were estimated and simulated under a variety of identifying restrictions for the
structural shocks.
While some of the results seem contradictory, fortunately some also hold in most of
the cases, and allow one to draw some general conclusions from the previous analysis.
The first one is that thresholds exist in the data - it is highly likely that such a model
describes the data better. In addition, both coefficients from different regimes and
different histories change responses to shocks quite a lot.
The second is that spending shocks may have large positive effects on economic
activity in low growth periods, and that these effects are not much dependent on the
behavior of the central bank - the latter does not seem to accommodate spending policies.
The output multiplier of spending shocks in recessions is likely to be over 1.5, making
spending, at least non-defense one, a powerful tool to dampen recessions. Another
important result is that different spending variables may have totally different effects:
civilian spending is quite stimulative, while military spending might even be bad for
economic activity. Finally, the power of spending policies to affect the economy does
not seem to be diminished in the last decades, contrary to previous results.
A third is that identifying shocks is a dirty business with many gray areas - one of
these is taxes, since it is very difficult to isolate exogenous shocks from their movements;
they are just too correlated with output. Another problem is that responses are de-
pendent on the information set, even in the cases of exogenous shocks. Assuming that
the ones identified in this work are meaningful tax shocks, then one should not expect
taxes to affect the economy in a uniform way; the more likely answer is that the effects
of taxes, and in particular the tax multiplier, even if it is bigger in recessions, is not as
big as the one of spending. The extreme values reported in this study and in Romer
and Romer (2010) seem to depend on particular information sets, and are not robust to
reasonable changes in variables. Based on that, a tax multiplier around 1 in recessions
seems realistic, while it seems reasonable to say that it is close to zero in expansions.
These estimates also have important policy implications. Higher spending multi-
pliers suggest using spending increases in recessions to stimulate the economy. Higher
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multipliers of both policy variables in recessions imply that sensible policy makers would
never want to consolidate during recessions.
One should not expect big responses of inflation or interest rates due to fiscal shocks;
assuming these move somewhat, these responses are (or become soon) probably nega-
tive. Lastly, consumption and investment follow the output pattern, while (unremark-
ably) unemployment the opposite. Overall, once again the world looks somewhat more
Keynesian.
Off course, as with any econometric application, the results presented in this work
can be extended and / or verified in numerous ways. The two more obvious ones are a)
to use a Bayesian approach to estimation in order to economize on degrees of freedom
and b) to use data from other countries to see whether results from the U.S. are common,
or a special case. Another thing to do is to look deeper in the effects of taxes - there are
many things that elude our understanding. All these routes are left for future research.
Finally, a DSGE model (or better, a DSGE model for each regime) is set up that
manages to explain some of the basic results of the econometric analysis, namely the
stronger responses of the main macro variables during recessions to either spending and
(not so successfully in this case) tax shocks. The mechanism that is able to generate
these responses is very simple: the lower speed of adjustment of tax rates to debt in
this regime; this mechanism is successful in replicating qualitatively the responses to
spending shocks, and with a simple modification, that is add a non-distortionary tax
instrument, in the case of tax shocks too. Such a simple way to achieve these effects
is quite encouraging for the ability of DSGE models to replicate observed responses, at
least in the real sector, but is also warning us for the (in)validity of drawing general
conclusions from special cases of theoretical models - these can be designed to be so
general that they can be compatible with many of the observed patterns in the data.
Evidently, more work is needed in order to understand and build models that are able
to replicate these responses. This is left for future research.
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Chapter 4
The Effects of Fiscal Policy using
Long-Run Identification
4.1 Introduction
It is hard to overstate the practical importance of knowing what are actually the effects
of fiscal policy in the economy. As the recent crisis has shown, there are limitations to
the ability of central banks to stabilize the economy, and this is much more evident in
the case of EMU, where in some countries the crisis is far from over.
There are several important and interrelated issues concerning the effects of fiscal
policy. The first is what are the sizes of the multipliers, i.e. the effect of changes in the
policy variable to output; the spending multiplier is considered to be close to one, as the
majority of studies in Ramey (2011) find; however, it is notoriously difficult to estimate
the tax multiplier, because in the data taxes are very highly correlated with GDP, so
are mostly driven by the cyclical movements of output.
The second issue is what is the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. The typical
neoclassical model, and most of current DSGEs, predict that spending has a multiplier
lower than one, since the increase in useless government consumption (that will even-
tually lead to higher taxes) forces consumption to fall. This is unlike the results of
the majority of SVAR studies, which predict that consumption rises after increases in
spending. The tax multiplier naturally depends heavily on the nature of taxes in the
model: a lump-sum tax has very different effects compared to a distortionary income
tax.
104
CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY USING LONG-RUN IDENTIFICATION 105
The third is whether it is possible to consolidate without too much pain. In an
famous paper, Alesina and Perotti (1995) advocated that a fiscal consolidation based
on spending cuts is preferable to tax increases, since the former has a negative effect on
interest rates, that leads to increases in private sector’s investment and consumption.
Naturally, such a view considers government spending as predominantly useless, and
reducing it does not deteriorate the equilibrium of the economy.
The methods used so far, namely SVAR analysis a` la Blanchard and Perotti or using
Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix, or using exogenous shocks,
have several drawbacks: in the previous chapter it was shown that exogenous tax shocks
do not give particularly robust results, while SVAR methods impose many restrictions,
which may be justified on a priori grounds, but typically are not testable; in chapter
2 it was shown that Ramey’s exogenous shocks are of limited use, capable to inform
us about defense spending, and not to be used to draw general conclusions, while SPF
forecast errors are not structural and using them may lead to incorrect conclusions.
Sign restrictions are also not immune to problems, and their application in fiscal policy
issues is likely to be less successful than in e.g. in business cycle issues, for the reasons
discussed earlier in section 1.2.1.4.
In this chapter I will try, like many others before, to give some answers to the first
two issues, and as a byproduct of the analysis to the third. To do that, I employ a
methodology different to those already used; I follow the recent literature in that I try
to estimate the effects using IV methods instead of the reduced form covariance matrix.
Following Pagan and Pesaran (2008), instead of trying to find exogenous instruments
to estimate responses to fiscal shocks, I use the instruments that become available by
employing the main identification restrictions: that some shocks have permanent and
some other have transitory effects. This procedure generates quite good instruments,
that allow reliable estimates of the structural equations while needing fewer restrictions
in the contemporaneous relations. Several countries are used, the choice of which is
mainly due to the availability of long enough fiscal data - especially taxes and transfers.
The basic results from the various models confirm the basic findings from the SVAR
methodology: in response to a spending shock, economic activity (measured by output)
is higher. Importantly, the spending shock has a positive effect on consumption, sug-
gesting the the simple neoclassical model is not consistent with the data. In addition,
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inflation and the nominal interest rate fall, something that is consistent with a New
Keynesian model where spending shocks lead to a fall in markups. A tax shock has a
negative effect on economic activity; both consumption and output fall; additionally, it
tends to have a positive effect on prices and the interest rate.
Spending multipliers are positive and quite high in some cases, and not as uniform
among countries as those estimated using SVAR methods. Tax multipliers are consis-
tently lower than the ones of spending in absolute value; the tax multipliers for US and
UK are much lower than those estimated using exogenous tax shocks. Also, despite dif-
ferences in estimates in a shorter sample starting in 1981, there does not seem to exist a
general trend towards lower spending multipliers, contrary to what Perotti (2004) finds.
An important finding is that the size of spending multipliers depends on the policy
coefficients - the countries with more countercyclical spending policies are the ones with
the bigger spending multipliers. The same thing happens with taxes - the countries
with the highest elasticity of taxes with respect to output also have the highest tax
multipliers.
The remaining of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 4.2 presents
the methodology. Section 4.3 presents the identification assumptions and the results
from various specifications. Section 4.4 extends the results and discusses in depth certain
aspects of them. Section 4.5 concludes. Appendix C presents additional description of
the data, tests and results not included in this chapter.
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Theory
This paper used Structural Vector Autoregression models (SVAR - in particular Struc-
tural Vector Error Correction models, SVECM) to estimate the effects of fiscal policy
shocks. The typical implementation of SVAR models is to estimate the effects of “struc-
tural” shocks by utilizing enough restrictions in the variance-covariance matrix of the
reduced form residuals to make estimation of the matrix of contemporaneous effects
possible. In this paper I will use a different approach, proposed by Pagan and Pesaran
(2008) that bases estimation of contemporaneous effects on the separation of structural
shocks into those that have long lasting effects on the economy - permanent shocks,
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and to those that only affect the economy for a limited period - transitory shocks. This
procedure has the advantage that it potentially allows more parameters of the structural
form to be estimated, but its implementation depends on the availability of suitable in-
struments. Ultimately, the estimation procedure resembles very much that of traditional
Keynesian Structural Econometric Models, but otherwise estimates are used to perform
typical SVARs analysis.
To begin with, assume that the true model is an SVAR in n I(1) variables like the
following1
A0zt = A1zt−1 + A2zt−2 + εt, (4.1)
which, like all VARs, can be transformed to the following form
A0Δzt = −(A0 −A1 −A2)zt−1 −A2Δzt−1 + εt = −A(1)zt−1 −A2Δzt−1 + εt,
(4.2)
and, if there exist r<n cointegrating relations, the reduced form of the model can be
written as
Δzt = −A−10 A(1)zt−1 −A−10 A2Δzt−1 + A−10 εt = −Πzt−1 + ΨΔzt−1 + et
= −αβ′zt−1 + ΨΔzt−1 + et (4.3)
while the structural one as
A0Δzt = −α˜β′zt−1 −A2Δzt−1 + εt, α˜ = A0α. (4.4)
The idea is that knowledge of some elements of α˜ allows to use the relevant cointegra-
tion relations, β′zt−1 as instruments to estimate some of the contemporaneous effects in
A0 matrix. The authors, making use of the assumption that some shocks are permanent
while other are transitory, and partitioning all matrices conformably, manage to derive
that “the structural equations for which there are known permanent shocks must have no
1The presentation follows closely the paper.
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error correction terms present in them”, so the first n-r rows of α˜ are filled with zeros2.
Our system is thus represented by two sets of equations, the first n-r having the unit
roots of the system and the other r having the I(0) structural shocks. One can easily
depict these in matrix form (by partitioning the matrices in (1) accordingly) as
 A011 A012
A021 A
0
22

 z1t
z2t
 =
 A111 A112
A121 A
1
22

 z1,t−1
z2,t−1
+
 A211 A212
A221 A
2
22

 z1,t−2
z2,t−2
+
 ε1t
ε2t
.
This system has I(1) variables, as well as shocks; to render the system stationary,
one needs to first difference the first set of equations (as no cointegration terms appear
in these equations) and impose the cointegration restrictions in the second set. Thus
the stationary system can be written as
 A011 A012
A021 A
0
22

 Δz1t
Δz2t
 =
 0
−α˜2β′
 zt−1 +
 A111 A112
−A221 −A222

 Δz1,t−1
Δz2,t−1

+
 A211 A212
0 0

 Δz1,t−2
Δz2,t−2
+
 Δε1t
ε2t
. (4.5)
With some simple algebra3, one can see that the system can be transformed to the
MA representation of the stationary time series Δzt to the transformed shock vector wt
A(L)Δzt =
 0
−α˜2β’
 zt−1 +
 Δε1t
ε2t
⇒
Δzt = A(L)
−1
 0
−α˜2β′
 zt−1 + A(L)−1
 Δε1t
ε2t
⇒
2This assumes that equations with permanent shocks are placed first, and it will be an assumption
maintained for the rest of this exposition.
3The derivation is very similar to section 3.3 of Pagan & Pesaran (2008).
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Δzt = C(L)
 0
−α˜2β′
 zt−1 + C(L)
 Δε1t
ε2t

=
 C11(L)0−C12(L)α˜2β′
C21(L)0−C22(L)α˜2β′
 zt−1 +
 C11(L)Δε1t + C12(L)ε2t
C21(L)Δε1t + C22(L)ε2t

= −
 C12(L)
C22(L)
 α˜2β′zt−1 +
 C11(L)Δε1t + C12(L)ε2t
C21(L)Δε1t + C22(L)ε2t
⇒
Δzt =
 C11(L)Δε1t + C12(L)(ε2t − α˜2β′zt−1)
C21(L)Δε1t + C22(L)(ε2t − α˜2β′zt−1)

= C(L)
 Δε1t
(ε2t − α˜2β′zt−1)
 = C(L)wt
In fact, because C12(1) has the long run effects of transitory shocks on variables
with unit root shocks, it must hold that C12(1) = 0. In addition, A(L)
−1 = C(L) ⇒
A(1)C(1) = In and since A11(1)C12(1) + A12(1)C22(1) = 0, the facts that C12(1) =
0 and C22(1) 6= 0 (it has to be nonzero otherwise C(1) would not be invertible) lead
us to find that A12(1) = 0: in the structural equations with permanent shocks, the
coefficients on current values and lags of all variables with transitory shocks must sum
to zero. Both C(1) and A(1) are block lower diagonal.
However, these are not the only restrictions that are allowed by separating the shocks
in permanent and transitory. It can be the case that a variable with a permanent shock
is not affected by all other permanent shocks in the long run, and that the permanent
shock it contains does not affect other variables with permanent shocks in the long run.
A commonly used assumption of this type is the monetary dichotomy - neither nominal
nor real variables affect the other in the long run. This has the effect to render C11(1)
block diagonal, and necessarily give A11(1) the same block diagonal structure. As a
consequence, when a variable with permanent shocks has zero long run effects on the
other variables with permanent shocks, the coefficients of its current and lagged values
in these equations must also sum to zero.
To have a better understanding of the effect of restrictions, this is how the first set of
equations in the structural form (5) will transform to when the restrictions are imposed.
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A011Δz1t + A
0
12Δz2t = A
1
11Δz1,t−1 + A
1
12Δz2,t−1
+A211Δz1,t−2 + A
2
12Δz2,t−2 + Δε1t ⇒
A011Δz1t + A
0
12Δz2t −A012Δz2,t−1 + A012Δz2,t−1 = ...⇒
A011Δz1t + A
0
12Δ
2z2t+A
0
12Δz2,t−1 = ...⇒
A011Δz1t + A
0
12Δ
2z2t+(A
1
12 + A
2
12)Δz2,t−1 = ...⇒
A011Δz1t + A
0
12Δ
2z2t = A
1
11Δz1,t−1 −A212Δ2z2,t−1
+A211Δz1,t−2 + Δε1t.
This form, since the variables with transitory shocks (and permanent shocks with
zero long run effects) appear in second differences, readily allows the use of two kinds of
instruments for the estimation of the elements of A011 and A
2
11: the lagged cointegrating
errors β′zt−1 and lagged first differences Δz2,t−1 of the variables with transitory shocks.
As it is evident, the equations with the permanent shocks are at least just identified -
in addition, as estimations progress, the estimated structural errors can (and probably
should) be used as instruments. In the second set of equations, only the estimated struc-
tural errors are available as instruments, so here one would need additional restrictions
to identify the model, or valid instruments outside the model. Yet, this procedure allows
more coefficients of the A0 matrix to be estimated.
4.2.2 Weak Instruments
As with all IV exercises, this one too may be plagued by the presence of weak instru-
ments; for the problems caused by their presence, a good introduction is Stock, Wright
and Yogo (2002). The previous analysis has shown that it is possible to find many
instruments to estimate the A0 matrix consistently with a minimum set of restrictions.
However, there is no guarantee that these instruments will be sufficiently strong for the
purpose. In fact, this is an empirical question, that cannot be answered a priori.
Specifically, for the potential problems of using long-run identifying restrictions,
the interested reader may consult Faust and Leeper (1997), and especially Pagan and
Robertson (1998) and Fry and Pagan (2005), who demonstrate how identification restric-
tions, and in particular long-run ones, lead to finding suitable instruments to estimate
A0; this procedure may lead to valid yet weak instruments, that could weaken sub-
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sequent analysis. Erceg et al (2005) found that even though long-run restrictions can
recover the true sign and pattern of the responses to technology shocks, they are subject
to significant small-sample bias and give rather imprecise estimates; these problems can
be caused by the weak instruments generated by such restrictions. An estimator that is
robust to weak instruments can be a partial solution to this problem.
In brief, in the presence of weak instruments the relevant literature has shown that it
is better to avoid the IV estimator in such a case - Stock and Yogo (2002) are among the
authors documenting the disadvantages of its use. The most common alternatives to the
IV estimator are LIML and Fuller-k estimators, but the relevant (quite big) literature
is still experimenting with other estimators, commonly based on the jackknife principle.
There are no still no widely accepted methods to estimate in such an environment.
In this work, I depart from standard treatments of IV estimation in two ways: the
first departure is that I use single equation methods to assess the strength of the in-
struments instead of using matrix rank statistics, as typically done in modern uses of
IV estimation; the reason is that the loss in power from using the full system methods
is quite high, even when the instruments are of acceptable quality; consequently, Shea’s
(1997) partial R2 statistic will be reported. For more details and discussion see Zervas
(2014).
In addition, unlike most attempts in the SVAR literature, I do not use the IV estima-
tor, but instead a newly proposed one - see Hausman et al (2012), the Heteroskedastic
Fuller (HFUL). This estimator, which is a modification of Fuller based on the jack-
knife principle, has much more desirable properties - namely is as good as Fuller in
homoskedasticity, but much better in heteroskedasticity, as documented by the afore-
mentioned authors. It is consistent in heteroskedasticity, unlike IV, LIML and Fuller
estimators. In homoskedasticity, compared to the IV estimator, it has much better point
estimates in terms of bias and confidence intervals generated by its standard errors have
much better coverage; compared to LIML, it is much more concentrated around the
true value, giving more robust estimates, and the confidence intervals generated by its
standard errors almost match those of LIML in correct coverage, despite being shorter,
making it preferable in practice, overcoming the main advantage of LIML, median un-
biasedness. HFUL can be written as (see Bekker and Crudu 2013 equation 9):
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β = [X′(P−D)X− kX′X]−1[X′(P−D)X− kX′y] (4.6)
k =
(T + 1)α− 1
T + α− 1 , α = mineig({[y X]
′[y X]}−1{[y X]′(P−D)[y X]}),
where y is the endogenous variable, X the regressors, P = Z(Z′Z)−1Z′ is the projection
matrix of the instruments Z, D is a diagonal matrix with the elements of the main
diagonal of P, and T is the sample length.
4.2.3 Impulse Responses
Typical SVAR analysis aims to generate the impulse responses of the system to the
structural shock(s) of interest. I will not deviate from this tradition. Since the interest
lies on the effects of fiscal policy, I estimate the A0 matrix with the procedure described
in the previous subsection and then feed (the relevant columns of) its inverse to the
companion matrix generated by the reduced form VECM, in order to get the impulses
to innovations in government spending and taxes. Confidence intervals for these impulse
responses are generated in a Bayesian way (Koop and Korobilis 2010 is a useful introduc-
tion to the literature), assuming an uninformative natural conjugate Normal-Wishart
prior given by the HFUL estimates of each structural equation separately and the OLS
estimates of the reduced form VECM (assuming known - not estimated - cointegrating
relations for reasons explained later). The posterior has the form
Σ=iW(V, ν), Β|Σ = N(B, Σ) (4.7)
where iW(V, ν) is the inverse Wishart distribution centered at V with ν degrees of
freedom, B and V are the estimated coefficient vector (or vectorized system in the case
of VECM) and variance covariance matrix of parameters respectively; ν is equal to the
number of columns of V plus 3, so as to be uninformative4. Confidence intervals are
generated by Monte Carlo integration: in each iteration, a draw from the iW distribution
gives a variance covariance matrix for each equation (or the VECM), which is then used
to get a draw for the coefficient vector, assemble the A0 matrix as well as the companion
4There are no clear guidelines for the selection of ν, except that it has to be low so as not to drive the
results, with no explicit numbers, and at least equal to the columns of V, in order for the distribution
to have support. 3 was chosen as it is low, yet not as low as to make IRFs meaningless.
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matrix and calculate the IRFs for this iteration.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Data, model setup and identification restrictions
The dataset includes 6 countries, US, UK, EMU, France, Canada and Australia. The
choice of countries was dictated by the availability of fiscal, and especially tax data,
publicly in the internet covering a time period sufficient to estimate a VAR - the shortest
sample available, in the case of France, begins in 1980. Frequency is quarterly. More
details on the data are available in Appendix C.1.
The sample is not uniform in all countries, but differs primarily according to data
availability. In all countries it stops at the end of 2006 (end of 2005 in EMU case, as
the database has not been updated further) - this date was chosen in order to avoid
possible nonlinearities from the crisis. The beginning of the sample is 1960:1 in US and
UK; 1963:1 in Canada; 1970:1 in Australia (no interest rate is available before late 60’s);
1981:1 in France and EMU - in the latter case the database starts at 1970, but it is more
reasonable to treat the initial EMU countries as a unified economy only after ERM had
essentially fixed the exchange rates and harmonized monetary policy across them.
For each country, a VECM with 7 variables5 was estimated; the variables are real
government spending in good and services (consumption and investment) - g, real GDP -
y, inflation (from GDP deflator) - pi, real private consumption - c, real private investment
- ip, real net taxes - t, and a short term interest rate - i. All models have two lags in
VAR form. In all VECMs 4 cointegrating restrictions are imposed: g - t (stationarity of
fiscal deficit), ip - y and c - y (balanced growth path - great ratios are stationary) and
i - pi (stationarity of the real interest rate). In all cases, the necessary deterministic
variables to make the cointegrating relations (as close as possible to being) stationary
are used - fortunately breaks appear to have an economic significance - these break
variables are restricted in the cointegrating relations. For more details on lag selection
and cointegrating properties of the data, the interested reader should read Appendix
C.2.
5One thing to mention here is that there is a tradeoff between the VAR dimension and the appropriate
lag length - bigger VARs typically allow one to use less lags, as truncated VARs have an infinite VAR
representation, so many lags are needed to approximate the infinite polynomial sufficiently well.
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With 4 cointegrating relations, the identifying assumption in section 4.2.1 means
that in the structural form, there are 3 equations having the permanent shocks - the
unit roots of the system, and 4 equations with transitory shocks6. The assumption is
that the variables with the permanent shocks are g, y and pi, so we have a permanent
fiscal (spending shock), a permanent real (“supply”) shock and a permanent nominal
shock (like the central bank’s inflation target). The other variables carry the transitory
shocks - t has the transitory fiscal (tax) shock - the fiscal authority first decides about
the level of spending, and then adjusts taxes to maintain solvency.
There is another identifying assumption concerning the permanent shocks: the per-
manent nominal shock does not affect g and y in the long run, and pi is not affected by
real shocks in the long run. Then, as shown in section 4.2.1, in the equation for pi all
other endogenous variables (including g and y) appear in second differences, allowing to
use lagged differences as instruments, while in the equations for g and y, pi appears in
second differences, so its lagged difference is once again a valid instrument. Thus, the
structural equations with permanent shocks are always overidentified, as the available
instruments to estimate the 6 unknown coefficients of the first 3 rows of the A0 matrix
are, at the very least, the lagged cointegrating errors (4) and the lagged first differences
(4, 6 in the equation for pi), and progressively the estimated structural errors become
available. In addition, since lagged differences are likely to be quite good instruments
for the second differences7, it seems reasonable to start the estimation of structural
equations from the equation for pi, followed by the one for g and then the one for y.
Turning now to the equations with transitory shocks, we see that there are less in-
struments than necessary to estimate all the elements of the last 4 rows of the A0 matrix
- the only available instruments to begin with are the 3 estimated permanent shocks, and
as estimation progresses the estimated transitory shocks will become available. Thus,
some more restrictions are necessary. The most obvious ones are possible in the equa-
tions for i and t : a central bank following a Taylor rule (in general, a c.b. with a mandate
to stabilize the economy and fight inflation) would only react on output and inflation
- if it also tends to accommodate the fiscal authority, then it would react to spending
increases - but no reaction to c, ip or t are expected, therefore the relevant coefficients
6I also assume that the structural errors are uncorrelated within the period and impose that assump-
tion by including these errors as instruments even if they are not needed.
7This is verified in the data, as it will become evident in Appendix C.3.
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are set to 0. If the tax equation follows the interest rate equation, 4 instruments (the
estimated structural errors) are available; the minimum for a tax equation (tax reac-
tion function) would consist of the reaction of taxes to output and inflation, but also
adding spending (it is conceivable that the fiscal authority changes taxes in response to
spending changes) and interest rate (either reaction to market pressure to close deficits
or countercyclical fiscal policy - when c.b. tightens to fight inflation, government tries
to mitigate the pain) seems justified. Finally, one more restriction is needed, and it is
placed in the equation for consumption, where I assume that consumption is not affected
by investment contemporaneously - consumption decisions precede those for investment.
In total, this procedure requires 6 restrictions in the A0 matrix, instead of 21 that would
be necessary if covariance restrictions were used. The pattern of the estimated matrix
is the following (with * are the estimated elements):

1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ 1 0 ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 1 ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 1 ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 1

(4.8)
However, this sequence of estimating the structural equations is not kept if it does
not result in good instruments, and the structural equations are reordered so as to
find overall better instruments. The method should be viewed as quite successful in
generating both valid and strong instruments, suitable to estimate the contemporaneous
relations. The Sargan and Andreson - Rubin tests, as well as the partial R2 statistics
presented in tables C.8 and C.9 in Appendix C.3, for all countries and identification
patterns, confirm this. As it is evident, in only a few coefficients instruments are rather
(but not very) weak, and it is for this cases that I opted to use the HFUL estimator.
In addition, it is usually (and reasonably) argued that spending does not react to
other variables contemporaneously due to the time it takes to parliaments to enact
legislation, as well as due to implementation lags - this is the argument used to justify
the Cholesky decomposition with spending ordered first as an appropriate way to identify
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spending shocks. For this reason, an alternative identification pattern is used, which is
like (8), except that in the first line only the third element, the response of spending
to inflation, is estimated; this is a pattern analogous to the one used in Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004) - except that the response to inflation is estimated,
not imposed.
In addition, in the equation for taxes, the aforementioned authors fix the elasticities
based on information outside the model, e.g. on the tax structure. In the current imple-
mentation, the procedure generates instruments that allow estimating these elasticities.
4.3.2 Results
This section presents the results of both specifications. To begin with, figure 4.1 presents
the impulse responses to spending shocks from the baseline specification for all countries
with 90% posterior intervals. Spending increases cause output to rise significantly in
all countries, with the exception of UK where the increase is marginally insignificant.
Importantly, consumption rises significantly in all cases. In most countries, private
investment rises significantly, with the exception of UK and (the first periods of) EMU;
in fact, it is this particular response that seems to determine the strength of the output
response - since consumption always rises, it is the response of private investment that
will determine the total output response. Taxes rise, as the cointegration restriction
forces them to match the spending increase eventually - however, initially we get a
deficit. In what concerns nominal variables, spending increases force inflation to fall
significantly in all countries; this effect is consistent with with a baseline NK model
where all shocks with positive effects on output work through the fall in markups, and
consequently inflation. Lastly, the effects on interest rates are not uniform - they fall
in France, EMU and US, a response consistent with the fall in inflation, do not move
significantly in UK and rise significantly in Australia and Canada.
Next, figure 4.2 shows the responses to tax increases in the baseline specification.
In all cases, taxes rise, yet there is an important distinction in these responses: in
Australia, France, EMU and the US, taxes eventually return to zero; in Canada and
the UK, they set in a positive value. This is a fundamental difference, as the workings
of cointegration restrictions force the system to settle on a different equilibrium; in the
first case, spending does not move significantly, so output is rather free to move and
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falls driving consumption and investment down. In the other case, spending settles in a
higher equilibrium, and forces output to increase, as a predominantly spending increase
would do - the consumption response is negative in Canada or essentially zero in the UK,
leaving private investment to do the adjustment; one might not want to consider these
cases as having proper tax shocks; alternatively, one might want to consider these cases
as a combination of a tax shock and a permanent fiscal expansion. In what concerns the
nominal variables, inflation and interest rates rise in France and EMU, consistently with
a baseline NK model where recessions are linked with increases in markups and inflation.
In the other countries inflation (after an initial positive response in UK, Australia and
Canada) and interest rates fall, consistently with a Keynesian view of the economy.
Turning now to the alternative identification, one has to bear in mind that spend-
ing is identified similarly to typical SVAR implementations, and responses to spending
shocks are expected to behave similarly to those generated from conventional Cholesky
decompositions with spending first - unless the estimated inflation coefficient has some
significant effect. Tax shocks are identified as in the previous case, so no big differences
are expected between them. These expectations are verified in the data, if one compares
the IRFs in figures 4.3 with those in figure C.1 in appendix C.4 and those in figure 4.4
with those in 4.2. Therefore, I will only discuss spending results here: once again, a
spending increase causes output and consumption to increase significantly in all cases;
taxes rise to close the deficit. Private investment responses are positive in the end of
the forecasting period, but in most cases negative initially. Inflation and interest rates
fall in all cases. These responses are quite uniform and their similarity in all countries
of the sample, their similarity with a modified NK model and their simplicity, both in
implementation as well as in justification, are probably the reasons for the widespread
use of Cholesky identification to spending shocks.
In table 4.1 the cumulative output multipliers8 of all aforementioned cases are pre-
sented; The multipliers of Cholesky shocks are in table C.10 in Appendix C.4, and their
similarity with those of alternative identification for spending shocks is striking. Out-
put multipliers of spending are much higher in the baseline identification in Australia,
Canada and US, are essentially the same in the two identifications in France and UK,
8The cumulative sum of the IRFs of output divided by the same sum of the fiscal variable, divided
by the average share of the fiscal variable in GDP.
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and are lower in the baseline identification in EMU. In the alternative identification they
are close to one in all countries but UK.
The output multipliers of tax shocks are higher in the baseline identification in Aus-
tralia, France, EMU and the US, and they are the same in Canada and UK. Importantly,
the absolute values of tax multipliers are always lower than those of spending multipli-
ers, especially in the first two years, in all countries. One thing to remember is that, as
shown in Appendix C.3, if one accepts the validity of the identifying restrictions then
one has to admit that tax equations are very well identified, since the quality of IVs for
this equation is very good, and the estimates have to be close to true parameter val-
ues. Another is that it is possible to generate responses compatible with usual a priori
views on tax shocks (negative output and consumption responses), unlike typical SVAR
models, in which this is quite hard to achieve.
An interesting thing to note, deserving further scrutiny, is that in the SVAR models
with short-run restrictions in Appendix C.4, in two countries one is able to generate
conventional responses to shocks in taxes and significantly negative (and quite big)
output tax multipliers: in Australia and the US. Although this is just a conjecture,
perhaps it has to do with a characteristic that is unique to these two countries: they
constitute the most closed economies in the sample. It may be possible that this kind of
structural shocks, that occur in variables highly correlated with real activity, like taxes
or interest rates, are only identifiable using SVAR methods in closed economies, where
external shocks do not complicate things any further.
Finally, as it is evident from the results presented in Appendix C.5, adding for-
eign activity variables, namely Lutz Kilian’s Global Activity Measure (GAM), does not
significantly affect results. In particular, it is clear from table C.11 that GAM enters
the models of Australia, Canada, UK and US in the full sample (here sample starts at
1969:1 since GAM is not available before 1968), but does not enter the models in the
post 81 period in all countries but UK - possible reasons for this effect might be that
the system of flexible exchange rates made foreign shocks less influential, despite the
increase in trade volume; in addition, for countries other than U.S., the introduction of
flexible exchange rates allowed the use of monetary policy to stabilize the economy, as
the central bank did not have to maintain a peg. Multipliers reported in table C.12 for
the baseline identification case in the cases were GAM was significant indicate that the
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Table 4.2: Spending equations estimates
Baseline Alternative
Country y pi c ip t i pi
Australia -1.2245 0.16216 0.0057431 -0.090879 -0.076016 -0.96463 0.44939**
Canada -0.25456 0.087817 -0.099398 -0.14293 -0.0079698 -0.58892 0.1444
France 0.35299 -0.10364 -0.2678** -0.082346 -0.044098 -0.18186 -0.11382
UK 0.23702 -0.069004 -0.55235** 0.045219 0.04114 -0.88331 -0.27122*
EMU 0.20944 0.064692 -0.30542 0.13343 -0.10404 -0.090416 -0.079025
US 0.44249 0.20997 -1.5081* -0.18325* 0.050065 1.2137* -0.041856
Significance (one sided): at 10% level bold, at 5% level bold and star, at 1% level bold
and double star
main results remain intact, and possibly are even stronger9.
4.3.3 Why do multipliers across identifications differ?
The answer is off course that the estimates differ. But which estimates drive the re-
sults? Obviously, the prime suspect is the spending equation. In table 4.2 the estimated
coefficients for contemporaneous variables from spending equations of all countries are
presented. A few things are worth mentioning. First, the inflation coefficients in the
alternative identification, the one resembling the Blanchard and Perotti approach, are
insignificant in most cases and their values are much lower in absolute value than the
baseline value considered by Perotti (-0.5); additionally, in the full equations no coef-
ficient of inflation is ever significant, casting doubt on the true significance of inflation
coefficients in the two cases (Australia and UK) where they were significant.
The most important thing however is the estimates of the full equations. In most
cases, there are significant estimates, some of which are highly so; especially the coef-
ficients of private consumption are significant in 4 out of 6 countries. These estimates
suggest the implementation of some kind of countercyclical policy in real time, unlike
the usual arguments suggesting that the fiscal authority is not reacting contemporane-
ously to changing economic environment. The estimates also suggest that the size of
multipliers is roughly analogous to the strength of that countercyclical policy. US that
has the strongest countercyclical policy also has the strongest output multiplier.
In addition, the estimates suggest that the usual identification of spending shocks by
government spending ordered first in the Cholesky ordering is likely to be misspecified
9As it is shown in table C.13 in that Appendix, the reasons for higher spending multipliers, to be
discussed in the next section, are the same.
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in several occasions. In fact, eliminating some insignificant regressors (inflation in all
cases, output in UK, US and EMU10, consumption in Australia and Canada) reveals
that the results obtained in these restricted models (available on request) do not change
substantially from those in the baseline specification. The most notable differences are
that the spending multipliers of Australia, EMU and UK rise - in EMU the multiplier
becomes very similar to the one obtained by the alternative identification - and that
both US multipliers fall slightly.
4.4 Further issues
4.4.1 Stability of responses - do the exchange rate regime or policy
changes affect the outcomes?
In Perotti (2004) it was documented that there was a fall in government spending mul-
tipliers, that was attributed by the author and by Bilbiie et al (2008) mostly to the
change in monetary policy, that became more anti-inflationary after 1980, and conse-
quently less accommodative to fiscal expansions; in addition, a contributing factor was
also the fall in the percentage of credit constrained consumers. Canzoneri et al (2012)
argue for a related, yet different explanation: the change in exchange rate regime that
led to a change in monetary policy target, from exchange rate stabilization to interest
rate stabilization, and secondarily increased openness.
Do these findings survive the change in identification restrictions? Table 4.3 presents
the spending and tax multipliers from estimating the models of Australia, Canada, UK
and US in a shorter sample, 1981 - 200611; one may compare the relevant entries with
those of Cholesky identification presented in table C.10 in Appendix C.4. Once again,
the results from the alternative identification are similar to those from the Cholesky.
However, the baseline identification does not reveal any general trend towards re-
duced effectiveness of spending increases. Only in Australia can one clearly observe such
an effect. In US, the multiplier falls only on the first few periods, while in Canada and
the UK it actually rises. Tax multipliers do not change substantially, yet they increase
a bit (in absolute value) in UK and US. It seems that the fall in the effectiveness of
10Eliminating output in the spending equation of France allows spending multiplier to reach 2 on
impact and 1.55 in the long run.
11France and EMU are omitted since the short sample was used from the beginning.
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spending policy is an artifact of the changes in the variance-covariance matrix after
1980, which naturally affect any identification method based on the residuals; both the
Cholesky decomposition of the residual variance-covariance matrix and the method of
Blanchard and Perotti are using residuals.
These findings echo the finding of Sims and Zha (2006) that the best model for US
is the one with break only in the variance-covariance matrix, not in the coefficients of
the VAR. In addition, they confirm the results in Caldara and Kamps (2008), who do
not find any appreciable fall in spending multipliers in the US, once the turbulent years
of 1979 - 1982, when the FED under Volcker increased interests rates very aggressively
to battle inflation, were omitted from the sample.
Overall, these results considered jointly with those in section 4.3 suggest that changes
in monetary policy or differences in openness12 do not seem to affect the results in any
unambiguous way.
4.4.2 The size of the US tax multiplier
In the last years a consensus seems to have been reached over the size of the spending
multiplier (defining spending as purchases of goods and services - public consumption
and investment), which is is considered around, perhaps slightly higher than 1. However,
there is an ongoing debate on the value of the tax multiplier; this is sparkled by the
difficulty to find proper instruments to estimate the parameters of the tax equation13
and the inability to resort to some easy way out, like placing taxes e.g. second or third
in the Cholesky ordering. As argued by Caldara and Kamps (2012) the elasticities of
policy variables (government spending and taxes) to output are of great importance
for the estimation of the relevant output multiplier, and the different identification
restrictions are in effect priors for these parameters. A Cholesky ordering imposes an
output elasticity of government spending equal to 0, while the different ways to estimate
output elasticities of net taxes lead to estimates ranging from 0 to infinity (in the pure
sign restrictions case). They conclude however that the spending multiplier should be
12Schematically, the countries in the sample can be divided in the following groups with respect to
how open they are: a) more closed economies, US and Australia, b) relatively open, UK and France and
c) open, Canada and EMU. Openness is defined as the sum of imports and exports to GDP ratio.
13A reminder: typical SVAR analysis is usually done not for the A0 matrix of contemporaneous
relations but for the B matrix that relates reduced form residuals with the underlying “structural”
shocks. Most authors mentioned in this section work with the latter matrix. For more details, an
excellent introduction to the SVAR methodology is chapter 9 of Lu¨tkepohl (2005).
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Table 4.4: Tax equations - estimates of baseline identification
Baseline
Country g y pi i
Australia 0.41823* 1.5057** -1.0807* -1.1132
Canada -0.0065107 0.94668** -0.1481 0.98888
France 0.068446 1.6555** 0.3204 0.45749
UK 0.24049* 0.93411** 0.36805 2.7481**
EMU 0.70528** 1.266** -0.13391 1.1179
US -0.47542* 2.221** 2.4491** 1.2539
Significance (one sided): at 10% level bold, at 5% level bold and star, at 1% level bold
and double star.
higher than the one of taxes for reasonable values of the elasticities.
Perhaps the most convincing way to estimate the output elasticity of taxes is to find a
proper exogenous tax shock and either use it directly to estimate the output response, or
indirectly as an instrument for structural tax shocks. Romer and Romer (2010) are the
first who have presented an exogenous tax shock for the US and followed the first route
to directly estimate output responses. Mertens and Ravn (2013a,b) take an extended
version of these shocks14 and follow the second, estimating output elasticities of taxes
around 3. In all these papers output multipliers of taxes are very high, typically higher
than 2 and even higher than 3 in some specifications. Cloyne (2013) finds very similar
results for the UK. Perotti (2012) extends the Romer and Romer dataset for the US and
finds output elasticities of taxes around 1.8 and output tax multipliers around 1.5 after
3 years.
These results are at odds with those obtained by the implementation of Blanchard
- Perotti approach, which gives much lower multipliers (typically lower than spending).
The main difference is the output elasticity of taxes which, for the countries of the
sample, is calculated as follows: US=1.85, UK=0.76, Canada=1.86, Australia=0.81
(Perotti 2004); EMU=1.54 (Burriel et al 2009); France=0.8 (Biau and Girard 2004).
From section 4.3.2 one may recall that in the present study the estimated effects of
taxes resemble those of the Blanchard - Perotti SVAR approach, and that the estimated
tax equations are well identified15. What are the estimated output elasticities of taxes?
The estimates of the coefficients for the contemporaneous variables of the tax equation
are presented in table 4.4 for the baseline case of all countries. As it is evident, the
14They distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated tax changes based on the time it took for
implementation after legislation. They use unanticipated shocks in their estimates.
15The interested reader may check Appendix C.3.
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Table 4.5: Output multipliers of baseline specification for the US with Mertens-Ravn
unanticipated shocks included
spending taxes
0.1 base 0.9 0.1 base 0.9
t=0 1.70 1.98 2.27 -0.28 -0.12 0.00
t=4 1.82 2.18 2.57 -0.85 -0.38 -0.07
t=8 1.74 2.09 2.45 -1.41 -0.63 -0.16
t=16 1.63 1.95 2.27 -2.99 -1.20 -0.28
estimated output elasticities of taxes are very significant, but not high enough to generate
the very high output multipliers of taxes found in studies using exogenous tax shocks -
their values are not that different from those calculated using the Blanchard - Perotti
approach. One may observe that these elasticities of taxes with respect to output are
broadly analogous to the size of the tax multiplier - countries with higher elasticities
have higher tax multipliers16.
To compare results from this work with those generated by the use of exogenous tax
shocks, I re-estimated the baseline specification for the US adding the Mertens - Ravn
unanticipated shocks as instruments. The multipliers are presented in table 4.5. A quick
comparison between them and those in table 4.1 allow one to easily see that they do not
change the baseline results in any fundamental way; spending multipliers are slightly
lower, tax multipliers are higher but spending multipliers are still big, definitely much
bigger than those of taxes. IRFs (not presented) do not differ from those of the baseline.
In addition, following Mertens and Ravn, I estimate their tax equation as would
be written in the current specification: utt = θgε
g
t + θyu
y
t + θpiu
pi
t + θcu
c
t + θipu
ip
t + θtε
t
t
+θiuit, where u denote residuals from the relevant equations and ε the estimated struc-
tural errors; the coefficient of interest is θy and the equation is estimated by IV, using
two different sets of instruments: all structural errors and the Mertens and Ravn unan-
ticipated tax shocks, or all structural errors except the one from output equation and
the aforementioned shocks; the elasticity of taxes to output is estimated to be 2.15 (S.E.
0.041) in the first case or 2.19 (S.E. 0.117) in the second. These elasticities are almost
equal to the one estimated in the baseline case; it could be the case that their results
depend on the different specifications they used, in which they do not include so many
macroeconomic variables and could be more vulnerable to non-invertibility problems.
16The results of table C.14 in section C.5 of the Appendix maintain this conclusion even when the
foreign activity variable (GAM) is included in the models.
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4.4.3 Discussion - what are the implications of the results?
As mentioned in the introduction, a fundamental issue with fiscal policy is whether it is
possible to consolidate without too much pain. A rather large literature has taken this
issue. One strand of it asserts that it is possible to consolidate without (much) pain, if
the chosen policy is to cut expenses and not raise taxes - in fact such a policy is associated
with expansions (expansionary fiscal contractions); representative papers of this view are
Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010). The mechanism behind
this effect is that cutting state helps to reduce the interest rate and also has a negative
effect on wages, that helps to spur a supply driven expansion.
However, this view is seriously contested. Perotti (2011) suggests that in major
episodes of expansionary fiscal contractions no such effects were present, but rather
whatever growth happened was simply the export led growth that followed the large
depreciations after the fiscal consolidations. In addition, using a new dataset on fiscal
consolidations, Guajardo et al (2011) argue that fiscal consolidations are associated
with large contractions and that any positive effects on economic activity found by
the opposite view is simply the artifact of using wrong measures of fiscal policy stance
(typically cyclically adjusted deficits) that generate positive bias.
The results obtained in this paper suggest that the expansionary austerity theory is
highly unlikely to actually hold. Spending multipliers are consistently bigger than tax
ones, even when the are not big. Thus, in all cases cutting spending will do more harm
than raising taxes, even when that harm will be small.
Another thing worth discussing is what determines these multipliers. An mentioned
in the introduction, currently economists typically think that the extend of monetary
accommodation and the number of rule-of-thumb consumers determines the outcome.
However, no particular monetary accommodation is seen in the responses and it seems
hard to argue that US have the largest percentage of such consumers, even though they
lack many elements of the welfare state of Europe. Another mechanism is required
to generate the observed responses, especially the positive ones of consumption and
investment. In the sample, the size of the multiplier is related to the sizes of the elasticity
of spending with respect to economic activity and the elasticity of taxes with respect to
output - the bigger these elasticities are (in absolute value), the stronger the relevant
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multiplier17.
Another thing worth mentioning is that in most countries countercylclical policy
is conducted using spending - arguably, since the bulk of spending is not related to
the cycle, such policies will have small magnitude. On the other hand, the positive
coefficient of spending in the tax equation is probably because taxes are not used to
manage demand, but to satisfy fiscal solvency - only in US one observes a negative
coefficient in spending.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to estimate the effects of fiscal policy in economic activity
with particular emphasis to spending and tax multipliers. For this, I have used the
tools of typical SVAR methodology but with novel identifying restrictions, based on the
separation of structural shocks to permanent and transitory; these allow to find proper
instruments to estimate the contemporaneous relations. It turned out in most cases that
the instruments are quite good for the purpose.
The results confirm the findings of SVAR methodology, that spending causes an
increase in economic activity, and importantly an increase in consumption; taxes cause
economic activity to fall. Importantly, like in SVAR studies, spending multipliers are
higher; this is an important result, as it casts doubt on the results of some important
recent papers, that have found very high output multipliers of taxes using exogenous tax
shocks. This kind of results obtained in this paper support a predominantly Keynesian
view of the economy.
In addition, fiscal multipliers depend heavily on certain parameters of the matrix
of contemporaneous relations, those that are mostly related to how strongly spending
or taxes respond to economic activity - multipliers depend on policy. The stronger the
countercyclical reaction of spending, the stronger the output multiplier of spending. The
bigger the output elasticity of taxes, the bigger (other things equal) the tax multiplier.
Also, they do not support a commonly held view, that fiscal policy is less effective
the latter decades that it was before. The findings of previous studies are probably due
17One may argue that also the degree of openness is relevant, as Australia and US, which are the
most closed economies, had the biggest multipliers. However Canada has the third strongest multiplier,
despite the fact that it is the most open economy in the sample. In addition, increased openness after
1980 does not seem to reduce these multipliers.
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to breaks in the correlations of residuals, not the underlying model. In addition, the
common view, founded in the Mundell - Flemming model, that fiscal policy is more
potent in fixed exchange rates finds no support in the results.
Furthermore, such results strongly refute the empirical relevance of theories like the
expansionary fiscal consolidation - fiscal adjustments, necessary as they may be, are
never easy or painless, and this is probably the reason policy makers postpone them as
much as they can. In any case, the advice to cut government consumption in consoli-
dations seems to be a bad one. This is particularly relevant in current consolidations in
Eurozone countries - it seems that the adjustment programs could be more successful if
they were better designed.
Lastly, this work can be extended in various ways, like adding countries, changing
variables etc. However, the most important extension seems to be the implementation
of this identification method to datasets consisting of annual data. If anything, tax data
are frequently available in annual frequency, for quite some time, but only rarely can one
find data covering more than 20 years on quarterly frequency; long run restrictions can
be implemented in principle with annual data, allowing to vastly increase the country
coverage and obtaining more general results. It remains to be seen if it is possible to suc-
cessfully implement it in lower frequency - if it is possible to generate good instruments
to estimate the contemporaneous relations in such an environment.
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Chapter 5
A Prototype Model of Fiscal
Policy
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter the econometric analysis has shown that differences in fiscal
multipliers can be traced to differences in the reactions of policy variables to changing
environment. In chapter 3 this idea was also used to make a basic DSGE model match
qualitatively certain features of the responses to the regime switching models simulated
there. It was shown that if policy makers do not rush to suppress deficits, it is possible
to generate the typical responses found in most SVAR studies (including the present
work) for spending, in each regime, and the use of two taxes, one distortionary and
one not, to balance the budget allows to generate asymmetries to tax shocks. This was
achieved without any need to resort to financial frictions or the zero lower bound, which
was however unlikely to bind in the used sample.
The use of policy rules is a topic scarcely studied in the context of fiscal policy. Most
papers assume some simple relations, usually in the form of Autoregressive processes
for policy instruments, mainly to close the model - e.g. one may look at Burnside et al
(2004) or Edelberg et al (1999). Especially if taxes are lump-sum, most economists think
that Ricardian equivalence should make them irrelevant to the workings of the model.
Alternatively, (distortionary or not) taxes are usually modeled as the instrument to
satisfy budget constraint - they react to debt to ensure long run solvency.
The main topic in this chapter is to see where this idea can lead: can policy rules
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explain country differences shown in chapter 4? In addition, can such rules reproduce
the estimated responses, e.g. that spending has higher multipliers than taxes? As it will
become evident later, such rules can actually generate qualitatively some of the sought
for responses, especially the higher spending multipliers and their bigger magnitude to
that of tax multipliers.
The remaining of this chapter is structured in the following way. Section 5.2 sum-
marizes the model and presents the multipliers for a variety of policy rules. Section 5.3
concludes.
5.2 The model and the multipliers of different policies
5.2.1 The model
Fiscal rules and their effects is a topic the literature has scarcely addressed so far: Lud-
vigson (1996) was the first to describe the macroeconomic effects of cuts of distortionary
income taxes - this deficit financed policy led to an expansion, with positive output and
consumption reactions. Most of literature treats policy rules to study optimal policy
and monetary and fiscal policy interactions, mainly to see whether the Ramsey equilib-
rium can be approximated with fiscal and monetary policy rules either in the context of
balanced budgets (e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Ur´ıbe 1997) or allowing the accumulation of
debt (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Ur´ıbe 2004, 2006 and 2007); it is found that balanced budgets
can be destabilizing and in any case suboptimal to changing debt levels. However, the
focus was entirely on monetary policy, and fiscal policy was in general passive.
Reis (2007), to the best of my knowledge at least, was the first to point out that
fiscal policy rules matter a lot in DSGE, and chosen appropriately allow one to replicate
any desired pattern in the reactions of endogenous variables even in an RBC with distor-
tionary taxes and balanced budgets, at least if several distortionary taxes are available
and the fiscal authority may choose the policy instrument. In addition, he asserted that
especially in modern monetary models, fiscal policy matters, since demand matters, as
e.g. price or wage rigidities affect the adjustment paths and ultimately the change in
real variables.
The model used in the simulations is entirely identical to the one in section 3.4.1, so
the interested reader should read there for a full description. A model that generates
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Table 5.1: Parameters used in calibration and their values; known steady state values
of variables
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Time discount factor
δ 0.025 Depreciation of capital
θ 2 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
κ W (1−τ
w)
LθC
Normalization factor for disutility of labor
α 0.3 Share of capital
γ 0.4 Value of externality of government services
χ 0.7 Productivity of government workers
B/Y 3 ss debt to GDP ratio (75% on annual basis)
ρτ 0.9 strength of tax smoothing
ξ – Speed of reaction of taxes to debt
εgy – Elasticity of government spending to output
εty – Elasticity of taxes to output
εtg – Elasticity of taxes to government spending
ρlg 0.9 Autoregressive coefficient of Lg
σlg 0.01 Variance of elg
στ 0.01 Variance of eτt
L 0.3 Steady state level of employment
Lg 0.15L Steady state level of government employment
positive output and consumption responses to taxes is essential, since they are present
in the data. The easiest and more transparent way to do it is to assume that spending
has some form of productivity externality for the private sector. The differences with
this model are only two, and they concern the conduct of fiscal policy: equations (3.11)
and (3.12) have been replaced with the following two:
ln (τwt WtLt/τwWL) = ρτln (τ
w
t−1Wt−1Lt−1/τwWL) + ξln (Bt−1/B) (5.1)
+ετgln (WtL
g
t/WLg) + ετyln (Yt/Y ) + eτt
Lgt = (1− ρlg)Lg + ρlgLgt−1 + εgyln (Yt/Y ) + elgt (5.2)
These policy rules are inspired by the estimates of chapter 4, especially tables 4.2
and 4.4, where it is evident that the policy rules involve more variables than those
typically assumed in DSGEs, namely an autoregressive process for spending and a set of
tax rules to stabilize debt. The above equations constitute more general rules, allowing
more complex interactions of policy variables and consequently they allow more complex
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reactions of the endogenous variables. The model calibration is presented in table 5.11.
The 4 parameters appearing in policy rules are ξ, the speed of adjustment of taxes to
debt, εgy and εty, the elasticities of policy variables to changing economic environment,
and εtg which indicates whether tax policy is coordinated with spending policy (negative
coefficient) or simply reacts to increased spending mechanically to reduce the deficit
(positive). The coefficient on past tax rate, ρτ, is fixed at 0.9.
The simulation experiment is very simple: the model is solved in Dynare for all
combinations of values of the 4 parameters, and cumulative multipliers are calculated as
in chapter 3. The parameters can take the following values: εgy ∈ {−1,−0.8,−0.6,−0.4,
−0.2, 0} - it cannot take positive values as this leads to indeterminacy; εty ∈ {0, 0.5, 1,
1.5, 2, 2.5}, yet one has to admit that this not quite the elasticity of taxes to output
in the data; εtg ∈ {−0.4,−0.2, 0, 0.2}2; lastly ξ ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}. Two sets of
simulations are run, one using only a distortionary wage tax, and the other using both
the wage tax and a lump sum tax, each covering 50% of revenue. In the second case,
the fiscal block is described in the following equations:
ln (Tt/T) = ρτln (Tt−1/T) + ξln (Bt−1/B) + ετgln (WtL
g
t/WLg)
+ετyln (Yt/Y ) + eτt (5.3)
Lgt = (1− ρlg)Lg + ρlgLgt−1 + εgyln (Yt/Y ) + elgt (5.4)
Tt = tt + τ
w
t WtLt (5.5)
tt = τ
w
t WtLt (5.6)
Here the tax rule is in total revenue, Tt, that is split equally to a lump-sum tax, tt,
and the revenue from the distortionary wage tax, τwt WtLt; both adjust when when Tt
changes, so that they contribute equally to the budget, like in chapter 3.
5.2.2 Multipliers of different policies
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 plot the mean multipliers of spending for each tax structure. The
results are saying a consistent story: in all graphs, the lower εtg and εty, the higher the
1The only difference is the increase of χ, the productivity of goverment workers to 0.7 from 0.5, but
it was essential to maintain determinacy of the model when fiscal policy was very responsive to output.
2The simulation with distortionary taxes had to stop at 0.2 in this case for determinacy reasons.
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spending multiplier. In addition, increasing ξ uniformly decreases the multiplier, more
so in the case where only distortionary taxes are available. In the latter case, multipliers
can be from over 2 to 0.5, depending on chosen policy mix. In the case of 2 taxes,
multipliers do not differ that much: they range from 1.7 to 0.8.
Turning to taxes multipliers, figures 5.3 and 5.4 present the mean multipliers for each
tax structure. The results here are striking: the tax multiplier is very low, if government
conducts any kind of stabilization policy that reduces the speed of adjustment of taxes
to debt, but most importantly, when it uses countercyclical spending to stabilize the
economy. When two tax instruments, one distortionary and one not, are available, the
tax multiplier is from negligible to low, no matter what spending policies are, and is
always smaller than spending multiplier, with the exception of some cases when spending
is not used at all for stabilization of output.
In the case of one tax instrument, things are more involved. At first, when the speed
of adjustment to debt is not very high, any kind of countercyclical spending policy
results in a very low tax multiplier here too. With high speeds of adjustment, we get
some peculiar patterns, mainly because taxes fall to negative ground and their reduction
allows output to rise.
The last column of figure 5.3, which shows tax multipliers when no countercyclical
spending policy is conducted, deserves a special attention. Here is the only case where
we get sizable multipliers, with their value increasing in the elasticity of taxes to output,
but mostly affected by the speed of adjustment to debt. With high speed of adjustment
of taxes to debt (ξ > 0.7), things become complicated, since fast reduction of debt
allows tax rates to fall and output to rise, causing again changes in sign of multiplier, a
situation that complicates drawing conclusions.
In general, we can see that differences in policy can explain some aspects of the
results in chapter 4. In particular, the model is quite successful in generating higher
spending multipliers when fiscal policy is countercyclical. Like the estimates of table
4.2, spending multipliers are higher, the higher the strength of countercyclical reaction.
In addition, spending multipliers are almost always higher than the ones of taxes, unless
we get some peculiar responses because of very strong debt adjustment. In any case,
even with only very mild countercyclical policy, spending multipliers are higher, and are
always higher if non-distortionary taxes are available as a policy tool.
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However, the model is not that successful in generating the tax multipliers observed
in table 4.1. Only in Canada and the UK one could assert that the estimates conform
with the predictions of the model, because in these two countries the tax multipliers are
close to zero. In the other four cases, the only way to get higher tax multipliers would be
to accept the lack of countercylcical policy, something the data might tolerate only in the
EMU case. Thus, one can only conclude that the modeling of the taxes and their effects
in the model is inadequate3. And, it seems that this is prevalent in DSGE models. The
issue with these models is probably that they do not have the required heterogeneity
to generate realistic responses to taxes - rule of thumb consumers is no solution to this
problem. Taxes probably operate through marginal tax rates, not average ones, which
is what one models in a DSGE; but marginal tax rates can not work in a model where
all are the same.4 Nevertheless, the results in this chapter justify a reconsideration of
how fiscal policy is described in DSGE models, and most importantly in models that
are used in policy making.
This exercise has however some practical lessons to teach. The main is that one
should not expect to consolidate costlessly (or close to), as argued by some. If public
spending has some productive value, then one can expect higher spending multipliers
than taxes ones. This argument does not include social security and transfers in general,
but the political issues generated when a government tries to cut this part of spending
can be insurmountable. If taxes are not excessive (in the model they are not), it seems
preferable to increase them, especially non-distortionary ones if they are available.
Let us compare the results in the previous graphs with the policies implemented in
certain EMU countries. Tax policy has moved towards the lower right corner, probably
increasing multipliers of distortionary taxes, increasing the potential harm tax increases
cause. Spending policy has probably moved in positive ground for εgy, at least in some
of them; in the model, this leads to indeterminacy - then, the depression in Greece comes
as no surprise, and can be attributed to, bad at the very least, policy design.
3Or that in reality fiscal policy is not operating in a consistent manner, applying one rule in some
cases and another in other.
4An alternative explanation could be that taxes work mostly through their effect on the steady state,
but is not possible to explore such an effect in models that are linearized around a constant steady state.
In any case, the magnitude of the estimated effects of taxes in this thesis does not justify taking this
route for them and not in the case of spending, that consistently gives stronger effects.
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5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter a simulation exercise was conducted in order to see how different policies,
in the form of different spending and tax rules affect the macroeconomic outcomes in
a baseline DSGE model. Spending rules that allow to conduct countercyclical policy
manage to give the desired outcomes, especially in cases of debt financing in the presence
of distortionary taxes. However, tax rules are not very successful in the task of mimicking
the pattern of estimated multipliers to tax shocks. They can give empirically relevant tax
multipliers for most countries only in the absence of countercyclical spending, contrary
to the results in chapter 4, where important countercyclical reactions of spending were
estimated in most countries. In any case more work in needed to explain these effects
and incorporate them in policy analysis.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
As was stated in the introduction, the principal question in this thesis is the size of
fiscal multipliers. In particular, the main motivation was a) to look at the differences
of multipliers according to different spending categories, b) to delve into differences
of multipliers over the business cycle, c) to examine whether the findings survive the
change in identifying restrictions and d) to investigate which fiscal instrument, spending
or taxes, has bigger multiplier (in absolute value) and therefore should be used when
needed. Secondary (but by no means in importance) issues explored were the ones of
fiscal foresight and the stability of multipliers over time. In addition, a major issue is
how fiscal policy works - which model is more consistent with the data?
Two important issues were not investigated in this thesis. The first is the effects
of components of taxes, but the exogenous shocks do not provide many observations
for the different categories of taxes, and the identification method of chapter 4 that
utilizes long-run restrictions does not easily extend to the components of spending and
taxes. The second is the effects of transfers, but this variable is more correlated with the
business cycle, reducing the likelihood to extract proper structural shocks, and social
security does not change the total income of households substantially, as the bulk of
taxes collected to finance it is returned to households. Nevertheless, several important
results were obtained.
In chapter 2 I was mostly engaged in answering question a, as well as the issue of
fiscal foresight. The latter did not prove to be a major concern, at least in U.S. data, as
there were no evidence that one could improve the model by adding more information,
as would be expected if agents were actually behaving as if they were utilizing more
149
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of it. The important finding was that there are big differences in the effects of various
spending categories. Civilian spending has a beneficial effect on economic activity;
this spending category resembles to a kind of productivity shock in a real model, giving
some supportive evidence to papers advocating this explanation for the positive effects of
government spending on economic activity; civilian consumption seems to affect private
consumption and investment particularly strongly, while civilian investment has the
highest output multiplier. On the contrary, military spending appears to have rather
neutral, and in some cases harmful, effects; especially government investment seems to
have a particularly negative effect on economic activity, like a negative productivity
shock. This later effect is not predicted by any standard theory. To explain this finding,
I set up a DSGE, whose key property is the disaggregation of the budget variables,
each of which can have quite distinct effects, as in reality. In particular, government
consumption - hires are assumed to work in a manner similar to a productivity shock.
Military equipment purchases work in the opposite way, because they are produced
by an inferior production function - shifting resources towards this unproductive sector
lowers the overall production of the economy. The mechanism is successful in replicating
qualitatively the observed responses.
Chapter 3 was mainly about answering question b, the one about the size of (both
spending and tax) multipliers over the business cycle. Civilian spending shocks appear
to have large positive effects on economic activity in low growth periods, effects that do
not seem to depend heavily on the behavior of the central bank - the latter does not
seem to accommodate spending policies. The output multiplier of spending shocks in
recessions is likely to be over 1.5, making civilian spending a powerful tool to dampen
recessions, while military spending might even lead to recessionary outcomes, confirming
the findings of chapter 2. In what concerns taxes, the results are less clear cut, but
the most sensible thing to say, mostly based on the results from exogenous shocks, is
that taxes have adverse macroeconomic effects only when they are raised / imposed
during recessions - they do not seem to affect output during expansions. A theoretical
explanation is proposed for the main effects on real variables which is based on policy
asymmetries over the cycle: in a DSGE model, a lower speed of adjustment of taxes to
debt in recessions is quite successful in replicating qualitatively the responses to spending
shocks; the inclusion of two taxes, one distortionary and one not, and the use of the first
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only in recessions (possible reasons are mentioned in the chapter) allows one to generate
the desired asymmetries in the responses to tax shocks too.
In chapter 4 I undertook issue c, in an international data set using a different way to
identify fiscal shocks, in particular using the restrictions implied by splitting the shocks
in permanent and transitory, and the instruments generated by the aforementioned di-
vision. Once again, spending causes an increase in economic activity, and notably an
increase in consumption; taxes cause economic activity to fall. Importantly, fiscal multi-
pliers depend heavily on certain parameters of the matrix of contemporaneous relations,
those that are mostly related to how strongly spending or taxes respond to economic
activity - multipliers depend on policy. The stronger the countercyclical reaction of
spending, the stronger the output multiplier of spending. The bigger the output elas-
ticity of taxes, the bigger (other things equal) the tax multiplier. This finding is in
accordance with the mechanism used in chapter 3 to generate asymmetric responses to
fiscal shocks over the business cycle.
A simulation exercise in chapter 5 allows one to see how different policies, in the form
of different spending and tax rules, affect the macroeconomic outcomes in a baseline
DSGE model similar to the real model of chapter 3. Spending rules that allow to
conduct countercyclical policy manage to give the desired outcomes, especially in cases
of debt financing in the presence of distortionary taxes. However, tax rules are not
very successful in the same task. In most cases, they can give empirically relevant tax
multipliers only in the absence of countercyclical spending, contrary to the results in
chapter 4, where important countercyclical reactions of spending were estimated; more
work in needed to explain these effects. Nevertheless, the simulation demonstrates the
importance of policy reactions/rules, a topic usually neglected by economists when they
try to design models or make sense of the available data.
Turning now to question d, it has been answered in chapters 3 and 4, where multi-
pliers of both spending and taxes were estimated. The outcome is very clear: spending
multiplier is higher (in absolute value), and by a comfortable margin. This naturally
has profound policy implications: it is better to use spending to stimulate the economy,
and consolidating during recessions is a bad policy, particularly when implemented by
cutting spending. In addition, it makes certain theories, like the expansionary austerity,
void of any empirical relevance.
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In what concerns the issue of stability of responses over time, in chapters 3 and 4 it
has been shown that the power of spending policies to affect the economy does not seem
to be diminished in the last decades, contrary to previous results.
The combined results of the empirical analysis in this thesis support and extend
the results obtained so far by the many studies using SVAR analysis, and have some
aspects compatible with typical Keynesian theory, like the increase of consumption after
spending shocks or the higher magnitude of spending multiplier; generally, one should
expect positive responses of real variables after spending shocks, and smaller negative
ones after tax shocks. Other results however, like the zero to negative response of
inflation to spending increases, are more compatible with modern NK models where
spending works as a productivity shock. In any case, as we progressively obtain more
results, the case for fiscal policy operating in a (semi-)Keynesian manner becomes more
and more robust.
Finally, on the issue of which model describes fiscal policy more accurately, since in
all chapters consumption was found to increase after spending shocks and government
spending multiplier was bigger, the evidence suggest that Keynesian models are better
to use in analyzing fiscal policy, compared to the baseline RBC/NK model. However,
this should not be seen as a dismission of DSGE modeling in general as inappropriate
to accurately describe fiscal issues: there are some theories that are capable to produce
the desired effects, and in the present work some other variations are proposed that
are reasonably successful to replicate the results from the empirical analysis. Certainly,
more work needs to be done, especially in the directions of i) properly modeling the
effects of fiscal policy on labor market and ii) describing taxes better.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
In this appendix some more results from the baseline models of Chapter 2 will be pre-
sented. The following results use another identification method, in particular sign restric-
tions. Estimation and general implementation of the procedure has been done similarly
to Uhlig (2005), but searching for impulse matrices has been done according to Rubio-
Ramirez et al (2005, 2010, algorithm 2) and the penalty function was implemented
according to Enders et al (2011).
At first I estimate the VAR using OLS - the prior implied is the uninformative
natural conjugate Normal-Wishart prior, leading to a similar posterior centered at the
OLS estimates, just like in Uhlig (especially Appendix B); the assumption is that the
reduced form and the structural residuals are linked by the equation Ut = BEt (see
also section 1.2.1 for the general discussion of Structural VAR), where E(UtUt΄) = Σ
and E(EtEt΄) = I. Drawing from the posterior, for each replication we can form the
companion matrix, a candidate Σ and P, the lower Cholesky factor of Σ; then one can
calculate B as if B = PQ, where Q (the crucial matrix, since its columns carry the
weights needed to identify the structural errors) is generated by decomposing random
standard normal matrices using the QR decomposition. Then IRFs are generated, and
if the sum of the squared deviations from the sign restrictions for all shocks, variables
and horizons do not violate the sign restrictions by more than 0.001, the impulses are
kept.
As mentioned in section 1.2.1.4, sign restrictions are more likely to identify true re-
sponses when several shocks are identified and the shocks under investigation explain a
significant portion of the variance of the residuals; this second requirement leads one to
153
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 154
be sceptical on the suitability of this kind of restrictions for fiscal policy issues. Never-
theless, in this implementation 6 structural shocks are assumed, namely a government
spending shock (eg), a tax shock (et), a supply shock (es), a demand shock (ed), an
inflation - cost-push shock (epi) and a monetary policy shock (em). The variables are
the same as in chapter 2, in particular a spending variable (g), net taxes (t), output
(y), inflation (pi), federal funds rate (i) and consumption (c) - real variables are logs of
per-capita values. The spending variables are total spending, govenrment consumption
and investment, and their civilian and military counterparts.
The restrictions, inspired by the DSGE literature, are the following: the spending
shock drives spending up - output also rises when total spending or civilian spending
variables are increased; the results of chapter 2 indicate that military spending variables
have lower multipliers, even negative in military investment case, so for comparison
purposes the reaction of output to military spending variables is left unrestricted. The
supply (technology) shock drives output, taxes and consumption up but inflation down;
demand shocks increase all variables except spending; monetary policy shocks drive
interest rate up, do not affect spending and drive all other variables down; tax shocks
increase taxes and decrease consumption; inflation shocks raise inflation and interest
rates and reduce consumption. In another variant, spending shocks also decrease taxes
and tax shocks also decrease the spending variable. These restrcitions are enforced either
for 1 or 4 periods or for 4 periods for the fiscal variables but for 1 period for the rest.
Table A.1 shows these restrictions:
Table A.1: Sign restrictions
eg es ed em et epi
g + (-)
t (-) + + - +
y + ( ) + + -
pi - + - +
i + + +
c + + - - -
In table A.2 the output multipliers to spending and in table A.3 those to tax shocks
are presented. Multipliers are from 10,000 replications, and blanks correspond to cases
where identification failed to produce valid outcomes or produced to few to be able to
calculate quantiles of responses. As it is clear from the first table, results are broadly
similar to those reported in section 2.3 of main text, and multipliers tend to be higher (in
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some cases very much so), casting doubt on the validity of these results. In addition, tax
multipliers tend to vary quite a lot, with no apparent explanation, since the tax variable
and identification restrictions are the same in all models. These results are indicative of
possible difficulties related to sign restrictions, already discussed in section 1.2.1.4. In
addition, figures A.1 to A.3 present the IRFs to spending shocks when only spending or
taxes (and output or consumption where applicable, but not the other fiscal variable)
are restricted; as it is evident from the graphs, the confidence intervals are very wide,
leading to insignificant results in most cases, and are scarcely informative for variables
not restricted a priori.
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Figure A.1: IRFs to total spending, total civilian and total military spending (90% C.I.)
(a) Total spending, 1 period sign re-
strictions on all
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Variables are in the following order: spending variable, taxes, output, inflation, federal
funds rate, private consumption.
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Figure A.2: IRFs to total government consumption, total civilian and total military
government consumption (90% C.I.)
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Variables are in the following order: spending variable, taxes, output, inflation, federal
funds rate, private consumption.
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 160
Figure A.3: IRFs to total government investment, total civilian and total military gov-
ernment investment (90% C.I.)
(a) Total government investment,
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Variables are in the following order: spending variable, taxes, output, inflation, federal
funds rate, private consumption.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Data
The data used are for the U.S.; the data frequency is quarterly; the sample covers
1960q1 to 2006q4. The choice of the sample is made in the light of the Discussion in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)1 who argue that the 50’s are not expected to be from the
same stochastic process as the rest of the series because of the Korean war and the large
increase in taxes to finance that war, and especially Perotti (2007) who discusses about
the effects of including the Korean War on the results under different identification
assumptions; the sample ends in 2006, since a similar argument should apply to the
recent crisis.
Most data series come from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
tables, published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis2. The following series from the
NIPA tables are used: At first the main macro variables, namely real total output,
real total private consumption and real total private investment. The main government
spending variable3 is total government spending on goods and services, in particular
total government consumption and investment (includes federal defense and and non-
defense spending and state and local spending, but excludes transfers). Additionally,
I use two more spending variables, total civilian (non-defense, without transfers) and
total defense spending (both include government consumption and investment) on good
and services. The tax variable is total net taxes, calculated as the sum of personal taxes,
1Throughout the Appendices, referenced papers are included in the Bibliography section of the rele-
vant chapter.
2Available at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/index.asp.
3The government spending and tax variables are similar to those used by Perotti (2004).
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Table B.1: Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root tests
Y C I GCI GCINDEF GCIDEF
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
3 3 5 3 2 1 4 1 1 1 5 4
-3.343 -3.343 -2.3374 -2.85703 -3.933* -3.393 -3.001 -2.225 -2.929 -2.929 -2.873 -2.46
0.059 0.059 0.413 0.177 0.011 0.052 0.132 0.475 0.153 0.153 0.171 0.348
TNET USPRIV WR UNRATE FEDFUNDS INFL
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
2 1 1 1 1 1 7 3 4 1
-3.675* -2.915 -2.441 -2.441 -2.996* -2.996* -2.202 -2.602 -2.188 -2.524
0.024 0.157 0.358 0.358 0.035 0.035 0.488 0.279 0.496 0.316
Bold: significance at 10%; bold and *: significance at 5%; bold and **: significance at 1%.
taxes on production and imports, corporate taxes and social security contributions minus
transfers, for total government (federal and state and local). Inflation is the annualized
quarterly GDP inflation rate.
Additional sources are St Louis FED’s FRED® database4 for the nominal interest
rate and the unemployment rate. The nominal interest rate is the federal funds rate.
All the above variables (except unemployment, inflation and the interest rate) are
in logs of the real per capita relevant variables, where the deflator used is the relevant
deflator for each variable, except the fiscal variables, which are deflated by the GDP
deflator. Population has been calculated by dividing nominal GDP by nominal per
capita GDP. All series are seasonally adjusted at annual rates by the source.
B.2 Unit root and unit root vs thresholds tests
One of the main motivations of this research was the observation that many time
series that are customarily considered to be unit roots may not be so, but may be better
described by a threshold autoregressive model, quite often a stationary one or a partial
unit root (unit root in one regime but not in the other). If this is the case, the linear
VAR might not be as appropriate to model the multiple time series DGP as usually
thought. In this section I will discuss the time series properties of the variables used in
the subsequent analysis.
First, table B.1 presents the ADF unit root tests on the series used; as it is evident,
most of the series can be described as unit roots under the assumption of linearity. The
results are calculated for the 1960:1 - 2006:4 sample, and the unit root test is for constant
4Available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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and trend for all variables but the last three, in which case it is only for constant5. In the
third row is the lag length picked by AIC and BIC criterion respectively, in the fourth
the ADF t-test and in the fifth the asymptotic p-value.
However, these results are not rock solid. Leaving out the very important (and quite
elusive) question concerning the best modeling approach and the robustness of these
tests in different circumstances, tables B.2 - B.3 suggest that many of the variables
under consideration may plausibly be described as threshold stationary or as partial
unit roots; to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to present some evidence
on the time series properties of most of these variables from a threshold perspective, and
as far as I know the first to incorporate time series testing for thresholds in the modeling
framework. The same sample and the same lags in each regime have been used as in
the linear case (something that might work in favor of the linear model if one regime
has few observations).
One of the basic reasons that it is difficult to work with nonlinear models is that
there are ... just too many of them. How can we know that we found the best model?
One way to proceed seems to be the following: start from the simplest two regime ones,
which is what I do in this work. Following this route, the linear unit root model will be
tested against: a) the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model assuming threshold effects
in either all regressors or lagged differences only using the test proposed by Caner and
Hansen (2001)6, with stationary threshold; b) STAR (Smooth Transition TAR) in lagged
levels using Kapetanios, Shin and Snell (2003); c) the TAR model again using lagged
levels as thresholds and block-bootstrapping the residuals using Seo’s (2008) test. In
the second and third test the variables are detrended first to have zero means. I have to
add that a STAR model should have power even when the DGP is TAR and vice versa,
since the former should be able to reject the linear unit root more easily in cases where
the transition function looks more like an abrupt change model. In the following, a 0.15
5Definitions: Y = GDP, C = consumption, I = private investment, GCI = total government spending
on goods and services, GCINDEF = non-defense spending on goods and services, GCIDEF = defense
spending on goods and services, TNET = net taxes, USPRIV WR = wage rate, UNRATE = unem-
ployment rate, FEDFUNDS = federal funds rate, INFL = inflation; for more information look at the
previous section.
6A word of caution is needed here: in the Caner and Hansen’s paper they have many different ways
of testing for unit roots; I use the following three of them, namely a) the unidentified bootstrap testing,
where testing is done with bootstrap data are generated by a linear unit root null estimated from the
data, b) the unidentified asymptotic testing and c) the identified asymptotic testing, where in these two
cases testing is done using the critical values presented in the paper; the strongest rejection from all
cases is presented.
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quantile of observations is left out of the grid search at each end of the sample, in order
to have a minimum number of observations in each regime.
As it is evident from tables B.2 - B.3, many of the usual assumptions about time
series behavior of these variables may not be tolerated by the data; especially output,
consumption, investment, taxes and unemployment may be stationary (with regime
switching) or partial unit roots. These results allow one to defend the choice to use
a nonlinear model in order to look at the effects of fiscal policy on the main macro
variables.
B.3 Testing for threshold effects
Here the results from the thresholds tests for the system will be presented. I test the
threshold model against the linear one, but I also try to compare it with a structural
break model (SBVAR), and let the data pick the best model. I use the levels of the
variables, since there are quite some evidence for nonlinearities of the threshold form,
and differencing might interfere with possibly important nonlinear reactions.
The baseline model I test is TVAR on levels, with total spending, taxes, output,
inflation, the federal funds rate and consumption comprising the vector of endogenous
variables and a constant, a time trend and a squared time trend being the exogenous
variables; the variables have this order, except when the Cholesky identification is used,
where taxes follow output - this ordering is consistent with the fact that the major force
behind tax movements are output fluctuations.
The threshold variable is a 4-period (backwards) moving average of output growth
rate. The reason for choosing this variable is that it is a natural business cycle indicator
(not the only natural candidate though) and that output is included in all model spec-
ifications, so the threshold variable is endogenous to the system, making it possible to
have endogenously generated regime switching7. One lag is allowed in each regime, as
it is indicated by the BIC criterion for the linear model; the threshold lag (d) is varied
between 1 and 4. The results are shown in table B.4. Threshold estimates are those from
the information criteria, which is equivalent to the quasi ML estimate of the minimum
log determinant of the variance - covariance matrix. The p-values for the Wald statistics
have been calculated using 1000 replications.
7One should also consider that papers using other threshold variables like interest rates or financial
conditions are probably splitting the sample in a way similar to the papers that use a business cycle
indicator - after all, low interest rates and tight money are correlated with low output growth rates.
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Table B.4: Linearity tests for the baseline model
Model Tsay Ef. Bounds Wald AIC HQ BIC supWald aveWald expWald Threshold
Linear -55.528 -55.151 -54.598
SBVAR 2.0118 -56.523 -55.770 -54.664 1980:3
TVAR, d=1 72.58 2.3885 -56.559 -55.806 -54.700 69.08 22.63 31.39 0.0019398
(0.0466) (0.018) (0.047) (0.027)
TVAR, d=2 70.09 2.4392 -56.203 -55.450 -54.344 75.49 27.42 34.15 0.0031590
(0.0695) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010)
TVAR, d=3 67.03 2.0440 -56.136 -55.383 -54.277 42.37 19.95 18.49 0.0015010
(0.1096) (0.122) (0.107) (0.106)
TVAR, d=4 44.34 2.1112 -55.883 -55.129 -54.024 52.46 18.52 21.65 0.0044003
(0.8229) (0.054 (0.167) (0.066)
P-values, where applicable, are in parenthesis. H0 is a linear VAR with 1 lag for all tests.
Table B.5: Linearity tests for the baseline specification with more lags
Model Tsay Ef. Bounds Wald AIC HQ BIC supWald aveWald expWald Threshold
2 lags
Linear -55.799 -55.171 -54.250
SBVAR 2.3485 -56.516 -55.261 -53.418 1975:2
TVAR, d=1 99.686 2.9013 -56.873 -55.618 -53.775 91.71 38.19 42.75 0.0019398
2l/2h (0.227) (0.013 ) (0.041) (0.009)
TVAR, d=1 1.8960 -56.744 -55.740 -54.265 72.83 38.39 33.01 0.0019398
1l/2h (0.012) (0.004) (0.009)
3 lags
Linear -55.913 -55.034 -53.744
SBVAR 2.7373 -56.769 -55.011 -52.431 1975:2
TVAR, d=1 121.68 3.2908 -57.125 -55.367 -52.787 136.6 64.46 64.68 0.0019398
3l/3h (0.5923) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019)
TVAR, d=1 1.8854 -56.910 -55.655 -53.811 90.45 47.92 41.87 0.0019398
1l/3h (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
4 lags
Linear -55.933 -54.803 -53.144
SBVAR 3.1991 -56.776 -54.516 -51.198 1975:2
TVAR, d=1 156.42 3.4797 -57.186 -54.926 -51.608 156.87 74.41 74.46 0.0012934
4l/4h (0.6089) (0.043) (0.033) (0.042)
TVAR, d=1 1.7924 -56.889 -55.382 -53.170 99.74 52.46 46.26 0.0019398
1l/4h (0.008) (0.032) (0.008)
2 - 4 lags in each regime or 1 lag in low growth and 2 - 4 lags in high growth regime; p-values, where
applicable, are in parenthesis. H0 is a linear VAR with the same number of lags for all tests.
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Table B.6: Linearity tests for the alternative specifications
Model Tsay Ef. Bounds Wald AIC HQ BIC supWald aveWald expWald Threshold
non-defense spending
Linear -55.794 -55.417 -54.864
SBVAR 2.1191 -56.797 -56.044 -54.938 1980:3
TVAR, d=1 79.446 2.5246 -56.741 -55.987 -54.882 82.14 29.83 38.84 0.0019398
(0.0137) (0.011 ) (0.012) (0.012)
defense spending
Linear -53.903 -53.526 -52.973
SBVAR 1.9697 -54.775 -54.021 -52.915 1980:3
TVAR, d=1 72.134 2.1169 -54.924 -54.171 -53.065 45.74 18.06 20.27 0.0015018
(0.0506) (0.090) (0.116) (0.075)
investment
Linear -52.668 -52.292 -51.739
SBVAR 2.0775 -53.406 -52.652 -51.546 1995:2
TVAR, d=1 59.573 2.1568 -52.939 -52.186 -51.080 61.96 23.11 27.24 0.0019398
(0.280) (0.032) (0.047) (0.029)
unemployment rate
Linear -48.018 -47.641 -47.088
SBVAR 1.989 -48.540 -47.786 -46.680 1983:2
TVAR, d=1 81.679 2.766 -48.584 -47.831 -46.725 82.63 31.72 37.60 0.0019398
(0.009) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
1 lag in both regimes; p-values, where applicable, are in parenthesis. H0 is a linear VAR with 1 lag for
all tests.
As it is evident, the TVAR model is supported by all tests, and the preferred thresh-
old lag is one. It clearly separates the sample in a high growth and a low growth regime.
The low growth regime occurs 21% of time (41 observations out of 188). In table B.5 the
same results are presented for the best threshold models with 2 - 4 lags in each regime
(typically the first lag of the threshold variable) or 1 lag in low and 2 - 4 lags in high
regime, and again the outcome is similar. In addition, the models with 1 lag in low and
more lags in high regime have the virtue that they give cleaner residuals. The threshold
value does not change much in most cases.
The TVAR model is supported by the data in most of the alternative specifications I
have tested, in particular using non-defense spending or defense spending as the spend-
ing variable or replacing consumption with investment or unemployment rate (in the
last place). Table B.6 presents the tests for models with 1 lag in both regimes. The
specification with investment is the least supportive for the TVAR model, but since the
Wald tests support it and investment is one of the variables that moves a lot during the
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business cycle, I include this model too.
B.4 Figures not presented in the main text
In this appendix the figures B.1 to B.5, showing the GIRFs of the additional models not
included in the main test are presented.
Figure B.1: Baseline model varying starting histories by decade, various identifications.
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Red: starting in recession regime; blue: starting in expansion regime. Lines: 1% shock, 60s; stars: 1%
shock, 70s; x: 1% shock, 80s; circles: 1% shock, 90s.
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Figure B.2: Non-defense spending, various identifications.
(a) BP spending shock
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.01
0 5 10 15 20 25
spending
-0.008
-0.007
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0 5 10 15 20 25
taxes
0
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.002
0 5 10 15 20 25
output
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0 5 10 15 20 25
inflation
-0.0015
-0.001
-0.0005
0
0.0005
0.001
0 5 10 15 20 25
federal funds rate
0
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.002
0 5 10 15 20 25
consumption
(b) BP tax shock
-0.0005
0
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.002
0 5 10 15 20 25
spending
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0 5 10 15 20 25
taxes
-0.0002
0
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.001
0.0012
0 5 10 15 20 25
output
-0.0015
-0.001
-0.0005
0
0.0005
0 5 10 15 20 25
inflation
-0.002
-0.0015
-0.001
-0.0005
0
0.0005
0 5 10 15 20 25
federal funds rate
0
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.001
0 5 10 15 20 25
consumption
(c) Cholesky spending shock
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.01
0 5 10 15 20 25
spending
0
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.002
0.0025
0.003
0 5 10 15 20 25
output
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0 5 10 15 20 25
taxes
-0.0005
0
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.002
0 5 10 15 20 25
inflation
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0 5 10 15 20 25
federal funds rate
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.002
0.0025
0.003
0 5 10 15 20 25
consumption
(d) Cholesky tax shock
-0.0002
0
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.001
0 5 10 15 20 25
spending
-0.0001
0
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
0.0005
0.0006
0 5 10 15 20 25
output
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0 5 10 15 20 25
taxes
-0.0006
-0.0004
-0.0002
0
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0 5 10 15 20 25
inflation
-0.001
-0.0005
0
0.0005
0.001
0 5 10 15 20 25
federal funds rate
0
5e-005
0.0001
0.00015
0.0002
0.00025
0.0003
0.00035
0.0004
0 5 10 15 20 25
consumption
(e) Exogenous tax shock
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0 5 10 15 20 25
spending
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0 5 10 15 20 25
taxes
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0 5 10 15 20 25
output
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0 5 10 15 20 25
inflation
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0 5 10 15 20 25
federal funds rate
-0.002
-0.0015
-0.001
-0.0005
0
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.002
0 5 10 15 20 25
consumption
Red: starting in recession regime; blue: starting in expansion regime. Lines: 1% shock, regime
specific history; stars: 1% shock, full history; x: 3% shock, regime specific history; circles: 3%
shock, full history.
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 171
Figure B.3: Defense spending, various identifications.
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Red: starting in recession regime; blue: starting in expansion regime. Lines: 1% shock, regime
specific history; stars: 1% shock, full history; x: 3% shock, regime specific history; circles: 3%
shock, full history.
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Figure B.4: Private investment, various identifications.
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Red: starting in recession regime; blue: starting in expansion regime. Lines: 1% shock, regime
specific history; stars: 1% shock, full history; x: 3% shock, regime specific history; circles: 3%
shock, full history.
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Figure B.5: Unemployment rate, various identifications.
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Red: starting in recession regime; blue: starting in expansion regime. Lines: 1% shock, regime
specific history; stars: 1% shock, full history; x: 3% shock, regime specific history; circles: 3%
shock, full history.
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B.5 Results with regime switching in variance - covariance
matrix
In Chapter 3, and in particular throughout section 3.3, the assumption regarding em-
pirical models has been that that the variance-covariance matrix of residuals has been
common across regimes, not least because this assumption facilitated comparison with
models using exogenous shocks; in the latter case, the lack of observations of structural
shocks in recessions suggests that breaking the sample in high and low growth periods
would not give good estimates or their effects in the latter period. However, one potential
criticism is that it is indeed possible to have such effects, and (old and) recent theories
suggest that the effect of fiscal policy should be higher in recessions. This exercise is
undertaken in this section.
In table B.7 the likelihood from different models with and without structural break
in variance are included8. Basic deterministics include a constrant, a time trend and a
squared time trend, as in the models of the chapter, and the extended deterministics
add (for reasons that will be discussed shortly) three more time trends for the following
periods: 1979:1-1981:2, 1981:3-1983:2, 1983:3-2006:4.
Results with the basic set of deterministic terms: It is clear that the data prefer
models with regime switching in variance, either threshold or structural break - however,
in models with linear conditional mean, there is some slighter support for a structural
brake in variance, and the model with the overall higher likelihood is the structural break
in variance model with 2 lags in the VAR. The threshold in variance is precisely the same
as the one in the conditional mean in all cases, while the break in variance is estimated
at Q2 of 1985. In the first part of table B.8 the spending multipliers of the linear models
and each regime of the structural break and threshold models (assuming there is no
change in regime of the coefficients, variance or both) from a Cholesky decomposition
of the variance covariance matrices are presented; two things stand out: first, allowing
a threshold in variance lowers (!) the multipliers in the low growth regime, and second,
8Information criteria are not presented because the way information criteria are calculated penalizes
extra coefficients in the systematic part of the model, but not extra variance - covariance matrices, so it
is not absolutely clear how one should decide which model to choose. In addition, sup-LR tests are also
not presented, since it is not clear how the model with threshold in variance - covariance matrix should
be simulated in order to calculate the test. However, in the case of linear in conditional mean VARs,
sup-LR tests reject the null of a common variance - covariance matrix against the both alternatives
(either threshold or structural break in variance - covariance matrix).
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Table B.7: Likelihood of various models
Basic deterministics Extended deterministics
Model Break LogLik Break LogLik
V(1) 5273.6 5306
V(2) 5335.1 5364.5
V(1) thr. 0.00194 5353.1 0.00194 5381.6
V(2) thr. 0.00194 5407.2 0.00194 5431.8
V(1) s.b. 1985Q2 5360.3 1985Q2 5389.8
V(2) s.b. 1985Q2 5431.2 1984Q4 5455.4
TV(1,1) 0.00194 5363.1 0.00194 5440.5
TV(1,1) thr. 0.00194 5424.6 0.00194 5497.5
there are small differences in the multipliers of structural break (in variance) models,
that however point to slightly higher spending multipliers in the second part of the
sample (the one covering the Great Moderation).
These results are rather surprising, counterintuitive and suspect, given the results
in chapter 3 and other papers referenced therein. However, Caldara and Kamps (2008)
have observed that it matters a lot in the results for linear VARs how one treats the
turbulent years of the Volker disinflation - they observe that taking them out shows
that there is no significant difference in the responses to spending shocks before and
after that period; this suggests that this period, which by the way was a recessionary
one, might drive the results, especially those of the low growth regime. To check this
conjecture, the second set of deterministics is added. As it is clear from the relevant
results of table B.7, these variables clearly enter the models (and in the linear VARs are
significant only in the equations for inflation and interest rates); the threshold models
are now the ones that give the most adequate description of the data. In addition,
the second part of table B.8 indicates that although the multipliers of linear models do
not change so much, those of the TVAR with (and without) break in variance give the
expected results: higher multipliers in recessions, by a comfortable margin, indicating
that the results of section 3.3 of the main text are robust, once brakes in variance -
covariance matrices are properly modelled.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Variable Sources and Definitions
As a reminder, all models include 7 variables: total real government spending in goods
and services (consumption + investment), real GDP, inflation (from GDP deflator), real
private consumption, real private investment, net taxes and the nominal interest rate.
Data frequency is quarterly. Needless to say that countries in the study are those for
which quarterly non-interpolated fiscal data are freely available and the relevant time
series start at least in the 80’s. Except from interest rate and inflation, which are in
quarterly rates, all other data are in log levels.
In EMU, data are those used in the estimation of ECB’s Area Wide Model - available
at http://www.eabcn.org/data/awm/index.htm. The interested reader should consult
Fagan et al (2001) for details. The data are treated in a manner completely analogous
to the one described below for the other countries to derive the needed variables.
For the other countries, data come from OECD - Quarterly National counts or Main
Economic Indicators (depending on availability of the particular variable and the sample
given) and fiscal data from country sources, typically the quarterly sector accounts of
each country. When data are not seasonally adjusted by the source, seasonal adjustment
is performed using X12 procedure in Gretl.
In particular, real GDP, real private and government consumption, real total invest-
ment, GDP deflator (and investment deflator when needed) and the nominal interest
rate are taken from the aforementioned OECD sources. The interest rate is a short-run
one; either the overnight rate (typically the Central Bank target rate) or the 3 month
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market rate; the one with the longest sample is used.
OECD reports only government consumption in the sources used. In order to get
the variables used, one needs government investment, total revenues (or at least total
taxes, including social security contributions) and social benefits (or transfers to the
private sector in general). So country sources are used to find these series. Tax data are
deflated using GDP deflator, government investment data are deflated using investment
deflator - then this variable is subtracted from total real investment to give total private
investment, and added to government consumption to give total spending in good and
services.
For Australia, I use tables 5206.3 - Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
Current prices; 5206.15 - General Government Income Account, Current prices; 5206.18
- Taxes, Current prices.
For Canada, I use tables 380-0002 - Gross domestic product (GDP), expenditure-
based, quarterly; and 380-0007 - Sector accounts, all levels of government, quarterly.
For France, I use the quarterly government sector accounts - uses and resources.
There were tables with 2005 base that had much longer time series, but the data there
were not similar to the current tables, so the most recent were used.
For UK, I use the following variables (downloaded from Navidata™ program of ONS):
ANBOQ (transfers), ANBTQ (total taxes), ANLYQ (transfers), NNBFQ (government
investment). The reason is that these series are much longer than other with similar
data.
For US, I use table 3.1 - Government Current Receipts and Expenditures, of National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
Government spending comprises of real total government consumption and invest-
ment. Net taxes, T = Total revenues (personal taxes + taxes on production and imports
+ corporate taxes + social security contributions + other revenues) - social benefits.
However, if total taxes only are available, they are used.
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C.2 Model selection and cointegration analysis
In this appendix I present: a) information selection criteria and autocorrelation tests
used to choose lag length of the VAR, b) info criteria and trace statistics to choose the
cointegration rank of the VECMs and c) unit root tests for the cointegrating relations,
for all countries. I follow Pesaran and Smith (1998) for the choice of VECM. Lu¨tkepohl
(2005) is an excellent choice for the details of model selection in general.
As it is evident in table C.2, the info criteria support VECM models of case 4 in most
cases, usually with one lag (of levels VAR) in the case of HQ and BIC, but typically
two lags are needed to remove autocorrelation from the residuals. However, the data
are quite uninformative with respect to the cointegration rank, as shown in tables C.3
to C.7; trace tests support 3 cointegrating relations in most cases, while the info criteria
also diverge - AIC supports 5 relations in most countries, HQ 4 and BIC 3 relations; the
likelihood is quite flat with respect to differences in cointegration rank.
The cointegrating relations in the specifications are four, as mentioned in the text,
and include one to ensure long-run fiscal solvency (g - t), the great ratios (c - y and ip -
y) and stationarity of the real interest rate (i - pi). In US, these relations appear to be
stationary, according to the unit root tests presented below. Only the real interest rate
can be considered stationary in all cases. Nevertheless, allowing for the following breaks
renders the other cointegrating relations stationary (or very close to) in most cases:
Table C.1: Breaks
Australia 1981:1 - macroeconomic reforms 1993:2 - beginning of inflation targeting
Canada 1981:1 - macroeconomic reforms / moderation 1994:1 - NAFTA
France 1986:1 - common market 1993:1 - Maastricht 1999:1 - Euro
UK 1981:1 - macroeconomic reforms / moderation 1993:1 - Maastricht / Floating exchange rate
EMU 1986:1 - common market 1993:1 - Maastricht 1999:1 - Euro
US 1994:1 - NAFTA
Breaks consist by both a break in level and the trend in the specific date. Table C.5
has the results of the unit root tests of the cointegrating relations. In most cases, the
break in 90’s helps to achieve stationarity in the shorter sample (1981 - 2006), and was
added to the full sample for consistency of the specifications. The many breaks in EMU
and France seem justified given the economic history of the EMU counties - in any case,
they are needed to make the cointegrating relations stationary. Finally, the trends and
the breaks are restricted in the cointegrating relations in the estimated models.
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Table C.7: Minimum info criteria for selecting model and cointegration restrictions -
BIC
Minimum BIC
rank 0 rank 1 rank 2 rank 3 rank 4 rank 5 rank6 rank7
A
u
st
ra
li
a value -59.70 -60.74 -60.94 -61.06 -61.01 -60.88 -60.71 -60.50
lag 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
case 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
C
an
a
d
a value -63.80 -64.45 -64.67 -64.70 -64.64 -64.52 -64.37 -64.21
lag 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
case 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
F
ra
n
ce value -72.52 -73.45 -73.78 -73.99 -74.05 -73.91 -73.70 -73.44
lag 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
case 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2
U
K
value -60.49 -61.36 -61.40 -61.43 -61.34 -61.22 -61.09 -60.91
lag 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
case 3 4 2 2 2 4 4 4
E
M
U value -75.37 -76.56 -76.78 -76.91 -77.00 -76.93 -76.69 -76.40
lag 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
case 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2
U
S
value -67.00 -67.64 -67.64 -67.63 -67.53 -67.40 -67.26 -67.07
lag 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
case 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 4
Bold indicates the minimum.
C.3 Further results not included in main text
In this appendix AR tests for the specification and the overidentifying restrictions, as
well as partial R2 statistics for the strength of identification of each endogenous re-
gressor for all equations are presented. As it is evident in tables C.8 and C.9, almost
all structural estimations are well estimated and in almost all cases instruments are at
least adequate. Importantly, there are almost always good instruments for spending
and taxes in the estimated equations. In the structural equations, invalid instruments
(correlated with structural errors) have been removed, so as to make the Sargan TR2
statistic insignificant1. The Anderson - Rubin (AR)2 statistic tests both specification
1Sargan test is performed by regressing the residuals from the HFUL estimation on the instruments,
just like the IV case; the TR2 statistic from this equation is distributed as χ2q−r, where q is the number of
instruments, r the number of endogenous variables and q - r the number of overidentifying restrictions.
2A common way to present the IV regression model is to write it as a simultaneous equations model:
y = Y β + Xγ + u (I)
Y = XΓ + ZΠ + V (II)
where (I) is the structural equation, (II) is the reduced form equation, y is a T×1 vector with the
endogenous variable, Y is a T×G matrix of endogenous regressors, X is a T×M matrix of exogenous
regressors, Z is a T×K matrix of excluded instruments, u is a T×1 vector with the structural residuals
and V is a T×G matrix of reduced form residuals; β and γ are G×1 and M×1 vectors of structural
coefficients, while Γ and Π are M×G and K×G matrices with the coefficients of reduced form equations;
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and the overidentifying restrictions and it is almost always not significant.
Only in the baseline specification for US and UK we observe rather weak instruments
for g in the output equation; in the case for US the estimated coefficients are insignificant
and close to zero (as in the alternative specification, where g is very well identified) and
setting the estimates at zero does not substantially alter the results in either case; in the
case for UK, the estimates are very close in both cases, despite the dramatically different
quality of instruments across specifications. These two cases illustrate the point made
in Zervas (2014) that instruments with partial R2 of approximately 0.1 are likely to give
usable estimates of the relevant structural coefficient.
C.4 Results of SVARs with short run restrictions
SVAR results (IRFs and multipliers) of the models using a Cholesky decomposition -
variables are ordered as in the main text. In these models, I change the parameter of
the inverse Wishart distribution and use v = 20 (instead of 3 in the main text), because
now the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR is used directly to calculate the impact
responses, and not only in the draw for the reduced form coefficients.
the full matrix of residuals U = [u V ]∼iid(0, Σ), and Σ is not block diagonal; this last assumption makes
u and V correlated, thus creates endogeneity and necessitates the use of an IV procedure for consistent
estimation of β. The Anderson-Rubin statistic (Anderson and Rubin 1949) is a test that β = β0, and is
given by:
AR(β0) =
(y˜ − Y˜ β0)′P (Z˜)(y˜ − Y˜ β0)/K
(y˜ − Y˜ β0)′M(Z˜)(y˜ − Y˜ β0)/(T −K −M)
where y˜, Y˜ and Z˜ are the residuals from projecting y, Y and Z respectively on X ; P(A) is the projection
matrix A(A′A)−1A′ and M(A) is the matrix generating the residuals from the linear projection I−P (A).
This statistic has a χ2K/K distribution or an F(K,T-K-M) under normality.
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C.5 Adding foreign variables
In this section of the Appendix the results from models including Kilian’s (AER 2009)
global activity measure (GAM) are presented; in particular, in the baseline specification
for all countries the current value and two lags of this variable are included, in order to
account for foreign shocks in the model; sample has to start after 1969:1, as GAM is not
available previously. In table C.11 LR test and info criteria for the inclusion of these
exogenous variables in the country models are included.
As it is obvious from this table, information criteria do not favour the addition of
GAM in the model (with the exception of AIC in case of UK and US in the full sample);
LR tests also reject the presence of GAM in the models in the short sample (with the
exception of UK). It seems that in the post 81 period, for some reason, the influence
of foreign variables has fallen. One can rationalize such an effect by e.g. noting that
flexible exchange rates stabilize economies from foreign shocks or that Governments and
Central Banks were free to focus on domestic economy in the latter period - in any case
the turbulent 70’s are excluded from the shorter sample.
In table C.12 spending and tax multipliers for cases3 were LR tests reject the omission
of (current and two lags of) GAM are presented - baseline identification is assumed in
all cases. As it is obvious from the table, all major results (higher spending than tax
multipliers, not particularly high tax multipliers) remain unaffected - in fact, spending
multipliers are higher now in all countries (altough the big increase in the case of US
might indicate some endogeneity issues, since US accounts for a big part of global output,
especially in the first part of the sample).
Estimates of the contemporaneous coefficients of equations for g and t are presented
in tables C.13 and C.14 respectively. As shown in table C.13, as in section 4.3.3 of main
text, spending multipliers are roughly analogous to the strength of countercyclical fiscal
policy, and are bigger now since the estimated coefficients are bigger in absolute value.
In addition, similarly to the results of section 4.4.2, tax multipliers tend to be bigger as
output elasticities rise.
3AUS, CA, UK and US for 1969 - 2006 period and UK only for 1981 - 2006 period.
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Table C.13: Spending equations estimates - GAM included
Country y pi c ip t i
Australia -1.794 0.064 -0.035 -0.125 -0.092 -0.772
Canada -0.952* 0.134 0.091 -0.191 0.048 -0.248
UK 1969-2006 -0.313 -0.128 -0.467* 0.027 0.041 -0.409
UK 1981-2006 -1.579 0.165 -1.780* -0.044 -0.073 2.160
US 1.082 0.648 -2.768** -0.342** 0.002 1.455*
Significance (one sided): at 10% level bold, at 5% level bold and star, at 1%
level bold and double star
Table C.14: Tax equations estimates - GAM included
Country g y pi i
Australia 0.359* 1.617** -1.147** -1.272
Canada 0.061 0.742* -0.120 0.667
UK 1969-2006 0.252* 1.134** 0.067 3.264**
UK 1981-2006 0.142 3.023** -0.987* 0.334
US 0.383 1.828** 2.892** 1.915**
Significance (one sided): at 10% level bold, at 5%
level bold and star, at 1% level bold and double star
